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Editor’s Note
The past year has witnessed an enhanced level of dedication, by many volunteers, to
the sustainability of our parent organization, the International Society for the
Comparative Study of Civilization, as well as to the continuing quality of the
Comparative Civilizations Review. Costs are down, membership is up, our journal is
more popular than it has been in years, the new website continues to amaze, and our
2017 conference was a success.
Costs are down.
1. CCR has achieved a nearly 75% reduction in the cost of printing and distributing
the journal. The savings are available to fund initiatives such as paid speakers
for our annual conference, a first in a long time.
2. Administrative costs have been eliminated thanks to volunteers who have
claimed responsibility for the necessary tasks. Liberated funds were
immediately re-directed to the development of our new website, which is
managed and regularly improved, for half of our previous administrative costs.
Membership is up.
Over the past year our membership has nearly doubled as a result of efforts from our
journal editors, and thanks to the employment of an innovative idea to include
membership benefits with our conference registration. All conference registrants are
now granted a complimentary membership in ISCSC for one year.
Comparative Civilizations Review is more popular than ever.
The Comparative Civilizations Review continues to provide our membership with the
journal they have come to anticipate every six months. Many of our members, as well
as non-members, publish peer-reviewed papers, essays, and book reviews. The journal
has been published continuously since 1979, which is a monumental accomplishment
in the world of scholarly publications run by volunteer organizations. For the past 20
years Dr. Joseph Drew has served as Editor-in-Chief, shaping the journal to reflect the
desires of the membership. He has been publicly thanked, most recently at the 2017
annual conference, by past-presidents of the ISCSC for saving the journal from an early
demise.
The work of the editors encompasses hundreds of hours of volunteer dedication
annually; it is a noteworthy example of the strength of the volunteer efforts that make
the journal, and ISCSC, a successful reality.
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Have you seen the NEW www.iscsc.org?
Our new website is under constant development, and will be replaced by an even newer
edition in the coming months. Improvements on the website now provide a simple and
easy way to renew memberships, subscriptions, buy back issues of CCR, and sign up
and pay for conferences. Credit card processing for our site is provided by PayPal, a
well known and secure website, which also provides the most cost effective payment
processing ISCSC can obtain from any vendor. ISCSC is also able to accept donations
using the same process, through the use of a button on the home page of the site. We
hope you visit the "donate now" button regularly. Donations are tax deductible. Please
consider becoming a life subscriber for $500.
2017 Annual Conference.
The 2017 annual conference was held at the beautiful Marconi Conference Center, just
north of San Francisco, California. Our conference speakers were Eric Trager and
Daniel Chirot.
From the Washington Institute website:
Eric Trager, the Esther K. Wagner Fellow at The Washington Institute, is an expert on
Egyptian politics and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He was in Egypt during the
2011 anti-Mubarak revolts and returns frequently to conduct firsthand interviews with
leaders in Egypt's government, military, political parties, media, and civil society. His
writings have appeared in numerous publications, including the New York Times, Wall
Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, the Atlantic, and the New Republic.
Trager is the author of Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt
in 891 Days (Georgetown University Press, 2016), which chronicles the precipitous rise
to power of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, culminating in the election of President
Mohamed Morsi in 2012, and its sudden demise just a year later. The book also assesses
the current state of Egyptian politics and the prospects for a reemergence of the
Brotherhood.
Dr. Trager has served as an adjunct professor at the University of Pennsylvania, where
his doctoral research focused on Egyptian opposition parties. From 2006-2007, he lived
in Egypt as an Islamic Civilizations Fulbright fellow, where he studied at the American
University in Cairo and received his M.A. in Arabic studies with a concentration in
Islamic studies. He served as a research assistant at The Washington Institute from
2005 to 2006 upon graduation from Harvard University with a degree in government
and language citations in Arabic and Hebrew.
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From the University of Washington Department of Sociology website:
Daniel Chirot, Herbert J. Ellison Professor of International Studies at the University of
Washington, has authored books about social change, ethnic conflict, genocides,
Eastern Europe, and tyranny. He co-authored Why Not Kill Them All? about political
mass murder and is the author of Modern Tyrants (both published by Princeton
University Press).
He has edited or co-edited books on Leninism's decline, on entrepreneurial ethnic
minorities, on ethnopolitical warfare, and on the economic history of Eastern
Europe. Some of his publications have been translated into Chinese, Korean, Swedish,
Finnish, Italian, German, Romanian, Polish, Hungarian, Albanian, and Lithuanian. His
most recent works are textbooks called Contentious Identities: Ethnic, Religious, and
Nationalist Conflicts in Today's World and a completely revised edition of How
Societies Change.
He founded the journal East European Politics and Societies and has received grants
from the John Simon Guggenheim, Rockefeller, and Mellon Foundations and from the
United States State Department. He has consulted for the US Government, the National
Endowment for Democracy, the Ford Foundation, and CARE. In 2004/05 he was a
Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace working on African conflicts. He
has a BA from Harvard and a PhD from Columbia.
What next?
In the past 12 months ISCSC has been working hard to reverse our several year decline
in membership. As a result, our membership has nearly doubled. This increase in
membership greatly enhances any efforts to expand the presence of our academic
society in the international world of comparative civilizational studies.
CCR will continue to produce enjoyable journals twice each year that will feature a
variety of scholars from the widest possible array of disciplines. We will continue to
ensure that these papers are readable, and enjoyable for all members, and prospective
members.
The website will continue to improve, offering more services and simpler solutions for
members.
ISCSC will lead the discussion about comparative civilizational studies and will support
the development of the next generation of scholars who are dedicated to the comparative
study of civilizations.
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Most importantly, this progress will support the mission of ISCSC:
To provide means of cooperation among all persons interested in the advancement
of the comparative study of civilizations.
The ISCSC mission, found on the homepage of our website, makes it clear that ISCSC
is an organization open to all who are interested in civilizational studies. ISCSC and
CCR have a proud history of serving a variety of academic interests. ISCSC encourages
participation from scholars of all types and levels of study. CCR encourages
submissions from professional scholars and academicians, as well as from interested
parties and independent scholars. The membership of ISCSC is proud of this legacy.
ISCSC also recognizes that in the modern world, professional success often requires
specialization, and this may lead to increasingly rigid dogma. In academia this
sometimes equates to a style of writing that is only interesting, or even discernible, to
experts in a field of study. That ISCSC and CCR provide an accessible forum,
encouraging inter-disciplinary research, and big-picture thinking, may be this society’s
most important contribution. In a period when intellectual thought has been eclipsed by
thuggish populism, ISCSC stands as an example of respect for ideas and people,
appreciation of accumulated wisdom, and hope for a future of measured reason and
communal responsibility. By providing this forum, through CCR and our annual
conferences, ISCSC hopes to fulfill the original mission set forth by UNESCO, which
founded the organization in 1961 in Salzburg, Austria.
The Society is committed to the idea that complex civilizational problems can
best be approached through multidisciplinary analyses and debate by scholars
from a variety of fields. The Comparative Civilizations Review, which
welcomes submissions from the Society's members as well as other scholars,
has been published continually since its inaugural issue in 1979.
Michael Palencia-Roth, former President, ISCSC

All of us here at the Comparative Civilizations Review view the future of the society
with optimism. We thank our members for their continuing interest and hours of
volunteer dedication, and welcome all interested readers to visit our website,
www.iscsc.org, and to join the International Society for the Comparative Study of
Civilizations.
Peter Hecht
Managing Editor
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Comments on Toby Huff's "Civilizational Analysis and Some Paths Not
Taken"
Johann P. Arnason

The Weberian legacy
There is much to agree with in Toby Huff's paper, and quite a few things to qualify.
He is, in particular, right to underline the exceptional significance of Max Weber's 1920
Vorbemerkung to collected essays on the sociology of religion. This text outlines a
comparative perspective still relevant to civilizational studies. Given the recurrent
attacks on Weber as a “Eurocentric,” it is worth reiterating the points that most
effectively disprove this claim. Weber's analysis of the path taken by the Occident
focuses on a “concatenation of circumstances,” not on any foundational cultural traits
or inherent developmental logic. The circumstances are, as a closer look at Weber's
comparative studies shows, of multiple kinds: environmental, geopolitical, institutional
and cultural. As for the long-term trends, the main emphasis is on rationalizing
transformations, but not in a way that would reduce or subordinate history to an
evolution of rationality.
The rationalizing processes that brought the Occident to world-historical prominence
unfolded in different spheres of life, with correspondingly specific contexts of meaning
irreducible to rational premises; comparisons of different civilizations deal with varying
combinations of such processes, rather than with contrasts between presence and
absence of rationalizing capacities; the particular combination that prevailed in the West
and shaped its course is not a guarantee of enduring harmony or continuing progress.
Finally, it seems clear that Weber regarded universalistic claims on behalf of Western
ideas or institutions as unfulfilled aspirations (he refers to a “developmental direction
of universal meaning and validity”), but also as assumptions to be tested through
comparative inquiry (that is the implication of “wie wir uns wenigstens gern
vorstellen”).
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All this sets Weber apart from Eurocentrism, at least in the sense of the half-imaginary
monster now under fire from mostly even more imaginary post-colonials of all
countries. But he adopts – and cannot avoid adopting – the position described by the
German historian Wolfgang Reinhard as a reflected and enlightened Eurocentrism.1 As
Weber notes at the beginning, a European scholar setting out to reflect on world history
must start with the European historical experience, and with a more or less articulate
but revisable pre-comprehension of it. The evidence for a certain Euro-centricity during
a given period cannot be ignored; on the other hand, the interpretive and normative
projections developed on that basis must be re-examined and scaled down, but that is a
matter of long-term inquiry rather than a priori denunciations.
That said, it should be added that Weber's perception of the “West as it is” (Huff's
formulation), or was in 1920, calls for some comments. In the context of the times, and,
even more so, in retrospect, the neglected aspects of the West merit closer consideration.
Weber did not take due note of European expansionism, distinctive and sustained
already in the Middle Ages but incomparably more ambitious in intent and global in
scope during the modern era. Nor did he consider the other side of this expansionism,
the possibilities for reinvention of European patterns in new settings, both by overseas
settlers of European origin and by non-European modernizers.
In this connection, his fundamentally misconceived view of Japan should be mentioned.
He saw Japan as a case of imported capitalism and argued that this transfer had been
facilitated by the lack of clearly defined cultural identity (he refers to a religious “tabula
rasa.”) Such interpretations were already at odds with the record of the Meiji period
(1868-1913); this was a clear-cut pattern of reinvention rather than mere import, and
Japan's very distinctive historical legacy left its mark on the results.
Last but not least, Weber wrote the abovementioned text – his most programmatic one
– in the aftermath of a great civilizational disaster, World War I; he lived through this
event as a passionate observer, and it can hardly be doubted that his commitment to the
German cause, critical though it was, limited his grasp of the unprecedentedly selfdestructive turn. There are clear indications that he took a bleak view of post-war
prospects (especially in Politics as a Vocation), but he certainly did not integrate the
experience of the war into his image of the West. Historians now widely agree that
World War I was the inaugural catastrophe of the twentieth century; civilizational
analysts have yet to take the measure of the war and its consequences, including – in
particular – the rise of two major counter-models of modernity, Communism and
Fascism.

1Wolfgang Reinhard, Die Unterwerfung der Welt, München, C.H.Beck 2016, p. 27. This book contains
a very insightful discussion of European expansionism.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20
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Eisenstadt’s contributions
Huff is also right to stress the importance of Benjamin Nelson’s response to Weber’s
work, as well as his moves beyond it. Nelson took the historical genealogy of modern
science further than Weber had ever done; he also opened up new comparative
perspectives. He overestimated Needham’s work on China, but this reference helped
him to identify a cross-civilizational field of inquiry, barely visible in Weber’s work.2
But given Huff’s emphasis on Nelson, it is all the more surprising that he should not
even mention another scholar who also took a civilizational turn in the 1970s (even if
slightly later than Nelson), and was also interested in continuing the Weberian project
with more adequate conceptual tools and on a broader historical basis. Here I cannot
discuss Shmuel N.Eisenstadt’s work in detail,but four crucial contributions to
civilizational analysis should at least be mentioned.
First and foremost, though formulated late in Eisenstadt’s career, his definition of the
civilizational dimension in history and society is, in my opinion, the best of its kind.3 It
highlights the intertwining of world-articulating meanings with social institutions, the
latter understood as frameworks of interaction, arenas of conflict and configurations of
power.
This frame of reference can be understood as an enriched reformulation of Weber’s
well-known statement on ideas and interests, with the institutional channelling of
interests brought into the picture and the world horizon of ideas made more explicit, but
also with stronger emphasis on the involvement of power structures in the application
of the ideas. Within this framework the interrelations of religion and politics are
particularly important; they, more than any other aspect, seem to demarcate the space
for differentiation and development of institutions across the social spectrum. It may
be objected that this idea of the civilizational dimension does not incorporate the
Durkheimian notion of a “family of societies”; but although it is not explicitly
mentioned in the quoted text, Eisenstadt’s comparative studies show that he took it into
account.

2

For a judicious critique of Needham, see Robert Finlay, “China, The West, and World History in
Joseph Needham’s Science and Civilization in China”, Journal of World History 11.2 (2000), 265-303.
3
The key text is S.N. Eisenstadt, “The civilizational dimension in sociological analysis”, in id.,
Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities, v. 1. Leiden, Brill, 2003, pp. 33-56.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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A second contribution, best understood as a specification of the first, is Eisenstadt’s
interpretation of the Axial Age (roughly defined as the eighth to fourth centuries BCE).
This was a period of fundamental cultural change in several civilizational centres.
Earlier authors (notably Karl Jaspers, who coined the term) had dealt with this theme
from the viewpoint of a philosophy of history; Eisenstadt was the first to translate it into
the language of historical sociology. For him, Axial transformations consisted in
interconnected changes to world-views, power structures and socio-cultural elites. That
said, his view of the Axial Age has come under well-founded criticism for being overgeneralized and one-sided, putting too much emphasis on a supposedly uniform
distinction between transcendental and mundane reality.4 It is the definition of a
problematic that remains important, rather than specific theses.
A third point is less developed in Eisenstadt’s writings, but potentially very important.
It is the idea of modernity as a new civilization, centred on a vision of human autonomy.
This core meaning is open to divergent interpretations, applicable in different spheres
of social life, and adaptable to various civilizational legacies. It is the background to
the more widely discussed notion of “multiple modernities”, introduced by Eisenstadt
in the 1990s. The multiplication of modernity is based on variations to its common but
problematic core.
Finally, Eisenstadt’s book on Japan remains one of the most significant works in the
history of civilizational studies, although it has not attracted the discussion that it merits.
Its argument, and notably the claim that Japan represents a non-Axial civilization
surviving into the modern world, is open to fundamental objections; but that also applies
to major texts in the sociological canon, beginning with that arch-classic, The
Elementary Forms of Religious Life.5

4

For the ongoing debate on the Axial Age, see two collections of papers: Johann P. Arnason, S.
N.Eisenstadt and Björn Wittrock (eds.), Axial Civilizations and World History, Leiden, Brill, 2005, and
Robert Bellah and Hans Jonas (eds.), The Axial Age and its Consequences, Cambridge/MA, 2012.
5
For a more extensive discussion of Eisenstadt’s work on Japan, see Johann P. Arnason. Social Theory
and Japanese Experience: The Dual Civilization, London: Kegan Paul International, 1997.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20
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Encounters and transformations
I am in basic agreement with Huff’s views on the outcome of intercivilizational
encounters in the West, the Islamic world and China. But some contextual
qualifications seem appropriate. If we place the two first cases in the context of the
transformation of the modern world, we should rather speak of Western Christendom
(including what we now call Western and Central Europe) than of a single European or
a continuing Western civilization (if we accept Eisenstadt’s model); the early modern
era saw the beginning of a new civilization, more marked in Western Europe than
elsewhere. The question of the “great divergence” between the three post-Roman
constellations – Western Christian, Byzantine and Islamic – is not irrelevant to the issue
of the “great divergence” between the West and the rest.
Recent scholarship clearly suggests a late date for the full geopolitical, geo-economic
and geocultural development of this divergence, but the internal prehistory of that
global shift was a long-term process, cumulative but neither teleological nor
deterministic, and it did not begin in the High Middle Ages. Trends and patterns of the
early medieval period contributed to the specific historical path of Western
Christendom. In particular, certain divisions within the religio-political complex had a
significant end enduring impact. Most importantly, the problematic and for a long time
conflictual relationship between empire and papacy became one of the most formative
factors in medieval history (the close alliance forged under the early Carolingians was
very short-lived).
The tension between these religious and political centres (both best understood as
mixtures of the sacred and the secular) was a key part of the background to the flowering
of the High Middle Ages; as the Norwegian medievalist Leidulf Melve has shown, the
most acute phase (the so-called investiture controversy of the eleventh and early twelfth
centuries) gave rise to a public sphere, a phenomenon previously unknown to the
medieval world.6 This development paved the way for the invention of universities.
But there were further divisions on both sides. In the political sphere, the imperial
centre – restored by the Carolingians in the late eighth century - coexisted on varying
terms with territorial kingdoms. The empire never exercised the kind of civilizationwide authority that the papacy managed to acquire, but it remained one of the defining
institutions of Western Christendom, it tried –intermittently – to win more power to
match its status, and when the territorial kingdoms gained strength, one of the
legitimizing devices used by their rulers was to claim imperial dignity within their
realms.

6

Leidulf Melve, Inventing the Public Sphere.The Public Debate During the Investiture Contest
(c.1030-1122), Leiden and Boston, Brill 2007.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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The surviving Holy Roman Empire became the historical nucleus of Central Europe,
whereas territorial monarchies predominated in Western Europe and shaped its path to
modernity. Finally, the division between the secular clergy and the monasteries was a
key feature of Western Christian religious culture. It enabled the monasteries to become
protagonists of reform.
Comparison with the other post-Roman constellations is needed, but it seems clear that
traditional views on Byzantine and Islamic patterns have proved inadequate. Neither
the “caesaropapism” long attributed to the Byzantine empire, nor the fusion of religion
and politics thought to be characteristic of Islam from the outset, can be substantiated.7
A more nuanced comparative approach should probably allow for a combination of
partial similarities and a set of deflecting factors.
As for the takeoff during and after the High Middle Ages, there is no doubt about the
importance of the legal revolution. But it is hardly possible to isolate it as the single
decisive factor. The complexity of the context in which it occurred is well described
by one of the most distinguished contemporary medievalists: “the strength of local,
cellular politics, plus the extension of literate practices to ever-wider social groups, plus
a continuing high-equilibrium economic system, plus a newly intrusive state, made
possible by taxation, communication and, once again, literacy, helped to create political
systems across Europe which allowed engagement, nearly everywhere. This marks the
last century of the Middle Ages, not the supposedly late medieval features which mark
so many textbooks: crisis, or anxiety, or the Renaissance, or a sense that the continent
was, somehow, waiting for the Reformation and European global conquest.”8
Constraints of time and space prevent me from discussing the Islamic and Chinese
worlds at any length. But one brief remark on each may be ventured. Islam was, as
recent scholarship has made clearer than before, the product of a highly conflictual
inter-civilizational constellation: the encounter between Sassanid Persia, two Christian
empires (the East Roman and the Axumite), the elusive but clearly important South
Arabian civilization, and Judaism, the last-named with strong indigenous footholds on
the Arabian peninsula. During the rest of the “middle millennium,”9 500-1500 CE, the
Islamic world experienced more varied encounters across the Afro-Eurasian macroregion than any other civilization of the times. It is nevertheless clear that these contacts
did not translate into anything on the scale of the changes unfolding in Western
Christendom, where encounters combined with internal dynamics to trigger the
processes mentioned above.

7

For a decisive critique of the caesaropapist thesis, see Gilbert Dagron, Emperor and Priest. The
Imperial Office in Byzantium,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2007.
8
Chris Wickham, Medieval Europe, New Haven-London, Yale University Press 2016, p.256-257.
9
This expression is used by the editors of the new Cambridge World History.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20

14

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

11

Some of the Islamic encounters may even have limited the effects of others. Did the
resurgence of Persian culture from the tenth century onwards play a role in
marginalizing Greek influences? There seems to be room for further discussion of that
question. In any case, the character of what Marshall Hodgson called the “middle
periods“ of Islamic history (950-1500) remains controversial. It is no doubt legitimate
to speak of decline in some fields, but the ongoing re-evaluation of this phase
(beginning with Marshall Hodgson’s classic work, and continued by various recent
authors) casts doubt on the notion of all-round decline or regression. A balanced
judgment will have to take multiple trends into account, e.g. the development of Sufi
orders and innovations in state formation. Is the affinity with the scientific revolution
the only criterion for a comparative history of philosophy? I do not think so. And what
about Ibn Khaldūn, the most genuine founding father of historical sociology?
As for China, I think it is now a well-established fact that the reception of Christianity
and the early modern scientific revolution was obstructed by an entrenched world-view
(in this context, the work of Jacques Gernet deserves particular mention).10 The
decomposition of the Chinese tradition began later, and was closely linked to
geopolitical setbacks.11 This does not mean that the cultural crisis was only a by-product
of the political one. It opened up a space for extensive and diversified rethinking of the
tradition; it is now safe to say that the Marxist-Leninist conversion was a less definitive
turn than it seemed at the time. Comparative studies of European and Chinese traditions
still have a long way to go. Huff’s points about Chinese law seem valid, as far as they
go, but how decisive are they? A more contextual analysis of Chinese statecraft might
reveal some counterbalancing factors. And the question of “laws of nature” in Chinese
thought remains a matter for debate. In 1957, Derk Bodde took issue with Joseph
Needham on this point, arguing that while Chinese thought had undoubtedly moved in
a direction quite different from European conceptions of law-governed nature, there
was some evidence of Chinese thinkers referring to natural regularities in terms not very
different from the idea of laws.12 This would, in other words, be a matter of degree,
overall emphasis and long-term direction, rather than a stark contrast between presence
and absence. To judge from what I have read on the subject (including, not least,
writings of Christoph Harbsmeier), this position is still plausible.

10

Jacques Gernet, Chine et christianisme, Paris, Gallimard, 1990.
See the very insightful essay by Mark Elvin,“How did the cracks open? The origins of the subversion
of China’s late traditional culture by the West”, Thesis Eleven 57 (1999), 1-16.
12
Derk Bodde,“Evidence for ‘laws of nature’ in Chinese thought,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,
20:3-4 (1957), 709-727. This text includes an exchange with Needham.
11
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Reply to Johann Arnason’s Comments
Toby Huff
It is an honor to have the comments of Johann Arnason on my paper. He has raised
many issues and important questions. No doubt we will disagree of some minor issues
but agree on major ones and I appreciate this opportunity to discuss matters vital to
civilizational analysis. There are more issues here than I can address in our limited
space, so I shall confine my reply to what I see as the most important of the questions
raised.
I agree with Arnason’s comments on Max Weber’s legacy and his overlooking of
imperialist consequences of Europe’s ascendancy. Likewise, his comments on
Eurocentric issues and the now excessive attacks on Weber seem to me justly put. No
doubt Weber’s understanding of Japan was deficient and given his sparse comments on
Japan and his extraordinary knowledge of many other cultures and civilizations, his
missteps on Japan seem forgivable.
I shall return, however, to his reference to “normative projections” that most likely refer
to Weber’s notion of “world-historical” consequences. I will also return to the question
of why I put so much stress on the unfolding of the European legal revolution in the late
medieval period.
A basic difference between us is the role of evidence versus theory in doing
civilizational analysis. I believe one should start with a reasonably clear problem and
then dig into the empirical/historical evidence. Eisenstadt’s approach seems to start at
the other pole. His paper cited by Arnason is an entirely theoretical and vast survey,
impressive as it is, that covers huge sweeps of time and space (from 500 BC to about
100 AD, and even later “modern” developments), suggesting all sorts of
developments, structurations and “crystallizations.” But the paper does not cite a
single historical or sociological study that could support his many generalizations
during the Axial Age.13 So it should not be surprising that my comparison of three
civilizational encounters (the West, Islam, China), based as it is on decades of trying
to find and master the best historical sources, finds little help in what Eisenstadt has
written.

13

Shmuel Eisenstadt,” The Civilizational Dimension in Sociological Analysis,” Thesis Eleven 62
(2000): pp. 1-21.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20

16

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

13

A perplexing feature of the Eisenstadt discussion is the fact that it proceeds with an
unclear conception of civilizational analysis that constantly verges back-and-forth
between the putative civilizational complexes (ancient Greece, Israel, China,
Buddhism, Hinduism, etc.) and references to “societies.” It is pretty much agreed
among sociologist that “societies” are social groups with distinct boundaries established
by their governments and economies. Having a formal governmental structure is the
defining characteristic of societies in this sense. In my understanding civilizations are
much larger units of two or more societies (or peoples) as articulated by
Durkheim/Mauss and Nelson14. This concept is a breakthrough in thinking about
civilizations as trans-national complexes. Such entities often have unclear boundaries
because they generally are voluntary entities, not empires or coercive entities (though
this could happen). This gets us to what it is that allows cultural phenomena to grow
and transcend national boundaries. The Durkheim/Mauss problematic asks: what is the
nature of this “coefficient of expansion”15 that some cultural phenomena have that
allows them to become translocal if not universal? Eisenstadt does not at all address
this question of how and why civilizational phenomena are trans-societal.
Eisenstadt does make an interesting suggestion that the “core” idea behind the concept
of “civilization” is an “ontological or cosmological vision.”16 He suggests that such
visions generally involve sacred, cosmological references and often entail tensions with
the mundane world. But does this help us understand the fundamental differences in
orientation between the Greek/Hellenic complex, Islamic civilization, Western and
Chinese civilizations?
Of course, one could improve on my description of the three encounters (between the
West, Islam, and China) but for the purpose of why the three took such different
approaches to naturalistic inquiry, it is far more useful to consider their alternative
philosophies of nature (which may have ontological references). These somewhat
metaphysical notions are more easily described and there is considerable literature on
the subject.
Thus, the ancient Greeks created a philosophy of nature (later adopted by Europeans)
that suggested that the natural world is a lawful, autonomous order, probably made up
of small particles, and a natural world that human beings can know and explain with
the aid of reason and logic.17

14

Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, "Note on the Notion of Civilization,” Social Research vol. 38,
no. 4 (1971): 809-813; translated by Benjamin Nelson.
15
Ibid.., p. 811.
16
Eisenstadt, ibid., p. 2.
17
This and the following paragraphs draw from the third revised edition of my book, The Rise of Early
Modern Science: Islam, China and the West (Cambridge University Press, third edition, forthcoming,
2017)
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In contrast, the Islamic philosophy of nature denied such rational-causal principles,
insisting instead that God is always in control, and that humankind can only know what
God enables or permits one to know.18 This is, of course, only one part of the story, as
my paper shows. Moreover, even with the aid of all the Greek-into-Arabic translations
of the core Greek scientific and philosophical texts, the Muslims did not institutionalize
the Greek modes of inquiry. Consequently, there was early success that soon dissipated.
The classic Chinese philosophy of nature entailed the polarities of yang/yin, the five
elements (water, wood, fire, earth, and metal) and the elusive energy called Chi. Here
no causal laws operate, there is no push-pull mechanism(s) operative. There is also a
notion of cyclical change over long periods of yang and then yin domination in timeless
cycles. In the long run (from ancient times to the 20th Century) no group of scholars
emerged who could or would overthrow that Confucian worldview (even with the help
of the European missionaries and thousands of translated books19). In a word, we can
understand these three intercivilizational encounters without resorting to Eisenstadt’s
loftier locutions such as “world-articulating meanings” and so on. From my limited
reading on the subject, I do not know of useful discussions of “multiple modernities”
that also take into account what I see as the fundamental grounding of European
civilization and its “modernity,” to which I shall return.20
Although I have difficulty with Chris Wickham’s precise time-line in the long citation
from his work, it strikes me that the general thrust of his statement endorses the multiple
factor and historical approach that I set out in the Epilogue to Intellectual Curiosity and
the Scientific Revolution.
Moreover, whatever point one wants to make with regard to the Holy Roman Empire
and its role in Central and Eastern Europe, the fact is that like all the other territorial
entities in Europe of the time, it adopted and operated with the aid of the ius commune,
the common law of Europe.21 This was the new and revised legal system that the
canonists and Romanists fashioned as one part of what I have called the legal revolution
of the long 12th century.
18

This is the well-known Islamic philosophy of occasionalism also discussed in The Rise of Early
Modern Science.
19
This I discussed in some detail in Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution. A Global
Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chapter 4.
20
This idea was advanced by S N. Eisenstadt: “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129 #1 (2000): 1-29.
Eisenstadt deserves credit for advancing this idea, but by claiming that the new modernity was an 18th
century phenomenon with its “first expansion” in the Americas (p. 13) seems to me off the mark. I shall
return to this.
21
Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History (New York; Cambridge University Press, 1999);
Michael Hoeltlich and Jasonne M. Grabler, "The Establishment of Normative Legal texts. The
Beginning of the Ius Commune," pp. 1-21 in The History of Medieval Canon Law in the Classical
Period, 1140- 1234, edited by William Hartmann (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of American
Press, 2008).
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Moreover, this new Romano-canonical system was taught in universities across Europe.
As a result, advocates across the Continent (and England) had to know both the
Ecclesiastical and civilian version of canon law, both based on the same legal principles.
This they had to do because they might have to try a case in an Ecclesiastical court.
This new legal system, above all other cultural factors, is what gave “Europe as a
civilization” its center and “framework of interacting” in all sorts of encounters and
transactions, that is, its modus operandi. In this sense, I am not “isolating” a single
factor but pointing to the multiple revolutions in institutional arrangements that gave
Europe an entirely new footing for virtually every aspect of political, economic, and
educational life. As I stressed in the first part of my Plenary paper, the European legal
revolution of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries laid the foundations for what we now
recognize as modern political institutions.22 These include due process of law, the
notion of elective representation in all forms of corporate bodies, the very idea of legally
autonomous organizations, and not least of all, legally autonomous professional
associations (of doctors and lawyers), charitable organizations, universities, as well as
cities and towns. All of these innovations, including the rise of parliamentary
governance, arose out of medieval canon law and contributed to the stability of
economic enterprises and made local self-government possible. Each of these
developments was part of the emergence of constitutionalism as understood in the
Western world.
Of course, the emergence of the universities created an institutional space for relatively
undisturbed public discourse on all sorts of subjects, most importantly by
institutionalizing the study of the (Greek-fashioned) natural sciences and incubating
modern science. There were further discussions within the universities and no doubt
they reverberated back on other political, economic, and political issues.
If, à la Eisenstadt, one would prefer to call this a “new civilization,” I would not greatly
object. I would insist, however, that this crystallization occurred long before the 17th
century and the Reformation, and that it produced the first real fusion of Greek
philosophy, Roman law, and Christianity, a position articulated by Ben Nelson and
many other historically minded scholars.23 That would also, in my view, place the title,
the “Axial” shift in the “long 12th century,” whether one wants to call it a “new”
Christian civilization or plainly, European civilization. That fusion was unique and was
soon exported to the U.S and “Europe overseas.”

22

Huff, “Europe as a Civilization: The Revolution of the Middle Ages and the Rise of the
Universities,” CCR #69 (2013); 65-86.
23
Nelson, On the Roads to Modernity. Conscience and Civilizations, edited by Toby E. Huff (Lanham,
Md: 1981; reprinted 2012), pp. 99-101; and, among others, Edward Grant, God and Reason in the
Middle Ages (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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Furthermore, that spiritual, legal, scientific complex is in my mind, at the heart of the
raging debates today about the rise or “decline” of “the West.” Whatever its fate, that
cluster of revolutions centered on the legal domain suggested above has no counterpart
in Islamic or Chinese civilization.24
One can explore the early history of Islam and influences on its formation as much as
one would like (as Patricia Crone25 and others have done), but the fact remains that the
canonical texts centered on the Quran and the hadith collections came to be the central
core of Islamic civilization, and there was no influence of the Roman Civil law. The
religious scholars (the ulama) worked assiduously to preserve and protect that central
legacy, rooted in faith, with the result that there were no revolutions (or reformations)
in religious thought, and no breakthroughs in theology or law. There is no Islamic Peter
Abelard, Thomas Aquinas or other intellectual innovators equivalent to those in
Western philosophy or theology. There were no innovative legal scholars parallel to
Gratian, Tancred, or Durand in Western Europe. Beyond that, and with more details
provided in Intellectual Curiosity, the fact remains that there was no Copernicus,
Galileo, Tycho Brahe, or Kepler in the history of Arabic-Islamic science.
Arnason also raises the question of how significant law and legal structures were in
China, so I offer this short account. Commentators on China who accent the “Chinese
bureaucracy” often forget to note that throughout the empire from before the Sung
dynasty (960-1279) throughout the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), the whole regime was
based on a legal code borrowed from earlier dynasties. The earlier Tang and Ming
codes were simply restated with additions and put in place without basic
modification.26 That code was based on a complex set of punishments and mitigations
and many hidden assumptions. The Code lacked a section detailing due process so
that the actions of the magistrates and all others followed their own whim, with no
effort to compile formal case records in order to achieve uniformity of outcome. This
also meant that there were no zones of autonomy, no independent associations of
doctors or lawyers (lawyers did not exist), nor were there any independent scholars
who could decide philosophical and educational issues as European scholars did. All
that was controlled by a small elite of official officeholders.

24

I have explored these comparative questions in several chapters in the third edition of my Rise of
Early Modern Science. Whether we could say that Japan experienced such revolutions of thought and
institutional arrangement, I leave to specialists on Japan to determine.
25
Patricia Crone, God’s Rule: Government and Islam. Six Centuries of Medieval Political Thought.
(New York. Columbia University Press, 2005).
26
The Great Ming Code, translated by Jiang Yonglin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013).
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During various periods of time it was unlawful (and hence backed by punishments) to
own books on mathematics or astronomy while astronomical observation was strictly
controlled and forbidden outside the royal aegis. Likewise owning or using a telescope
was regulated by royal decree when the devices arrived in the 17th century.
Given that there were no law schools and there was no independent body of legal
scholars, there was little chance for legal evolution or for advanced legal thought. With
this background in mind, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the Chinese had
anything like the Western legal system of due process that I mentioned earlier (and have
discussed in more detail elsewhere). There were no rights for legal challenge, no strict
procedures for getting a case heard by the magistrate who was in effect a person with
only “on-the-job training.” Moreover, he had a variety of options that would allow him
to ignore any petition that he did not want to deal with, or simply send it back to the
lineage elders for resolution.27
Because of this state of affairs in which the Emperor’s decree was law (on top of the
official legal code), and with the total absence of a notion of legal autonomy, all sorts
of activities were proscribed. Here I shall just mention the innocuous practice of official
examination of deceased bodies that were suspected of foul play. Postmortems as such
were conducted “by the book” by two novices: the magistrate who had no medical
training, and the ostensor, a lowly self-trained, often illiterate person who might have
been a barber. The book was called the Washing Away of Wrongs, dating from the 12th
century and by decree could not be changed in any detail all the way to the early 19th
century. The book contains diagrams of mortal and non-mortal places of wounds on
the body and which had to be identified by the two officials as they examined the corpse.
This was not a proper autopsy (such as Europeans had been carrying out since the 13th
century) and in this case without the aid of a properly trained physician, simply followed
the book with the ostensor calling out information that he extracted from observing the
body to the magistrate who recorded it on the form. It has been observed, however, that
even when more informed medical examiners discovered anomalies in the corpses they
studied, they were not allowed to make any changes to the official manual.28

27

Among many others, see Melissa Macauley, “Civil and Uncivil Disputes in Southeastern Coastal
China, 1728- 1820,” in Civil Justice in Qing and Republican China, edited by Kathryn Bernhardt and
Philip Huang, pp. 85-121 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); and idem,
Social Power and Legal Culture. Litigation Masters in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford
University Press,1998). I discuss the issues further in Chapter 7 in the new edition The Rise of Early
Modern Science.
28
Pierre-étienne Will, “Developing Forensic Knowledge Through Cases in the Qing Dynasty,” in
Thinking with Cases, In Thinking with Cases, edited by Charlotte Furth, Judith T. Zeitlin, Judith T., and
Ping-chen Hsiung, pp. 62-100. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007.
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In this way the rigidities of the Ming and Qing legal codes prevented learning in this
area of human anatomy, which, one would think, had no political implications, but
significant benefits for human well-being if subordinates had any leeway to speak and
record their new findings. Clearly there were many inhibitive effects of the Chinese
legal code on the advance of science and economic activity.
Perhaps there are alternative “modernities” that might be designated as modernity1,
modernity2, and so on. There is a problem, however, if we are following Eisenstadt’s
model. That is, just like the sociologists against whom he is arguing as he attempts to
forge the idea of multiple modernities, Eisenstadt adopts a socio-psychological
approach which means that he looks at personality characteristics not societal
characteristics.29 He talks about conceptions of “human agency,” and “reflexivity”
instead of identifying societal (and/or civilizational) structures and institutions. If,
however, one thinks about the deep roots of Western culture and civilization and the
unique institutions it invented, then one arrives the following suggestion.
In the first type of modernity I would place the presence of a public sphere (including
the right to assembly), the unfettered pursuit of science, a free press, a clear sense of
due process of law buttressed by articulated rules (not just conventions), the presence
of an independent legal profession, parliamentary democracy and constitutionalism,
along with legally autonomous commercial enterprises buttressed by secure property
rights. The seeds of all these ideas and institutions were planted long before the
Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Americas.
These I think are the likely “normative” implications that would flow from a
Weberian civilizational analytic. It would be most fascinating to see how a denizen of
another culture or civilization would construct an alternative modernity (modernity2).
And what kind of Westerners would choose it?

29

The examples of supposed unilinear development on the roads to modernity that Eisenstadt cites are:
Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1958); and Alex Inkeles,
Becoming Modern: Individual Changes in Six Developing Countries (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard
University Press,1974). As much as I admire the work of Lerner and Inkeles, it has to be said that their
work is entirely ahistorical insofar as it does not reflect upon the cultural and historical foundations of
Western modernity as it unfolded far earlier than the Enlightenment. But that was not their problematic.
Ben Nelson was well-aware of this problem in Inkeles’ work
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The Intrigue of Paradigmatic Similarity: Leibniz and China
Yu Liu
In a long letter written in the last year of his life, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (16461716) notably defended the philosophical and religious conviction of China from some
Catholic missionaries. “[Far] from being blameworthy,” he proclaimed, the Chinese
“merit praise for their idea of things being created by their natural propensity and by a
pre-established harmony.”1 Because of his apparent endorsement of Chinese belief in
terms of his well-known credo, Leibniz has been viewed as “the only major philosopher
of the period to hold that the Chinese possessed a spiritualistic doctrine compatible in
some of its aspects with Christianity,”2 but he has also often been seen at the same time
as someone whose “ecumenism was not purchased at the expense of European or
Christian chauvinism.”3 “Leibniz’s standard argument,” as Roger Ariew says
representatively, “was that a particular aspect of the Chinese religion was compatible
with his own thought—and was therefore compatible with Christianity.”4
The cosmology of China is indeed strikingly similar to the metaphysics of Leibniz, but
precisely where the two resemble each other, the former is unmistakably different from
Christianity. Scholars of Leibniz have so far generally taken it for granted that he was
ideologically aligned with Christianity, but his paradigmatic similarity to China should
alert us of a surprisingly different story. Leibniz was indisputably “the greatest of the
seventeenth century sinophiles”5 and key Chinese cosmological ideas were introduced
to Europe long before he formulated his worldview. Together, these two facts can help
us decide whether he “owes to Chinese organic naturalism … a deeply important
stimulus”6 or his doctrinal affinity with China resulted merely from “[the] spontaneous
generation of similar ideas in cultures removed in time and distance from one another.”7

1

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese,” in Writings on China,
trans. Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1994), 93.
2
Donald F. Lach, “Leibniz and China,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 6 (1945): 436-455, 454.
3
Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, “The Pre-established Harmony between Leibniz and Chinese
Thought,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 42 (1981): 253-267, 261.
4
Roger Ariew, “G.W. Leibniz, Life and Works,” in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas
Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 18-42, 37.
5
Arnold H. Rowbotham, “The Impact of Confucianism on 17th century Europe,” in The Far Eastern
Quarterly, 4 (1944-45), 224-42, 235.
6
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956),
II.504-505.
7
David E. Mungello, Leibniz and Confucianism: The Search for Accord (Honolulu: The University Press
of Hawaii, 1977), 15.
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The Metaphysics of Leibniz
As revealed by his long 1716 letter to Nicholas Remond de Montmart who incidentally
was also the confidential recipient in 1714 of The Monadology or the definitive
statement of his final philosophy, what is innovative and significant about the
metaphysics of Leibniz is the idea of things being created by their innate capacity or a
pre-established harmony which he most aptly used in his profoundly insightful and
positive interpretation of Chinese cosmology. Away from his discussions of China,
however, he largely buried this distinctive innovation under a totalizing conceptual
framework known as the best possible world. “[The] more we are enlightened and
informed in regard to the works of God,” as he alluded in 1686 to this all-encompassing
matrix of ideas early in Discourse on Metaphysics, which constituted the first
systematic pronouncement of his then still evolving mature philosophy, “the more will
we be disposed to find them excellent and conforming entirely to that which we might
desire.”8 “[Among] all the possible plans of the universe there is one better than all the
rest,” as he more palpably touched on this overarching panoramic vision in 1710 in The
Theodicy, which was the only one of his main philosophical works published in his
lifetime, “and … God has not failed to choose it.”9 “[In] creating the universe,” as he
most clearly said in 1714 in “The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason”
which, no less than The Monadology, embodied his final philosophical manifesto,
“[God] has chosen the best possible plan, in which there is the greatest variety together
with the greatest order; the best arranged ground, place, time; the most results produced
in the most simple ways; the most of power, knowledge, happiness and goodness in the
creatures that the universe could permit.”10
With God being characterized prominently as the raison d'être of everything and with
the anthropomorphized divine personage being imagined implicitly as all powerful and
all beneficent, the world simply could not have been other than the best of all possible
alternatives. Even though the undeniable presence of evil made it easy in the 18th
century for Voltaire (1694-1778) to satirize in Candide the theocentric optimism of
Leibniz, his all-embracing metaphysical frame of reference centered on a supernatural
agent is, as Nicholas Jolley astutely points out, “not the complacent nonsense that it
appears to be.”11 If anything, its pedigree started long before Leibniz.

8

Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], in Leibniz: Selections, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 291.
9
Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil, trans.
E.M. Huggard (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), 268.
10
Leibniz, “The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason” [1714],” in Leibniz: Selections,
528.
11
Nicholas Jolley, “Introduction,” in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, 1-17, 1.
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It is Plato (427 BCE-347 BCE) who in Timaeus first described the world as emerging
miraculously out of chaotic disorder at the hands of a reformist deity who “put
intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest
work in the order of nature.”12 Since the divine artificer “was good, and … being free
from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as possible,” as the
eponymous hero of Plato’s work explained it to Socrates, “the world became a living
soul and truly rational through the providence of God.”13
Even though in The Republic, The Symposium, and other works Plato had unequivocally
disparaged the phenomenal world of becoming as transient, ever-changing, and illusive
and glorified the noumenal world of being in contrast as eternal, constant, and true, he
surprisingly moderated the antithetical evaluation of his dualistic vision momentarily
in Timaeus via what Arthur O. Lovejoy perceptively calls “a bold logical inversion”14
by binding up the ideal with the real as near equivalences in a tight and inseparable
relationship of cause and effect.
On the basis of the Platonic Good and the related principle of plenitude explaining the
rich and divergent emanation of the multifarious from the originally singular one,
Aristotle (384BC-322BC) built his theory of four causalities and his hierarchically
structured and downwardly graded great chain of being (scala naturae). After being
synthesized with Stoicism by Plotinus (204-270), this part of European humanist
antiquity was eventually absorbed into the rationalist theology of European
scholasticism. The Platonic and Neo-Platonic myth of the world as being created or
recreated from disorder to order by a highly artistically-minded supernatural agent was
noticeably different from the doctrinal belief of Judeo-Christianity which involved the
divine seven-day creation of the world out of nothing, the history of humanity
descending from Adam and Eve, and the cosmic warfare of Christ against Satan.
However, the former nevertheless provided a most useful complementary service for
the latter with the theocentric orientation of its logic and the easy amenability of its
cosmological claims to monotheism. In Candide, Voltaire singled out Leibniz for
attack, but the best possible world scenario was never the idiosyncratic vagary of any
individual person. When poking fun at Leibniz, Voltaire was therefore consciously
taking to task the entire theistic heritage of Europe.

12

Plato, Timaeus, in Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Barnes & Noble,
2007), 30.
13
Plato, Timaeus, 29 and 30.
14
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1960), 49.
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As part of his Lutheran upbringing, Leibniz was introduced to the usual theocentric
tradition of European philosophy and religion when he started attending one of his
hometown Leipzig’s two main Latin schools at the age of seven. The strictly
propaedeutic mission of that educational establishment meant no special facility in or
encouragement to any in-depth study of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, or music, but
the emphasis of the curriculum on grammar (Latin and Greek), rhetoric, and logic
helped as much to seed a lifelong habit of seeing things theistically by reference to a
singular original cause as to provide him with the necessary linguistic tools for learning
about those ancient European writers who were most exemplary in connecting rational
thinking with theism.
Even before his formal schooling, he had already been guided informally into the
European world of learning centered on God by his father Friedrich Leubnitz (15971652) who was a professor of moral philosophy at the University of Leipzig and who
had great expectations for his precocious son. Leibniz lost his father when he was only
six years old, but one year after his father’s death, he gained free access to the family
library which, beyond the philosophical books of his father and the legal books of his
maternal grandfather Wilhelm Schmuch (1575-1634), included a great deal of
ideologically indiscriminate material left behind by Bartholomäus Voigt, father of his
father’s second wife Dorothea Voigt (?-1643) and a bookseller and publisher in Leipzig.
Unsupervised and unstructured, his entirely fortuitous exploration of writers, often at
doctrinal variance with each other, enabled him to mythologize himself later as an
autodidact and to evolve his characteristic eclecticism in theistic thinking.
At the University of Leipzig and long afterwards, Leibniz subsequently continued his
intellectual apprenticeship in the theocentric tradition of European philosophy and
religion. From writers of European antiquity and their Renaissance revival, he
progressed in time to scholastic philosophy and theology and their revisions in the
Reformation, ending finally with the brave new ideas of the modern period. In turn he
was exhilarated, but the sequentially late attraction of the new complicated rather than
erased his earlier attachment to the old. During his fateful stay in Paris from 1672 to
1676, for instance, the geometrically phrased new teaching of René Descartes (15961650) decisively inspired his intense interest in mathematics and logic while helping to
wean him from the heavily Aristotelian scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
and from the materialist philosophy of Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679).
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No matter how he was then captivated by the mechanistic worldview of Cartesianism,
however, he never lost his affection for the old cosmology of Platonism and NeoPlatonism. With the God-centered theory of the best possible world, he doubtlessly
wished to accommodate as much the past and the present of his formative influences as
the ancients and the moderns of his intellectual heritage. However, as will be shown
later, in relation to his true metaphysical innovation, his attempt at such an
accommodation within the existing parameters of European philosophy and religion
worked out mostly as an elaborate cover.
The Reconciliation of the Old and the New
Leibniz was born two years before the end of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).
Confined initially to a religiously instigated regional revolt within the Holy Roman
Empire, the hostilities had quickly spilled over into a full-blown pan-European conflict,
embroiling most of the major European powers and inflicting unprecedented pain and
devastation from protracted military violence and collateral famines and diseases. As
much as the unusual exposure to doctrinal diversity in his father’s library at a young
and impressionable age and the subsequent influence of teachers at the University of
Leipzig such as Jakob Thomasius (1622-1684) who strove to synthesize the
scholastically mediated classical philosophy with the fundamental tenets of Lutheran
theology, the historical circumstance of Leibniz’s birth in a world debilitatingly
fragmented but yearning for unity and peace contributed to the development of his
characteristic inclination for open-minded reconciliation and eclecticism.
Even in his youth, as a recent biographer of him points out, he already saw it as the
mission of his life “to put the pieces together to achieve a universal synthesis for the
glory of God and the happiness of mankind.”15 When he came to formulate his mature
philosophy later in life, it was not surprising that he spared no effort in showing off his
continuing desire in this direction and in making it perceived by others as what he was
doing.
Within his theocentric theory of the best possible world, he managed to make peace
between writers who were objectionable to each other. “[The] writings of distinguished
men of ancient as of modern times,” as he wrote in 1695 in Specimen Dynamicum,
“apart from their too sharp polemics against opposing thinkers, contain for the most
part much that is true and good and what well deserves to be excerpted and deposited
in the common treasury of knowledge.”16 For his ostensible purpose of intellectual and
ideological irenicism, he was particularly interested in discovering common ground
between the ancients and the moderns of his European heritage.
15
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Both inspired and emboldened by revolutionary changes in Post-Renaissance
astronomy and physics, the mathematically based new teaching of Descartes had
daringly challenged the scholastically filtered old thinking of European antiquity by
demanding to explain everything in terms of the sequential logic of causal relations. In
its turn, it had opened itself to attacks from defenders of the old because of its suspected
tendency to atheist materialism and its apparent inability to deal with issues such as the
coordination of the body and the soul. Rather than taking sides in the heated dispute,
Leibniz went between the old and the new. “It appears more and more clear that
although all the particular phenomena of nature can be explained mathematically or
mechanically by those who understand them,” as he said in Discourse on Metaphysics,
“yet nevertheless, the general principles of corporeal nature and even of mechanics are
metaphysical rather than geometric, and belong rather to certain indivisible forms or
natures as the causes of the appearances, than to the corporeal mass or to extension.”17
Here as elsewhere, the logical and rhetorical maneuver of Leibniz’s argument was, first
of all, to expose the deficiency of the moderns so as to cut down to size their proud
achievement, but the very fact of him attempting this already implied significant prior
recognition of what the moderns had claimed for themselves. In the same complex way,
Leibniz defended the honor of the ancients so as to direct attention to their enduring
usefulness, but in the study of nature he conspicuously limited this usefulness to
metaphysics and this limitation could not but give implicit validation to some of the
ideological challenges which the ancients had received from the moderns.
At once critical and appreciative though in different ways, Leibniz never shied away
from differences between the old and the new of his intellectual inheritance, but he
deftly chose to construe the differences as indicating a relationship of complement
rather than irreconcilable conflict or contradiction. So far as he could see, the moderns
were preoccupied with the mechanical explanation of specific natural phenomena or the
study of efficient causes, while the ancients were concerned with the metaphysical
understanding of underlying reasons or the consideration of final causes. “Both
explanations are good;” as he said conciliatorily in Discourse on Metaphysics, “both
are useful not only for the admiring of the work of a great artificer, but also for the
discovery of useful facts in physics and medicine.”18
Through a sort of division of labor or a conceptual sleight of hand, Leibniz brought the
ancients and the moderns together under his theocentric canopy of the best possible
world. Rather than embodying something innovative, however, this very reconciliation
of the old and the new exposed problems with the existing framework of his intellectual
heritage which to all appearances he was espousing.
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To be specific, the notions of efficient and final causes which he used respectively to
delineate the quasi-separate spheres of influence for the moderns and the ancients were
both derived from what Aristotle in Metaphysics called “knowledge of the first
causes.”19 In Physics, Aristotle identified the efficient cause as the third of the four
causalities and presented it as having to do with “the primary source of the change or
coming to rest; … and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change
of what is changed.”20 Classifying the final cause as the last of the four causalities,
Aristotle described it in contrast as understandable “in the sense of end or ‘that for the
sake of which’ a thing is done.”21 Alike, the efficient and final causes were ultimately
about a primordial original cause which, as the singular unchanging external source of
the changing multifarious inside the world, had to be understood theistically, but in the
quotidian exercise of this logical thinking which emphasized the distinction of before
and after, the invocation of the final cause could potentially or actually cause confusion
for the application of the efficient cause and vice versa. With Aristotle, as with Leibniz,
it is this actual or potential confusion which made these two causalities problematic
alike.
In Physics, for instance, Aristotle explained the final cause via a situation involving the
activity of walking about and the state of being healthy. Insofar as the state of being
healthy could be perceived as an end or goal while the activity of walking about could
be seen as the means or instrument to achieve that end or goal, the former could be
considered as the final cause of the latter. “[Health],” as Aristotle said in Physics, “is
the cause of walking about.”22
The problem with this way of logical analysis is that the relationship between the state
of being healthy and the activity of walking about could also be explained by the
efficient cause so that the activity of walking about was the prior cause while the state
of being healthy was the subsequent effect or result, but the invocation of the final cause
decidedly overturned this temporal sequence of causal relations and consequently made
the very concepts of before and after or cause and effect potentially or actually
confusing. In the 17th century it is this kind of potential or actual confusion which drew
the critical attention of Spinoza (1632-1667) who, in the process of formulating his
radically new philosophy, dismissed all final causes as “nothing but human fictions”
and characterized the ultimate identification of the final cause with divinity as “[taking]
refuge in the will of God, i.e., the sanctuary of ignorance.”23
19
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Just as Spinoza targeted Aristotle in his criticism of the final cause, so Voltaire set his
satirical focus on Leibniz in his repudiation of the same idea. “Observe: noses were
made to support spectacles,” as he had his fictional character Pangloss say in an
obviously ludicrous way in Candide, “hence we have spectacles.”24 “Legs, as anyone
can plainly see, were made to be breeched,” as the plainly misguided philosophical
teacher of Voltaire’s creation went on to remark idiotically, “and so we have
breeches.”25 “Stones were made to be shaped and to build castles with;” as he concluded
his ridiculous mini-lecture about the idea of an end for everything in the best possible
world to his pupil Candide, “thus My Lord has a fine castle, for the greatest Baron in
the province should have the finest house; and since pigs were made to be eaten, we eat
pork all year round.”26
From this kind of attacks Voltaire lodged against him or Spinoza launched against
Aristotle, Leibniz was in reality largely immune, but it was so only because his
discussion of the final cause was always vague and he never quite made clear what
specific end was achieved through what specific means in his cosmological thinking.
“There seems to be no followable route from Leibniz’s basic metaphysic to the notion
of doing something for the sake of an end,” as Jonathan Bennett says incisively, “let
alone the more fully teleological notion of doing something because one thinks it will
lead to a certain end.”27
The Metaphysical Innovation of Leibniz
Rather than the reconciliation of the old and the new within the existing boundaries of
his intellectual heritage, what was truly innovative about the metaphysics of Leibniz
was, as pointed out earlier, the idea of things being created by their natural propensity
or a pre-established harmony which he used most aptly in his profoundly insightful and
positive interpretation of Chinese cosmology. “[Every] soul,” as he said as early as
1686, “is as a world apart, independent of everything else but God.”28
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By itself, the idea of every predicate being necessarily included in the subject (principle
of sufficient reason) was not new, since it was closely related to the notion of ex nihilo
nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing) which was a major pillar of Aristotelian logic
and a crucial part of scholasticism, but it became innovative in Leibniz’s use of it,
because he not only extended the implied notion of self-sufficiency to the totality of
subjects to which all predicates belonged but also did it in a very unusual way. “[Every]
substance expresses the whole sequence of the universe in accordance with its own
viewpoint or relationship to the rest,” as he proclaimed in the same 1686 treatise, “so
that all are in perfect correspondence with one another.”29 Free from external
compulsion, each thing was independent. Rather than engendering chaos, this
independence ensured the good and mutually beneficial coordination of everything.
“God,” as Leibniz wrote in 1695, “has from the first created the soul or any other real
unity in such a way that everything arises in it from its own internal nature through a
perfect spontaneity relatively to itself, and yet with a perfect conformity to external
things.”30
The world was never without order, but the order resulted from the independent state
and action of everything rather than any immediately discernible external
determination. More than anything, this unusual notion of things being free
individually but well-coordinated collectively at the same time in their independent
relationship distinguished Leibniz from his contemporaries in a competition of ideas.
In addition to being unable to explain any meaningful interaction between the body and
the soul, as mentioned before, the dualistic vision of Descartes had opened itself to the
accusation of atheist materialism. To remedy this situation, Nicholas Malebranche
(1638-1715) developed the doctrine of Occasionalism so that the body and the soul
could impact each other, but the cause was always external and ultimately a singular
and personal God who continuously intervened to bring about the miraculous result. To
confront the same problem but away from the mechanistic worldview of Cartesianism,
Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688) and Henry More (1614-1687) drew on Plato’s concept of
world soul or its Neo-Platonist variation and enrichment and came up with the vitalist
idea of plastic nature which supposedly acted “as a Subordinate Instrument of Divine
Providence, in the Orderly disposal of Matter.”31 Leibniz roundly rejected the
involvement of miracles or divine interventions (direct or indirect) in the explanation
of nature, thereby clearing the way for his metaphysical innovation.
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From the Cartesians (Malebranche) and the Cambridge Neo-Platonists (Cudworth and
More), Leibniz differed superficially only in limiting the role of the deity to before the
creation of everything so that the world was still a supernaturally-made machine or
watch or automaton but everything in it always ran in perfect order and nothing ever
required any supernatural adjustment or maintenance. In reality, the palpable autonomy
of the world in its actual operation from any direct control of a supernatural agent
implied that the world was an organism rather than a machine and as such it cried out
for a cosmological explanation which involved a significantly different
conceptualization of divinity and a significantly different understanding of causality.
Even though things could and did impact each other, for instance, why everything was
the way it was could not be explained ultimately by the usual efficient causes. Even
though things could be related to each other in terms of means and ends, the routine
coordination between them could not be understood ultimately by the usual final causes.
Since freedom or self-determination was as characteristic of each individual thing as of
the totality to which all things belonged, in other words, neither the operation of
everything individually nor its independently well-coordinated cooperation with
everything else was explainable by the Cartesian idea of mechanism or the Platonically
mediated Judeo-Christian notion of teleology.
Being free, the activity of everything individually or in its cooperation with everything
else was contingent, but being conducive to the well-being of each thing and the totality
of all things alike, the same activity was also necessary. Both contingent and necessary
at the same time rather than either the one or the other, the paradoxical sounding
causality cannot but push the search for the ultimate explanation right inside the
operation of the world rather than outside it and cast light in the process on the
intricacies of Leibniz’s theistic attitude. In public, he never stopped touting himself as
a staunch defender of a unified Christian church and he always prompted others to
perceive him as such under his theocentric rubric of the best possible world. In private,
however, as reported after his death by Johann Georg von Eckhart (1664-1730) who
was his secretary during the last nineteen years of his life, he was never more than a
nominal Christian who rarely went to church and never took communion. Around the
House of Hanover he was widely known as a non-believer, being nicknamed Loewenix or “believer in nothing.” Even on his deathbed in 1716, he rejected repeated appeals
of Eckhart to allow a priest to come and give him the last sacraments, and he reportedly
protested both angrily and rhetorically by asking what he should confess since he had
stolen or taken from no one.
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Just as his habitual use of the efficient and final causes for the reconciliation of the
ancients and the moderns provided no real insight into the innovation of his cosmology,
so his customary parade of ideas supposedly taken from European antiquity generally
obscured rather than clarified the real and radical import of his inspiration. In The
Monadology, the most eye-catching and seemingly most important word is of course
monad which in the plural he defined notoriously as entities which “have no windows
through which anything can enter or depart.”32 This account of the monads has been
most appropriately characterized by Bertrand Russell as “a kind of fantastic fairy tale,
coherent perhaps, but wholly arbitrary.”33 Other allegedly ancient ideas he invoked are
not as bewilderingly mystifying, but they do not obfuscate things any the less. Entelechy
or entelechies, for instance, is a term which he was fond of throwing around and which
he explained in 1695 as meaning “primitive Forces which do not contain only the act
or the complement of possibility, but further an original activity.”34 Here, as if
providing an etymological origin for his notion of things being created by their natural
propensity, he was willy-nilly reminiscent of Cudworth and More who had resorted to
similar concepts of vitalism for the explanation of nature and for the related
understanding of an external God.
In reality, Leibniz differed drastically from the Cambridge Neo-Platonists because what
was most important in his innovative vision of the world was not how everything was
divinely animated to operate predictably in a downwardly spiraling chain of being but
how everything was independent of everything else in their well-coordinated
cooperation and how this independent correlation cannot be easily understood by
reference to the externally conceptualized God of Judeo-Christianity or the similarly
understood Demiurge of Plato and Aristotle.
In light of his true metaphysical innovation, both Leibniz’s habitual promotion of the
efficient and final causes within the theocentric theory of the best possible world and
his routine parade of ideas supposedly taken from European antiquity can be seen as
largely and even intentionally red herrings. Rather than identifying him ideologically
with his intellectual and religious heritage as is still generally and problematically
assumed today, they most importantly provided him with a convenient defensive or
self-defensive cover so that he was iconoclastic while being shielded somewhat from
any accusation of heresy. “It was necessary,” as he wrote in “New System of Nature
and of the Communication of Substances,” “… to recall and, so to speak, rehabilitate
the substantial forms so decried today, but in a way which would make them intelligible
and which would separate the use we should make of them from the abuse that has been
made of them.”35
32
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In the name of resurrecting moribund old ideas, he then went on to be daringly
revolutionary about a brave new world which was organic rather than mechanistic or
vitalistic. The new may still sound like being closely connected with the old, but the
connection was much more in rhetoric than in substance. To see this, it is crucially
important to take note of “an astonishing correlation [of his ideas] with various schools
of Chinese thought”36 which, from time to time, has been pointed out but which has not
so far received adequate attention.
The Paradigmatic Similarity to China
In the 20th century the person who most influentially pointed out the striking
resemblance between the metaphysics of Leibniz and the cosmology of China was
Joseph Needham. For Needham, the key to this resemblance is the historical context.
As mentioned earlier, Leibniz developed his metaphysical thinking in the late 17th and
early 18th centuries in response to Malebranche on the one hand and to Cudworth and
More on the other. No matter how different from each other in their accounts of the
communication between the body and the soul, the mechanistic worldview of
Cartesianism and the vitalistic cosmology of Cambridge Neo-Platonism were at the
same time similar to one another in the theistic orientation of their efforts and in their
consequently questionable attribution of the ultimate cause (be it efficient or final) to
the idea of God who was conceptualized as singular, personal, and existing outside the
natural process. With his notion of things being made by their innate capacity or a preestablished harmony, Leibniz not only kept any direct supernatural intervention away
from his explanation of nature but also changed the European understanding of the
world from a machine to an organism. It is in the stunning success of this quietly
iconoclastic effort to surmount “the characteristic European schizophrenia or splitpersonality” or “to overcome the European antinomy between theological vitalism and
mechanical materialism”37 that Leibniz most vividly and ineluctably reminded
Needham of China.
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To Needham, Leibniz’s metaphysical innovation is particularly reminiscent of the
Chinese Daoist worldview. In the human body, as the famous Daoist philosopher
Zhuangzi (369 BCE-286 BCE) once explained it by way of an example, there were nine
openings, six organs, and hundreds of joints which came together and kept good order,
but being uncompelled, the good coordination of the bodily parts did not result from
their being commanded in any way. “The hands and feet differ in their duties;” as two
Chinese scholars annotated Zhuangzi’s idea in the third century, “the five viscera differ
in their functions.”38 “They never associate with each other,” as the two scholars
quickly pointed out, “yet the hundred parts (of the body) are held together with them in
a common unity.”39 “They never (force themselves to) cooperate,” as they went on to
say, “and yet, both within and without, all complete one another.”40 “This is the way in
which they cooperate in non-cooperation,” as they concluded, “… Heaven and Earth
are such a (living) body.”41
To protect himself from any accusation of atheist heresy, Leibniz understandably
invoked the idea of God, but the essence of his metaphysical innovation, like the Daoist
worldview, consisted in what Needham calls “a kind of harmony of wills” or “a system
of correlative thinking,”42 and his habitual invocation of the deity was not only largely
perfunctory but also helped in that way to highlight his paradigmatic similarity to the
Chinese Daoists. “It would seem,” as Zhuangzi said about the cooperation of the bodily
parts in their independent relationship, “as though there must be some True Lord among
them.”43 “But whether I succeed in discovering his identity or not,” as he pointed out
bluntly, “it neither adds to nor detracts from his Truth.”44
In the history of modern science since the late 17th century, organism is arguably the
single most important idea which liberated Western conceptual thinking from the
Cartesian and Newtonian understanding of the universe as a machine and consequently
enabled drastic and revolutionary advances in field physics and evolutionary chemistry
and biology. As early as the third century BCE, Chinese Daoist philosophers like
Zhuangzi already talked about the idea.
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The decisive breakthrough of modern science was not achieved in China, and why this
did not happen is intriguing and important for any study of modern Chinese history, but
the crucial and indispensable idea of organism which made possible the scientific
revolution of the modern world was characteristically Chinese rather than European and
it was indisputably introduced in the early 17th century to Europe from China by Jesuit
missionaries who, furthermore, made crystal clear its fundamental difference from
European theistic and secular logical thinking by repudiating it.
In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, Leibniz was among the very first European
philosophers to think about the world innovatively as organic rather than mechanistic
or vitalistic. He has since been followed by a very long line of Western thinkers going
all the way to Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) in the 20th century, but in his day
could Leibniz have taken his inspiration from the Chinese organismic worldview which
was then verifiably accessible to him?
Needham apparently believed that Leibniz owed a crucially important inspirational debt
to China. “[Leibniz’s] own, the first, great attempt at a synthesis, which should
surmount the dichotomy of either theological vitalist idealism or mechanical
materialism,” as he put it, “was strongly stimulated by, if not indeed derived from, the
organic world-outlook which we have found to be characteristically Chinese.”45 Before
Needham, other scholars of China already drew attention to various points of contact
between Leibniz and China. In 1687, for instance, Leibniz had in his possession a copy
of Confucius Sinarum Philosophus which Jesuit missionaries to China published that
year and which, in addition to three Confucian classics in Latin translation, included a
lengthy discussion of the greatest Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and
his organismic theory of Li (principle) and Qi (material energy) which was known to
have been heavily influenced by Daoism and Buddhism. In 1689, Leibniz met in Rome
Jesuit missionary to China Claudio Filippo Grimaldi (1638-1712) to whom he
subsequently sent a list of thirty questions about a wide range of topics concerning
China. In 1697, Leibniz also started a correspondence with Jesuit missionary to China
Joachim Bouvet (1656-1730) which continued for several years. Needham knew all
these facts and more, but, as he readily admitted, none of these could have proved any
decisive influence, because “all the essentials of [Leibniz’s] system were worked out in
the Discourse on Metaphysics (written in the winter of 1685-86), the terminology of
monads being alone missing.”46
Chronologically, as implicitly acknowledged by Needham, it is plainly not the case that
Leibniz first studied Chinese cosmology consciously and then evolved his metaphysical
innovation. In his day, Leibniz was accused of plagiarizing Newton in the development
of the infinitesimal calculus. Leibniz strongly denied it and he was later largely
vindicated.
45
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During his correspondence with Joachim Bouvet beginning in the late 1690s, Leibniz
was amazed to find resemblance between his binary arithmetic and the hexagrams of
the ancient Chinese classic Yijing (Book of Changes), and so far there has been no
evidence that the resemblance was anything other than coincidence.
However, the case with organism is different. For his difficulty to link Leibniz’s
iconoclastic worldview with his knowledge of Chinese philosophy, Needham’s
attribution of Leibniz’s inspiration to China has been rightly challenged by David
Mungello, but in the context of the fact that organism was a characteristically Chinese
idea and was circulated in Europe before Leibniz even began to philosophize,
Mungello’s explanation of Leibniz’s paradigmatic similarity to China as “[the]
spontaneous generation of similar ideas in cultures removed in time and distance from
one another”47 is in its turn highly problematic, especially because his speculated
independence of Leibniz from China has since been used implicitly by some recent
scholars to deny the reality of Leibniz’s ideological affinity with the Far East and to
perversely characterize his insightful and positive interpretation of Chinese cosmology
in the long 1716 letter as, at worst, part of a show of “European or Christian
chauvinism,”48 and, at best, a misguided display of “hermeneutic generosity.”49 Leibniz
may not have studied the organismic idea of China consciously until very late in his
life, but long before that he could have absorbed it without knowing it consciously. The
crucial clue for this is his long 1716 letter.
The Chinese Connection of Leibniz
The long letter of Leibniz to Remond in 1716 contained his most important thoughts
about Chinese cosmology, but the thoughts were given in the form of a carefully
measured response to the separate discussions of the same topic by two Catholic
missionaries to China: Nicholas Longobardi (1565-1655) and Antonio Caballero a
Santa Maria (1602-1669). A Jesuit and a Franciscan respectively, both Longobardi and
Santa Maria were important in the history of the early modern East-West intellectual
interaction and in any study of Leibniz because of their principled and spirited
opposition to the legacy of Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) who pioneered the evangelical
enterprise of the Catholic Church in the Middle Kingdom.
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From Macao, Ricci first entered the Chinese mainland and founded the Jesuit China
mission in 1583. After years of study about the Chinese language and Chinese culture,
he gradually came to recognize the special importance of Confucianism which was
dominant in Chinese society both ideologically and politically. To win official
acceptance or at least tolerance, Ricci simply had to befriend Confucianism, but to
advance his apostolic agenda, he also had to distance himself from the official Chinese
ideology and repudiate it at the same time. Out of the contradictory needs of this
situation evolved eventually his carefully calculated strategy of evangelism which had
two main components: acceptance of ancient Confucianism as prefiguring Christian
monotheism and rejection of Neo-Confucianism as corrupted by Daoism and
Buddhism.
Ricci’s complex attitude of simultaneous acceptance and rejection toward
Confucianism inaugurated a longstanding Western prejudicial view of the Chinese as
being acquainted with ethics or natural theology but “[having] no conception of the
rules of logic” and “[having] obscured matters by the introduction of error rather than
enlightened them.”50 To a large extent, Leibniz’s surprising neglect of Chinese
metaphysical thinking reflected this. As early as 1667, as he revealed it in a letter to
Landgrave Ernst von Hessen Rheinfels, he was already intrigued by China.
So eager was he to lay his hands on everything about the Far East that he proudly
boasted to the Electress Sophia Charlotte (1668-1705) in 1697 that he should post a
notice on his door: Bureau of Information for Chinese Knowledge. In spite of his wellknown consuming interest, there were always blind spots up to the late 1690s. “His
interests extended beyond collecting data,” as Franklin Perkins says recently while
echoing Mungello’s doubt about Needham’s attribution of Leibniz’s metaphysical
inspiration to China but overlooking Mungello’s simultaneous recognition of Leibniz’s
real paradigmatic similarity to the Far East, “but did not extend to philosophy.”51 When
Leibniz wrote toward the end of the 17th century about the need of Europe for
missionaries from the Chinese “who might teach us the use and practice of natural
religion, just as we have sent them teachers of revealed theology,”52 his underlying
assumption about the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese and European
philosophical and religious paradigms was still largely informed by Ricci.
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Not until the late 1690s or early 1700s did Leibniz realize that the supposed weakness
of the Chinese in having no conception of the rules of logic and in having obscured
metaphysical thinking by the introduction of errors was a Jesuit code phrase for the idea
of organism for which Ricci denigrated Chinese philosophy but in which Leibniz found
his closest affinity with the Middle Kingdom. Long before he achieved that realization,
Longobardi and Santa Maria already prepared that process by challenging Ricci. For
his purpose of both endorsing and attacking the dominant Chinese ideology, in
particular, Ricci claimed to have detected in ancient Confucianism monotheistic
tendencies which were then lost in Neo-Confucianism under the corrupting influence
of Daoism and Buddhism.
Because of his ostensible acceptance of ancient Confucianism, Ricci has been
celebrated as epitomizing what Wolfgang Reinhard calls “one of the few serious
alternatives to the otherwise brutal ethno-centrism of the European expansion over the
earth.”53 In reality, his monotheistic reading of ancient Chinese texts was nothing more
than what Edward Said terms “a kind of Western projection onto and will to govern
over the Orient.”54 No matter how he seemed to be inclusive in his ambiguous
accommodation of Christianity to Confucianism, his supposedly inclusive reading of
Confucianism was actually exclusive because, as Urs App perceptively points out, “it
also hijacked other people’s histories and religions and embedded them in a
fundamentally biblical scenario.”55
Longobardi was one of the very first in the small Jesuit China mission to be critical of
Ricci’s specious division of Confucianism into a pristine early part and a degenerate
later part. Entering China in 1597 and staying in the country until his death in 1655, he
knew that the organismic worldview was not limited to Daoism or Buddhism but was
the crucial cornerstone of a productive relationship of concurrent competition and
complement among the three main philosophical and religious traditions of the Middle
Kingdom. Ricci was aware of Longobardi’s criticism. Before his death in 1610, he
could have meant to acknowledge its validity quietly and to silence it at the same time
when he promoted Longobardi to be his successor as the leader of the Jesuit China
mission.
Longobardi did not stay loyal and submissive to the legacy of Ricci for long. Soon after
Ricci’s death, he started an internal Jesuit debate about Ricci’s dubious reading of
Confucianism, and as one of Ricci’s most vocal critics, he also wrote a long and feisty
treatise. Things did not go his way in the debate and he was even ordered to have his
treatise destroyed, but his anti-Ricci text was leaked out and Santa Maria was the one
who got it and made it possible for it to be published in Europe.
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On the basis of Longobardi’s information, Santa Maria also wrote out his opposition to
Ricci. Both of these texts were sent by Remond to Leibniz for a response, but before
Leibniz wrote his long 1716 letter, there is evidence that he not only already knew the
contents of the two treatises but also already put two and two together about his
paradigmatic similarity to China.
The doctrinal fight Longobardi and Santa Maria had with Ricci was over the Chinese
idea of tianren heyi (humanity’s unity with heaven) or wanwu yiti (ten thousand things
in one body) which Leibniz dealt with in the most important first two parts of his 1716
letter (the last two parts treated Confucian rites and the similarity of his binary
arithmetic to the hexagrams of Yijing). Ricci first discussed the Chinese idea in the
early 17th century when he described the Chinese as believing “that the entire universe
is composed of a common substance; that the creator of the universe is one in a
continuous body, a continuum as it were, together with heaven and earth, men and
beasts, trees and plants, and the four elements, and that each individual thing is a
member of this body.”56 For the tactical maneuvers of his proselytizing enterprise,
Ricci willfully characterized the view as a Daoist and Buddhist corruption of NeoConfucianism, but relying on testimonies of Chinese scholar-officials either friendly or
hostile to Ricci, Longobardi and Santa Maria proved that it was a fundamental belief
always shared by Confucianism with Daoism and Buddhism. Just as European
mechanistic and vitalistic views of nature both distinguished God clearly from
everything else, so all three Chinese philosophical and religious traditions considered
everything in the universe in contrast as intertwined with heaven because the latter as
an ever on-going organic process was actualized only in the independent exercise of a
cooperative principle by each participant and because “Heaven and Earth … are void
of Reason, that is, of Will and Deliberation, but do all things by a certain natural
Propension.”57
In the form of tianren heyi (humanity’s unity with heaven) or wanwu yiti (ten thousand
things in one body), the organismic worldview of China was apparently absorbed into
the monistic philosophy of Spinoza in the middle of the 17th century. Spinoza is not
widely recognized today as a Sinophile, but when he was expelled from his synagogue
in 1656, he was reportedly accused of teaching children of the Jewish Sabbath school
“that the Bible was not the history of the world, that Chinese history was independent
of biblical history, and so on”58 and his Latin teacher Van den Enden (1602-1674) is
known to have believed “that nature had to be considered the only God.”59 Between
1619 and 1633 Van den Enden was a Jesuit.
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To the European public, China was then the pride of the Jesuit missionary effort outside
Europe, but behind closed doors, debates about the Chinese organismic cosmology were
raging between Ricci’s supporters and detractors and both sides sent their views back
to their Jesuit superiors and confreres in Europe. With his insider’s information, Van
den Enden evidently played a most instrumental role in the formulation of Spinoza’s
radical philosophy which, reminiscent of the Chinese organismic idea of humanity’s
free and entirely voluntary conformity with heaven, conceptualized the highest ideal of
life as freedom or “a firm existence, which our intellect acquires through immediate
union with God, so that it can produce ideas in itself, and outside itself effects agreeing
well with its nature, without its effects being subjected, however, to any external causes
by which they can be changed or transformed.”60
Leibniz’s substantive contact with the organismic conviction of China was via Spinoza.
On the way from Paris to the Court of Hanover in 1676, he made a special detour to
The Hague and met the Dutch philosopher in person for at least three days and possibly
a week. Before that momentous encounter, he had already learned diligently about the
main contents of Spinoza’s monistic philosophy in 1675 in Paris from Walther
Ehrenfried von Tschirnhaus (1651-1708), a mathematician and fellow German
compatriot, who had earned the trust and respect of Spinoza in 1674 and had been given
extracts by Spinoza from his then unpublished masterpiece the Ethics. “In a
philosophical as well as a literal sense,” as Matthew Stewart points out in a recent study
of the two European philosophers, “Spinoza opened a door for Leibniz.”61 Leibniz did
not seem to have any idea then of any possible connection of Spinoza with the Far East,
but in the late 1690s he could not have remained unaware of it, because Pierre Bayle
(1647-1708) had already drawn public attention to the similarity of Spinoza to the
doctrinal beliefs of Chinese Buddhism and to what he called “[a] hypothesis, that is
very much in vogue among the Chinese”62 by which he meant Neo-Confucianism. In
Theodicy published in 1710, Leibniz alluded to Bayle’s reference to Chinese Buddhism
when he described how the belief about the annihilation of all things belonging to us
was shared by the Quietists of Europe and “the Quietism of Foë, originator of a great
Chinese sect,”63 but he did not mention Bayle’s concurrent reference to Confucianism
or Neo-Confucianism. Given the reputation of Spinoza as a materialist and atheist
philosopher and the need of protection for himself, Leibniz’s omission could not have
been accidental.

60

Spinoza, Short Treatise, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, 149.
Matthew Stewart, The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern
World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), 293; the direct and indirect contacts of Leibniz
with Spinoza are all carefully documented in chapters 1, 8, and 12 of this book.
62
Pierre Bayle, The Dictionary Historical and Critical, 2nd Edition (London, 1734), 5:217.
63
Leibniz, Theodicy, 79.
61

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

41

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 77 [2017], No. 77, Art. 20

38

Number 77, Fall 2017

In a short piece about the civil cult of Confucius written in 1700/1701, Leibniz first
mentioned Longobardi by name and showed knowledge of the internal Jesuit debate
about the nature of Chinese metaphysics. He claimed then that he did not “know if it is
sufficiently clear what in fact is the authentic doctrine of the Chinese literati (especially
of the classical ones), officially approved, based on their classical texts,” but he quickly
supported Ricci by praising him as “a great man, for following the example of the
Church Fathers who interpreted Plato and other philosophers in a Christian fashion.”64
In another short piece about Chinese rites and religion written in 1708, he more clearly
sided with Ricci in the internal Jesuit dispute, claiming that “nothing prevents us from
thinking well of the ancient doctrines until we are compelled to proceed in any other
ways.”65
In his 1716 letter to Remond, Leibniz superficially maintained his usual support for
Ricci. Close to the start of his treatise, he advised against repudiating Chinese
cosmology, because “[it] would be highly foolish and presumptuous on our part, having
newly arrived compared with them, and scarcely out of barbarism, to want to condemn
such an ancient doctrine simply because it does not appear to agree at first glance with
our ordinary scholastic notions.”66 It was reasonable, he suggested, “to inquire whether
we could give it a proper meaning.”67 Here, as in his habitual promotion of the new in
the name of the old in his own metaphysical thinking, he was reminiscent of Ricci, but
the Jesuit father read monotheism into Confucianism for the purpose of subverting it
while Leibniz lined Confucianism up with Christianity for the different purpose of
deflecting criticism from both it and himself.
Longobardi, for instance, disputed Ricci’s identification of the Chinese Heaven with
the Christian God by mentioning how the Neo-Confucian Li “is the natural law of
Heaven and by its operation all things are governed, according to weight and measure,
and conforming to their state; not, however, on the basis of intelligence or reflection,
but only by propensity and natural order.”68 In response, Leibniz did not distinguish
ancient Confucianism from Neo-Confucianism as Ricci would have done. Instead, he
simply embraced the Confucian and Neo-Confucian idea of Tian (Heaven) or Li
(principle) by pointing out its similarity to his metaphysical innovation. “For me,” as
he said, “I find all this quite excellent and quite in accord with natural theology.”69 “It
is pure Christianity,” as he said in a different place, “insofar as it renews the natural law
inscribed in our hearts—except for what revelation and grace add to it to improve our
nature.”70
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Without hesitation, he included Neo-Confucianism in his approval. “Thus one can even
find satisfaction with modern Chinese interpreters, and commend them,” as he said,
“since they reduce the governance of Heaven and other things to natural causes and
distance themselves from the ignorance of the masses, who seek out supernatural
miracles—or rather super-corporeal ones—as well as seek out Spirits like those of a
Deus ex Machina.”71
Leibniz’s iconoclastic view of the world as organic rather than mechanistic or vitalistic
was indeed uncannily similar to the cosmology of China including Confucianism and
Neo-Confucianism, but precisely because they so much resembled each other, his
metaphysical innovation could not be Christian in character as he claimed or as scholars
of him have so far generally followed him in taking it to be.
Conclusion
One of the things which Leibniz in his long 1716 letter cited Longobardi as saying about
Confucianism was the idea of an esoteric or secret doctrine. Leibniz showed no trust
in Longobardi on this issue, but the idea of a contrast between a well-hidden private
belief and a well-advertised public conviction seems to be most apt and illuminating
about Leibniz’s metaphysical thinking and about his interest in China.
In public, he never stopped prompting others to see him as a great conciliator who
brought the mechanistic worldview of Cartesianism and the vitalistic cosmology of
Platonism and Neo-Platonism together under the theocentric umbrella of the best
possible world. In reality, in the name of resuscitating moribund old ideas from his
intellectual heritage he quietly and iconoclastically promoted his brave new vision of
the world as organic.
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Similarly, he appeared in public to be as much motivated in his interest in China by
international politics or by what Yuen-Ting Lai calls “a grandiose vision of a worldsociety, to be realized by the elimination of Islam, the conversion of China and Tartary,
and the reconciliation of Protestants and Catholics in Europe”72 as in his famous or
notorious Egyptian Plan which he concocted around 1672 with his friend Johannes
Christian von Boineburg (1622-1672) for the purpose of diverting the aggressive urge
of Louis XIV (1638-1715) from Holland. In reality, the most important connection of
him with China was the quiet absorption of the characteristically Chinese philosophical
idea of organism and the related Chinese monistic doctrine of tianren heyi (humanity’s
unity with heaven) which, as the noted 20th century Chinese scholar Qian Mu contends,
“constitutes the greatest contribution of Chinese culture to mankind.”73 In relation to
what he was in private, what Leibniz appeared in public was rarely more than smoke
and mirrors. To understand the real and radical import of his metaphysical thinking and
his inspirational debt to China in this regard, it seems crucially important to recognize
this fact.
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Narrativized Ethics and Hiroshima:
Harry S. Truman, Homer, and Aeschylus1
Michael Palencia-Roth
Introduction
Discussions of the atomic bomb and Hiroshima have to be deeply troubling for anyone.
The natural inclination is to turn one’s eyes away or to remain silent. Avoidance and
silence, however, were not valid options immediately after the Second World War and
are not valid options today. The decision – or decisions, for there were many – to drop
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and later Nagasaki raises issues of profound importance
for the human community. It compels us to ask who we are as individuals and as
members of a society engaged in actions with such devastating consequences. We must
ask ourselves as well how otherwise ordinary people come to such decisions and how
they justify them – consciously or unconsciously – before or after the fact.
Thousands of pages have been devoted to the topic of the atomic bomb and Hiroshima,
but relatively little attention has been paid to the role that narrative played. Yet stories
shape the actions of individuals and of cultures. “Narrativized ethics” – which is my
own term – may help in understanding how the “Hiroshima narrative” informed the
attitudes and decisions of many involved in the Manhattan Project.
Narrativized ethics is primarily of two kinds. First, there is the story that is deliberately
constructed, at the conscious level, for explanatory and justificatory purposes. The most
frequent use of this kind of narrativized ethics on a national stage occurs in politics,
especially during an election or in the run-up to an initiative like going to war, which
requires at least the implied, if not the formal, consent of the populace. Second, there
is the story that operates at a more unconscious level. This story may sometimes not
look like a conventional story, for it tends to be determined by hidden motivations,
somewhat like the dreams that are motivated by unconscious desires in Freudian
psychoanalysis. This is the story behind the story. In general, at whatever level of
awareness, narrativized ethics provides justifications for the beliefs, thoughts, and
actions of an individual, a nation, or a culture.
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Narrativized ethics can be a useful analytical tool in a number of areas in comparative
history, especially when historical circumstances lead to and seem to require the threat
of force and/or its application. Consider, for example, the drive toward the East by
Alexander the Great, the Roman colonization of much of the known western world, the
Muslim expansion which began in the 7th century, the Crusades, the Spanish conquest
and colonization of the New World, the treatment of Indians by North Americans, the
English colonization of India, the European push into Africa in the 19th century, Russian
expansionism, the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, and the so-called War on Terror.
The appeal to justificatory arguments favoring aggression has a long history in the West,
especially with the rise of nationalism. The rationale for “Just War Theory,” articulated
by St. Thomas Aquinas, who took the term from St. Augustine (The City of God), even
made its way into 19th-century American law. Chief Justice John Marshall, in an 1823
Supreme Court decision, basing his argument on the Just War Theory used by the
Spanish in the New World, delivered a judgment that he named “The Doctrine of
Discovery.”2 The doctrine stated that Christian nations – in this case, the United States
– had the right, by virtue of their “discovery” of non-Christian nations, to appropriate
property from Native Americans. The Doctrine of Discovery became part of
international law in the 19th century and into the 20th. All justificatory arguments are
based on narratives of one kind or another.
The names which triangulate the subtitle of this essay would seem to have little in
common. Yet the events leading up to and following August 6, 1945, acquire a
profoundly ethical resonance when viewed through the prism of the cultural values
underlying both Homer and Aeschylus as they were refracted through the classical and
biblical frames of reference of President Truman and a few other central players in this
drama. That prism is a kind of narrative lens through which we may better understand
not only the past but also the challenges of the present moment. Of course, the
manufacture and use of the Atomic Bomb were not a direct consequence of Homer and
Aeschylus, or of the Judeo-Christian worldview.

2

Francisco de Vitoria, in the 16th century in Spain, convincingly argued against the Just War Theory in
the Spanish conquest of the New World, saying in effect that the Spanish Crown had no authority, moral,
legal or natural, to appropriate land that, by natural right, belonged to the natives. Chief Justice Marshall
ignored that argument. See Vitoria, Relecciones sobre los indios y el derecho de guerra, written in 1532.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20

46

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

43

But Hiroshima and Nagasaki became caught in the web of a grand narrative3 with a
largely pre-determined plot4 made justifiable by an appeal, conscious or not, to the logic
and consequences of the excluded middle, the dropped middle, and the classical form
of the Aristotelian syllogism.
Narrativized Ethics I: Harry S. Truman
Although President Truman could have decided against using the atomic bomb, he
decided in favor of it because, I believe, he was influenced by two kinds of narrative
structures. The first was a plot in which he was a major actor with little freedom to
improvise, and the second was a moral tale which provided ethical support for his
decision. I do not wish to excuse that decision but to explain how I believe that it
became justifiable to him.
President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. Thirteen days later President Truman,
having previously been kept in the dark, on President Roosevelt’s instructions, learned
of the Manhattan Project for the first time. He was informed of it by Henry Stimson,
the Secretary of War, and General Leslie R. Groves, the general who directed the project
to develop the atomic bomb. We do not have a record of Truman’s response at the time,
but we do have the memorandum by Secretary Stimson which was the basis of the
conversation. For my purposes, the most important points are the first, the fifth, the
seventh, and the eighth:
1. Within four months we shall in all probability have completed the most terrible
weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole
city.
5. The world in its present state of moral advancement compared with its technical
development would be eventually at the mercy of such a weapon. In other words,
modern civilization might be completely destroyed.
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7. In light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of
sharing it with other nations and, if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary
question of our foreign relations. Also our leadership in the war and in the
development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility upon us which
we cannot shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to civilization
which it would further.
8. On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved,
we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace
of the world and our civilization can be saved.5

From this moment until the end of the war, Stimson and Groves – joined, late in the
process, by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes – controlled Truman’s access to
information concerning the Manhattan Project.
In White House discussions, arguments for the use of the bomb were emphasized, while
arguments against its use were discounted or suppressed.6 For example, it is now
commonly accepted that General Groves made certain that Truman would not see a
petition of July 1945 signed by 69 scientists involved in the Manhattan Project based in
Chicago; that petition urged that “purely on moral considerations” the bomb should not
be used against the Japanese without explicit warning.7
We have nothing in Truman’s own hand which refers even indirectly to the Manhattan
Project or the atomic bomb until June 17, 1945, after a boat ride on the Potomac River
with some friends. He writes in his diary: “I have to decide Japanese strategy – shall
we invade Japan proper or shall we bomb and blockade?”8 It is possible that the word
“bomb” refers to the atomic bomb, but it could also refer to the more conventional yet
also devastating bombing which was already taking place.
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What appears to have happened in the White House in the spring and summer of 1945
is that whenever moral issues concerning the atomic bomb were raised they were
dropped from the discussion. Why this happened is itself a moral issue and central to
my concerns. I suggest that narrativized ethics played a role.
In Hiroshima in America, Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell characterize the months
before and after August 1945 as a time of “psychic numbing”. For instance, Secretary
Stimson in his own diary referred to the bomb as “the gadget,” “the thing,” “the secret”
or “the diabolical,” as if he were afraid to name it directly.9 A different kind of numbing
occurred with President Truman. That is evident in his diary entries made during the
Potsdam Conference, which took place between July 17th and August 2nd in a suburb of
Berlin which had not been destroyed by the Allies. The day before the conference,
Truman toured Berlin and saw the destruction caused by war. He wrote in his diary:
“I thought of Carthage, Baalbek, Jerusalem, Rome, Atlantis [sic], Peking, Babylon,
Nineveh; Scipio, Rameses II, Titus, Herman, Sherman, Jenghis Khan, Alexander,
Darius the Great. But Hitler only destroyed Stalingrad -- and Berlin. I hope for
some sort of peace -- but I fear that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries
and when morals catch up perhaps there’ll be no reason for any of it.”10
Several points are of interest here.11 First, Truman may have been an autodidact, but he
was a devoted student of history:12 he could name a number of cities -- east and west,
classical and biblical -- destroyed by war. Second, he could name the perpetrators.
Third, he identified Hitler as responsible for the destruction of his own city. Fourth, he
expressed the fear that the instruments of war would outpace ethical considerations.
9
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transmutes the potential and actual horror of war into something more acceptable to the mind: thus the
language of body counts, scenarios, collateral damage, smart bombs, and so on (p. 3ff).
10
Truman, Off the Record, p. 52. There is a curious slip of the pen here, as Truman appeared to have
associated the destruction of Atlantis with the destruction of Atlanta by General Sherman in the American
Civil War.
11
In the final analysis, we cannot determine whether or not Truman intended his diaries to remain
completely private forever. The question of Truman’s intentions is an interesting one but does not alter
the kind of rhetorical analysis I am pursuing. Either he was justifying and explaining things to himself
or he was speaking to “history.” In either case, narrativized ethics influenced both the substance and
form of what he thought and wrote.
12
One of his favorite classical authors was Plutarch, whom he read frequently. As he wrote in the first
volume of his memoirs, entitled Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955), “[as a young
man] I pored over Plutarch’s Lives time and time again . . . . I read the standard histories of ancient
Egypt, the Mesopotamian cultures, Greece and Rome, the exploits of Genghis Khan and the stories of
oriental civilizations, the accounts of the developments of every modern country. . . . Reading history .
. . was solid instruction and wise teaching” (p. 119). Truman continued to read Plutarch and to think
about the lessons of history well into his presidency
See also Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman, pp. 69-70.
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All this is fairly clear. Yet most revealing is the stance that Truman took toward the
events described and what he did not say. He removed himself from the calculus of war
and placed the responsibility for destruction elsewhere. He even removed himself from
the moral debate about the machines of war. He did this even though he was at the
center of it all.
On July 18th, after being told of the successful testing of the atomic bomb, Truman
confidently wrote in his diary: “the Japs will fold up . . . when Manhattan appears over
their homeland.”13 The term “Japs” is characteristic of the mentality of the 1930s and
1940s. There is no record in Truman’s diaries of him referring to the Italians as “Wops”
or to the Germans as “Krauts” or “Fritzes”. The stereotyping of the Japanese in this
manner became part of the psychic numbing which made the decision to deploy the
atomic bomb easier.
On July 25th Truman made of the longest diary entry of this period of his presidency. It
is worth quoting at some length:
I had a most important session with Lord Mountbatten and General Marshall before
[meeting with Stalin and Churchill]. We have discovered the most terrible bomb in
the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates
Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.
This weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told
the Sec. of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and
sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages,
ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare
cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital [Kyoto] or the new [Tokyo].
He [Mr. Stimson] and I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and
we will issue a warning statement asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I’m
sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a
good thing for the world that Hitler’s crowd or Stalin’s did not discover this atomic
bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the
most useful.14
In this remarkable diary entry, Truman first placed Japan into a Judeo-Christian context
by describing the bomb as somehow related to biblical prophecy which is then somehow
also connected to Japan itself. In addition, Truman linked Japan to the sinful races
around Noah after the Great Flood. Put another way: Truman has brought Japan within
the moral orbit of the West in order to account for its destruction.
13
14

Truman, Off the Record, p. 53.
See Truman, Off the Record, pp. 55-56.
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Second, he adopted the passive voice, saying that the bomb “is” to be used; this strategy
distanced Truman from the decision itself; it also suggests that, psychologically,
Truman was merely acquiescing to a decision which had been taken earlier. Third, the
target is to be military only. This twice-repeated statement is either an outright lie or a
self-protective delusion on Truman’s part, for he knew full well that a single atomic
bomb could destroy an entire city and therefore that most of the casualties would be
civilian. Fourth, Truman described the Japanese people, not just the military, as
“savage, ruthless, merciless and fanatic,” a description which merged the civilian with
the soldier and made the entire Japanese nation, including women and young children,
into an army. Fifth, Truman placed himself and the Allies on the high moral ground as
“the leader of the world for the common welfare” and, because of that, decided to “save”
Kyoto and Tokyo.15 Sixth, Truman said that the Allies will first warn the Japanese of
the bomb. In fact, however, Truman had already agreed with the Select Committee’s
recommendation not to warn the Japanese but to drop the bomb as a surprise in order to
“shock” them into surrender.16 The word “shock” comes up in several documents of
this time period. Seventh, Truman described the United States as the only nation moral
enough to possess this “most terrible thing ever discovered.” Eighth, Truman
considered that this most terrible thing “can be made the most useful,” a point to which
I will return later.
We know from several first-hand accounts that Truman’s reaction after the bomb was
dropped on Hiroshima was one of “extreme excitement and pleasure,” with no
immediate thought of innocent victims.17 After both bombs were dropped, Truman
received letters and telegrams of all sorts, the majority congratulatory but some critical.
He replied in blistering language to a telegram critical of his decision from the Federal
Council of the Churches of Christ in America.

15

I find it ironical that Kyoto was originally the first city on the intended target list and later, on August
10th and 11th, as Truman became impatient for Japan to surrender, Tokyo went to the head of the list as
the next target of the Atomic Bomb. Yet after the war ended, one of the ways that Truman defended his
decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to say that he had spared Kyoto and Tokyo.
16
I have sometimes wondered if the “Shock and Awe” campaign in the first Iraq war were not a reference
by some in the Bush administration, their hubris intact, to the Hiroshima bomb and its effects, in the
expectation of a sudden capitulation and then the glorious reconstruction of a devastated Iraq. If so, then
the Manhattan Project and Hiroshima became a narrative influential in the run-up to that war.
17
The words are from Gar Alperovitz, Op.Cit., p. 513. A United Press reporter wrote that Truman “had
never been happier” (p. 513).
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Truman wrote: “Nobody is more disturbed over the use of Atomic bombs than I am but
I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor
and their murder of our prisoners of war. The only language they seem to understand
is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a beast
you have to treat him as a beast.”18 Vengeance and payback are motives. Moreover, he
considered the atomic bomb to be fully justified because, after all, the Japanese were
“beasts.” The attitude behind Truman’s words is of great significance.
Narrativized Ethics II: Homer, Aeschylus, and Logic
How is all this related to Homer and to Aeschylus, to excluded and dropped middles,
and to the syllogism? Let us focus on a single passage from Book 9 (ll. 105-115) of the
Odyssey, both in Greek and in Robert Fitzgerald’s English translation. Since Homer’s
language is relevant to my analysis, his terminology requires comment:
ἔνθεν δὲ προτέρω πλέομεν ἀκαχήμενοι ἦτορ. (105)
Κυκλώπων δ’ ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεμίστων
ἱκόμεθ’, οἵ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες ἀθανάτοισιν
οὔτε φυτεύουσιν χερσὶν φυτὸν οὔτ’ ἀρόωσιν,
ἀλλὰ τά γ’ ἄσπαρτα καὶ ἀνήροτα πάντα φύονται,
πυροὶ καὶ κριθαὶ ἠδ’ ἄμπελοι, αἵ τε φέρουσιν (110)
οἶνον ἐριστάφυλον, καί σφιν Διὸς ὄμβρος ἀέξει.
τοῖσιν δ’ οὔτ’ ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες,
ἀλλ’ οἵ γ’ ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα
ἐν σπέεσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
παίδων ἠδ’ ἀλόχων, οὐδ’ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν. (115)
In the next land we found were Kyklopes,
giants, louts, without a law to bless them.
In ignorance leaving the fruitage of the earth in mystery
to the immortal gods, they neither plow
nor sow by hand, nor till the ground, though grain—
wild wheat and barley—grow untended, and
wine-grapes, in clusters, ripen in heaven´s rain.
Kyklopes have no muster and no meeting,
no consultation or old tribal ways,
but each one dwells in his own mountain cave
dealing out rough justice to wife and child,
indifferent to what the others do.
Odyssey, 9: 105-115

18

Harry S. Truman, Dear Harry: Truman’s Mailroom, 1945-1953. The Truman Administration through
Correspondence with “Everyday Americans,” p. 295.
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One may ask why Odysseus is telling King Alkinoös at this very moment about the
Cyclops, this monstrous race he has encountered. It is a familiar story. Having arrived
at King Alkinoös’s kingdom, exhausted and near death, Odysseus has been revived by
food and drink and by celebrations in his honor, though no one yet knows his name.
After the celebrations, he hears a blind minstrel sing about the exploits of the great hero
Odysseus. Overcome with emotion, he cries. Seeing his tears, King Alkinoös asks
about them. Odysseus confesses that he is the person whom the minstrel has just
praised. Then he begins to recount his adventures in such a way as to let King Alkinoös
know that he, too, is civilized, and therefore worthy of the hospitality he has just
received. This he accomplishes by telling the King of a race that is as different from
the two of them as it is possible to be, a race that is non-civilized, barbarous, and even
inhuman. His main narrative strategy depends on the logic of the excluded middle.
In western philosophy, the principle of the excluded middle is one of the logical
principles at the foundation of precision in logic. A standard formulation of the
excluded middle is to say “either A is B, or A is not B.” That is, every individual in the
universe is a member either of the class “A” or of “not-A” (B). There is no middle; it
is excluded. In Latin, this is known as the principle of tertium non datur, there is no
third term. There are only two terms (“A” and “not-A”): such binaries are absolute and
exclusive.
In the cited passage, the first important word in Odysseus’s binary conceptual universe
is “Kyklopes” in the English or “Κυκλώπων” in the Greek which means Cyclops in
modern English and refers to a race of beings characterized by a single round eye in the
center of their foreheads and gigantic size. This appearance distinguishes them from
every other race. Odysseus is here depending on certain traditions in Greek
ethnography of both actual and fabulous races. Even today, the classification of peoples
may be based in part on such characteristics as appearance, eating habits, and language.
As far as we know, the Greeks originated this kind of thinking in the West, and in
addition to being the origin of anthropology it is as well the origin of stereotyping as a
mental process. Stereotyping generally depends on the exaggeration of a physical
quality like skin color or noses, which results in the objectification of the person.19
This passage is built on a series of negations around the idea of the differences between
civilized and non-civilized cultures. These “louts” are “without a law” to bless them.
One of the terms for law in Greek is “θέμις.” Therefore these louts are “ἀθεμίστων” or
“lawless.” “θέμιστες,” the plural form of “θέμις,” is a mostly untranslatable term which
means “right custom” or “the proper procedure” or “the proper social order,” and it was
considered to be one of the main gifts of the gods to humankind.

19

For an excellent overview of the images of stereotyping, see Katérina Stenou, Images de l’Autre: La
différence: Du mythe au préjugé.
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As good as this English translation by Robert Fitzgerald is, it does not transmit to the
reader how effectively the repetition of “θέμις” as a literary device builds toward a
concluding condemnation of the Cyclops. Variants of the word are used three times in
the passage: ἀθεμίστων (106), θέμιστες (112), θεμιστεύει (114) – as a genitive plural
adjective in the negative, as a noun, and as a verb. To be “ἀθεμίστων” is to be unable
to behave in society according to proper custom. To be non-civilized is to be ignorant
of agriculture as well as the importance of assembly; it is to be indifferent to others; it
is to live not in cities or communities but in isolated caves.
If non-civilized societies are characterized by these and other negatives (the neither nor
structure, οὔτε . . . οὔτ’, is also used), then civilized societies are going to be the
opposite. They are going to be lawful and law abiding; they will conduct themselves
according to proper custom; they will know something of agriculture and viniculture;
they will conduct their business in democratic meetings; they will live in communities
and they will care about their citizens and their opinions. Upon hearing Odysseus speak
in this manner, Alkinoös, being civilized, recognizes him as someone who is also
civilized. Without actually saying so, Alkinoös accepts Odysseus’s characterization of
the Cyclops, despite being the son of Poseidon, as irredeemably “other”.
It is a brilliantly successful strategy on the part of Odysseus. The complete otherness
of the Cyclops will be considered as sufficient justification for aggression.20 Odysseus
blinds Polyphêmos, plunging a burning stake into that single eye-socket so that, in
Homer’s words, the eyeball burned and, as the blood flowed out of the socket, its roots
crackled and hissed around the stake.
One sometimes forgets, because of the terrible beauty of Homer’s language and the
heroic sweep of the narrative, just what the cultural values are in Homer’s epics, and
what kind of behavior is being advocated as a survival tactic and in the name of
civilization. There is no middle position in this episode. The middle is excluded.
President Truman is not Odysseus and the Japanese are not a Cyclopean people, but the
attitudinal structure of the relationship is linguistically similar. Truman arrogates to
himself the high ground of civilization, of right conduct, of moral authority, of justice,
of reasonableness. The Japanese are stereotyped as “Japs,” they are savage, ruthless
and fanatic, their conduct of the war is unwarranted and murderous, they are beasts. For
Truman – as for Odysseus and Alkinoös – the middle has been excluded. Neither
dialogue nor compromise is even considered. Surrender must be unconditional. The
only alternative to unconditional surrender is total destruction.
20

There is enough blame to go around. Odysseus and his men have violated the guest-host relationship
by entering the Cyclops’ cave uninvited, lighting a fire and helping themselves to some of the Cyclops’
cheese while the Cyclops is absent. Upon returning to his cave, the Cyclops also violates the guest-host
relationship by killing and eating several of Odysseus’ men. Vengeance thus becomes an additional
motive.
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There is no third outcome. Tertium non datur. On August 7th, The New York Times
published a front-page article announcing the bombing of Hiroshima. President Truman
is quoted as saying that if the Japanese did not accept the American ultimatum of
unconditional surrender, “they may expect a rain of ruin from the air the like of which
has never been seen on this earth.” Biblical and apocalyptic language has been added
to Greek categories of thought and of ethnographic distinctions.
Up to this point, my analysis still does not explain how Truman could have come to
such a morally dark and difficult decision that he knew would kill perhaps 100,000
people in an instant. For that part of the story we turn to Aeschylus’s Oresteia, in
particular to the end of that trilogy, The Eumenides.21
At this climactic point a trial is underway. Orestes has been accused of the murder of
his mother. Apollo is his defense attorney. Knowing that Orestes really did kill his
mother, Apollo shifts the grounds of his defense in order to prove that the killing of
one’s mother is not a serious crime and that therefore Orestes must be declared innocent.
“The mother is no parent of that which is called her child, but only nurse of the newplanted seed that grows. The parent is he who mounts” (ll. 658-660). This statement is
so astonishing and on the surface so indefensible that Apollo knows that he must quickly
win his argument or lose the trial. Dramatically, he states, “I will show you proof. . . .
There she stands, the living witness, daughter of Olympian Zeus” (ll. 662-664). He
points to the goddess Pallas Athene, who, along with the chorus, must decide Orestes’s
guilt or innocence. She agrees with Apollo’s argument and, declaring that “there is no
mother anywhere who gave me birth” (l. 736), casts the vote which results in the
acquittal of Orestes.
Pallas Athene agrees to what she knows is a lie. She and the rest of the chorus know
that Pallas Athene had a mother named Metis. When she was pregnant with Pallas
Athene, Metis was swallowed by Zeus and kept in his stomach. Pallas Athene was then
born through Zeus’s head rather than through the birth canal of her mother. In Apollo’s
argument, the mother disappears, the middle term is dropped. Orestes, therefore, cannot
have killed his mother because, in this argument, he had no mother.
Let us not dismiss this argument as ludicrous. Let us acknowledge, rather, that it has a
strangely seductive logical power. That power may perhaps best be visualized through
applying Leonard Euler’s circles for the distribution of terms to this story. Euler was
an 18th-century Swiss mathematician.

21

Since I am depending on plot and not on the use of language for my analysis here, I quote only from
the English translation by Richard Lattimore, Orestia, The Eumenides, pp. 158-162, ll. 657-753.
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Using Euler’s circles, we may say that if
we take class A (or Zeus)

and then class B (or Metis) with the element
C (or Athene) within it, then the most
succinct way of describing the position of C
(Athene) if B (Metis) is made a class within A
(Zeus) is to draw the circles in the following
manner:
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A

A
B
C

A

Therefore, C is within A; C is within class A:

C

It is no longer necessary to cite B, the middle element, in order to describe the position
of C. Therefore, the middle is dropped and B (or Metis, Athene’s mother) “vanishes.”
In this line of argument, as strange as it may seem, there can be no matricide. Athene
supports Apollo’s argument further when she states that she is “always for the male
with all [her] heart and strongly on [her] father’s side” (ll. 737-738).
Perhaps another reason why Apollo’s argument appears convincing is that, by analogy,
it makes an appeal to syllogistic processes in which the middle also appears to be
dropped. This is a classic form of the syllogism: If A, then B; and if B, then C; therefore,
if A, then C. The middle term, B, is dropped in the concluding third movement of this
process.
One should note, however, that even though the middle is dropped, this does not mean
that it has actually ceased to exist. In fact, logicians could argue that it continues to
exist because it is the carrier of the meaning, because it links A with C. But Apollo asks
the jury to conclude that the middle has vanished in fact. And Athene accepts the story
and the argument. Her decision is the result of narrativized ethics at work.
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President’s Truman’s decision to obliterate Hiroshima in an instant – men, women, and
children, civilians as well as soldiers – owes its justificatory logic to a distribution of
terms resembling that of Euler’s circles. Truman’s thinking, like that of Aeschylus,
may also be visualized with the aid of Euler’s circles.
A
Let us take the city of Hiroshima as class A:

B

Let us take the people of Hiroshima as class B, within the
city itself:

Let us take, further, the Japanese military as class C,
which is stationed among the people of Hiroshima.
The most succinct way of describing the position of C
or the Japanese military, if it is made a class within B or
the people of Hiroshima, and the people of Hiroshima are
made a class within A or the city itself, is to say that class
C is within class A.

A
B
C

Class B becomes superfluous as a logical class in order for the position of C to be
described. Class B was dropped in Truman’s thinking and Hiroshima re-defined as a
purely military target; in effect, he willed the non-combatant population of Hiroshima
out of existence in a theoretical sense. The dropping of the middle at this stage of the
process resembles what happened in White House meetings in spring and summer of
1945 when sustained discussions of the morality of the atomic bomb were also dropped.
Recall that Truman stated emphatically in his diary entry of July 25, 1945, that “women
and children” are not to be the target of the atomic bomb. Yet, inevitably, they were
the target, along with the military, because they occupied an actual space, despite
Truman’s theoretical and abstract redefinitions of them. Reality will always trump
theory and logic, but theory and logic, even twisted logic, may have an effect on reality.
Narrativized ethics here becomes a kind of narrativized logic, subservient to ends which
justify means.
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Narrativized Ethics III: Consequences
The story that Truman told himself is either a gigantic lie or a gigantic self-deception.
That he somehow felt this narrative to be a lie, despite relying on it at the time, is
evidenced by the fact that in later years, while not admitting guilt for being responsible
for the instant annihilation of some 200,000 people, most of them civilians, he attempted
over and over to restore a moral component to his decision. Thus, he repeatedly drew
attention not to the lives that were actually lost because of the atomic bomb but to all
those other lives that might have been lost had the atomic bomb not been deployed. He
said that he dropped the bomb in order to save American lives and in order to save those
Japanese lives – all the women and children – that an invasion of Japan would have
cost. In later years, the characterization of the Japanese people as beasts is dropped
from his public and private ruminations. To me, that is a sign of a private expiation that
is too horrible to be made conscious.22 The story protects the psyche.
President Truman was of course not the only important American to have relied on
narrativized ethics for a justification of his actions and thoughts. As an interpretive
method, narrativized ethics may be applied to several of the major figures involved in
the Manhattan Project, from its generals to its scientists, even to its most famous
journalist, William L. Laurence. The Greek and the biblical frames of reference were
never very far from the thoughts of these men, as the following examples demonstrate.
Let us review the most famous version of the Aristotelian deductive syllogism. All men
are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore Socrates is mortal. John Stuart Mill criticized
deductive logic on the grounds that it could not lead to the discovery of new knowledge
and that it merely could be used to confirm the truth of the major premise. For John
Stuart Mill, in this case the major premise of “all men are mortal” already contains
within it both the minor premise and the conclusion. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the
scientific director of the Manhattan Project, recognized this truth about atomic bomb
research when he admitted that the use of the bomb was implicit in its discovery and
testing.23 He was not the only one.

22

One can sense regret, as well as perhaps suppressed guilt, in notes that Truman made for a speech
delivered on December 15, 1945. The decision, he wrote, was difficult because it meant “the wholesale
slaughter of human beings . . . blotting out women, children, and noncombatants” (Cited by Alperovitz,
Op. Cit., pp. 566-567). This kind of language is nowhere to be found in the lead-up to Hiroshima and
Nagasaki or in his immediate reactions afterwards.
23
Lifton and Mitchell, Op. Cit., p. 155.
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The Interim Committee on the use of the bomb took that use for granted in its meeting
of May 31, 1945, as did the Scientific Panel in its report of June 16, 1945.24 In his
memoir, Year of Decision, Truman himself said: “I regarded the bomb as a military
weapon and never had any doubt that it should be used” (p. 419). In other words, once
the Manhattan Project was conceived, once the atomic bomb became a reality,
Hiroshima was logically inevitable. Narrativized ethics became part of the justification
of that inevitability.
Let us return now to a statement from the end of Truman’s diary entry of July 25th.
There Truman muses that “this most terrible thing ever discovered . . . can be made the
most useful.” I think of this comment as a Promethean moment, a justification found
in Aeschylus’s drama, Prometheus Bound. As is well known, Prometheus stole fire
from the gods and gave it to humankind, thus making all sorts of technological advances
possible. As dangerous as fire may be, it is also potentially useful and beneficial.
Whether or not he was actually aware that he was doing so, Truman was echoing a view
common within the scientific community that atomic bomb research was itself a
Promethean enterprise. It was daring and dangerous, even perhaps “forbidden,” for the
scientists all knew that they were probing the deepest secrets of the universe itself in
order to create a weapon of unimaginable destructive power.
William L. Laurence, science correspondent for the New York Times, was hired in secret
by General Groves to follow the Manhattan Project from start to finish so that, at the
appropriate time, he could tell its story to the American people. He wrote two influential
books on the subject. His frame of reference for both books is Greek and biblical. In
this first of these books, Dawn over Zero: the Story of the Atomic Bomb, published in
1946, he entitles its three parts as “Genesis,” “Atomland-on-Mars,” and
“Armageddon.”25 “Genesis” narrates the first atomic test in the New Mexico desert on
July 16, 1945. He reports his initial reaction: “One felt as though one were present at
the moment of creation when God said: ‘Let there be light’” (p. 11). Another observer,
Professor George Kistiakowsky of Harvard, thought that the scene was one of
“doomsday” and he imagined that this is how “the last millisecond of the earth’s
existence” would look (p. 11).

24
25

Alperovitz, Op. Cit., pp. 163-164, 188-189.
William L. Laurence, Dawn over Zero: The Story of the Atomic Bomb.
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Laurence later compares the search for the atomic bomb with the search for the
legendary and impossible philosopher’s stone that transmutes elements into gold (p.
254), and he ends his book with a hymn to Prometheus, calling him “the first scientist”
(p. 273), the great “liberator,” implying that his modern avatars have liberated the world
from “bondage” (p. 273) and created the potential for “a new promised land of plenty”
(p. 274). In a second book entitled Men and Atoms: The Discovery, the Uses and the
Future of Atomic Energy, published in 1959, he entitles Part I (of five) “The Second
Coming of Prometheus,” mingling in that single phrase narratives from Greek and
biblical cultures.26
This rhetorical hubris exalting scientists and decision makers, using narrativized ethics,
is in my view dangerous. Such a narrative divinizes the human intellect, divinizes
human power, and exalts the United States above all other nations, arrogating to
America the authority to determine the fate of other nations in an absolute manner. One
wonders, finally, about the real meaning of J. Robert Oppenheimer’s reaction to that
first atomic test of July 16, 1945. He said that as he saw the atomic flash, two lines
from the Bhagavad Gita, which he had studied in the original Sanskrit, flashed through
his mind: “I am become death, the shatterer of worlds.”27 Was he thinking of the bomb
itself? Was he thinking of himself and his fellow scientists? Was he thinking of the
human race in general? Or was as he, in essence, pointing directly at us? We are, after
all, the stories that we tell ourselves, and we use those stories, consciously or not, to
justify our thoughts and actions.

26

In this regard, let us note the title of a recent biography on the principal scientist on the Manhattan
Project: American Prometheus: the Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer by Kai Bird and
Martin J. Sherwin.
27
Time Magazine, November 8, 1948, p. 77.
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Civilizational analysis, political discourse, and reception of Western
modernity in post-Soviet Russia1
Yulia Prozorova
Introduction
Russian history of the 20th century reveals abrupt and radical changes to the
fundamental visions and trajectories of Russian society. The “post-Soviet” era unfolded
a distinct perspective on modernity that attempted to combine the Western liberal
democracy model with the legacy of Soviet Communism, along with some perpetuating
traditional structures.
The Western influence on Russia after 1991 was remarkable. The “reencounter” with
Western modernity, the “historical choice” to implement its cultural and political forms
in Russia, and intense interactions between Russia and the West after the collapse of
the USSR have been crucial driving forces for modernization and transformation
processes in contemporary Russia. Russia as the inventor of an alternative modernity
project that had been in a long conflict with the West made a critical step toward
Western modernity seen as the only possible civilizational pathway. The early 1990s
were transformational in Russia’s history when its society demonstrated an ultimate
“openness” to the Western models. Russia initially borrowed Western cultural ideas and
institutional forms, but they became more limited, regulated, or filtered out later.
This era was marked by new societal opportunities and heated debates about alternative
social and political trajectories for post-Soviet society. Discussions of the new
constitution and legal foundations for the Russian society indicated a conflict between
neoliberal and neoconservative political programs, and between the parliamentary and
the presidential republican projects of political architecture, in which intellectuals, law
specialists and political agents took part.
The assumption that Western liberal democracy had become the universal model was
proclaimed in the late 1980s2. However, after almost three decades have passed, this
belief has proven unrealistic. Modern societies, including post-Communist ones that
acknowledged the adherence to the “Western idea,” demonstrate persistent differences
in their cultural and institutional characteristics. Western-inspired projects gave rise to
patterns and orientations that differ greatly from the original ideal. Diverse reactions,
reflections, and evaluations of the Western-type liberal democracy, which emerge in
different discourses, contribute to the articulation of Russia’s post-Soviet version of the
modernity project.
1

This study was funded by the Russian government, project “Foundations and trends of the Russian
civilizational dynamics in culture, politics, economy”, No. AAAA-A17-117030110143-6.
2
Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest Summer (1989): 3–18.
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Official political discourse retains a special importance since the communicative
practices of the political elites generate interpretations and meanings, which are able
to become programmatic for the design and arrangement of the main societal
domains. This paper considers civilizational analysis and associated multiple
modernities theory as a promising framework for understanding of the post-Soviet
Russians experience of modernity in Russia. It also provides a review of how
contemporary Russian political discourse receives and interprets the Western
modernity project.
Theoretical background: civilizational analysis and multiple modernities theory
After the Communist project failed, it was declared that Russia had “returned to
civilization”3 and had integrated into the European “civilized community.” This was
accomplished by having made the “historical choice” to adopt political liberalism,
democracy, and the free market, which constitute the core of Western modernity. The
following radical transformations have been interpreted by political elites and some
academics as the next stage of modernization for the previous Soviet endeavor.
The “Post-Communist transition” and “modernization” experience are seen to be the
principal trends and the most influential frameworks in the post-Soviet period.
Teleological assumptions and the idea of the universality of the Western project of
democratic market-based society regarded as the epitome of modernity and a “blueprint
for the future,” constitute the core of “transitology”4. Transition is regarded as a cultural
and political convergence of post-communist societies with the West. This frame of
reference calls for a singular developmental pathway towards modernity that postSoviet Russia can follow only by implementing the Western ideas and institutional
forms.
In that political discourse, the concept of modernization appeared to be a symbol of the
long-term reform initiatives undertaken by the Russian government representing
Russia’s adherence to the “community of civilized states.” In the discourse of the social
sciences, modernization theory has become an umbrella approach that has covered a
number of models explaining the peculiarities of the post-Soviet transformation.

3

Iver Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: Identity and International Relations (Routledge,
1996).
4
Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13:1 (2002): 5-27;
Johann Paul Arnason, “Designs and Destinies: Making Sense of Post-Communism,” Thesis Eleven, 63
(2000): 89-97.
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However, the proposed models of Russian modernization (e.g. the “convergence,”
“catch-up modernization,” and “recurrent modernization”), as well as the transitology
framework disregard the socio-cultural and historical legacies that have shaped the
diversity of the modernization experience and its outcomes5. The diversity and variety
of modernity are undertheorized in those frameworks.
Critics of such a modernization approach proposed alternatives that claimed to be more
sensitive to Russia’s cultural and institutionally different frameworks (institutional
divergence, sociocultural modernization, world-system theory and the local
civilizations theory)6. However, these frameworks provide deterministic and
reductionist explanations and are unable to grasp the social transformations with their
diverse and internally controversial cultural characteristics. They also neglect historical
contingency, cultural autonomy and the creative potential of social imaginaries and
cultural interpretations.
The renaissance of the civilizational perspective7 in sociology was inspired by a critical
reaction to the prevalence of the teleological and universalistic Eurocentric conception
of modernization. Convergence and transition models revealed their epistemological
weakness given the indisputable diversity and heterogeneity of contemporary
societies. Civilizations are viewed as long-term historical complexes constituted by a
combination
of
cultural
orientations
and
institutional
patterns.
Although civilizational analysis comprises different theoretical approaches, the
common focus is on the cultural dimension – the variability of cultural visions and
interpretations of the world, and on their potential in shaping institutional formations.
These complexes entail a cultural and institutional diversity of “transitional”
modernizations along with well-developed modern societies that call into question the
idea of “the end of history” when all ideological and societal differences disappear.

5

Ibid; Paul Blokker, "Post-Communist Modernization, Transition Studies, and Diversity in Europe,"
European Journal of Social Theory 8, no. 4 (2005): 503-25.
6
Ruslan G. Braslavskiy, “Sotsiologicheskie modeli sovremennogo rossiyskogo obschestva: ot globalnoy
modernizatzii k globalnoy modernosti”, in Peterburgskaya sotziologiya segodnya: Sbornik nauchnih
trudov Sotziologicheskogo istituta RAN (St.Petersburg: Nestor-Istoriya, 2010), 7-20.
7
Benjamin Nelson, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Johann Arnason, and Toby Huff articulated the most important
ideas and frameworks for understanding of civilizational phenomena, although the research field
remains heterogeneous.
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The assumption of “historical contingency” set against the cultural domain seen as an
autonomous symbolic reality, open to various competitive interpretations and
imaginaries in such a way that emergent meanings and orientations have the capacity
to transcend the existing social frameworks. The ideas of contingency, discontinuity,
and creativity of action and social imagination, along with openness and indeterminacy
of societal development oppose the evolutionistic and structuralist approaches as well
as the historicity, determinism and teleologism of the widely accepted modernization
theory8. The cultural and the imaginary constitute an irrevocable dimension of the
institutions9. It is this potentially creative aspect of the institutions that facilitates the
radical transformations in the history of societies.
One of the principle themes of civilizational analysis is the dynamic of
“intercivilizational encounters.” B. Nelson, who coined the term, focused on the
relations between different “structures of consciousness” comprising cultural worldviews, ideas, logics and key images (of experiences, self, etc.) that direct human
thinking, perception, agency and experience10. The concept of intercivilizational
encounters can be understood more broadly as a relationship between different
civilizational complexes or “paradigmatic cultural patterns” and their respective
elements11. The expansion and the adoption of the Western modernity project by the
recipient societies with different historical and civilizational backgrounds, produce a
crucial modern form of intercivilizational encounters.
Such encounters “often result in decisive cultural borrowings, adaptations of alien ideas
and creative syntheses emerging from challenges to inherited ways of thinking […] in
new cultural creations which decisively modify the future civilizational landscape for
one or more of the parties involved”12.
Civilizational analysis assumes the multiplicity of civilizational complexes and
traditions that account for the diversity of responses to Western innovations. Multiple
modernities theory, introduced by Shmuel Eisenstadt, is a crucial contribution to the
theoretical debate on the dynamics of contemporary societies, especially the postCommunist ones.
8

See Johann P. Arnason, “Civilizational Analysis, Social Theory and Comparative History,” in
Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory, ed. by Gerard Delanty (London; New York:
Routledge, 2006), 230-241; Wolfgang Knöbl, "Contingency and modernity in the thought of J.P.
Arnason," European Journal of Social Theory 14, no. 1 (2011): 9-22.
9
Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, trans. K Blamey (MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA1987 [1975]).
10
Benjamin Nelson, On the Roads to Modernity: Conscience, Science, and Civilizations, ed. Toby Huff
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981).
11
Ibid, p.83-84.
12
Donald A. Nielsen, “Rationalization, Transformations of Consciousness and Intercivilizational
Encounters. Reflections on Benjamin Nelson’s Sociology of Civilizations,” in Rethinking Сivilizational
Analysis, ed. Said Amir Arjomand and Edward A. Tiryakian (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 120.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

65

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 77 [2017], No. 77, Art. 20

62

Number 77, Fall 2017

It proclaims that “modernity and Westernization are not identical” and that “Western
patterns of modernity are not the only "authentic" modernities”13. The modernity
project (liberalism, democracy, capitalism, nation-state) that had originated in the West
constitutes a crucial (albeit ambivalent) “basic reference point” for other societies
across the globe; however, its diffusion entailed “the interaction of new orientations
with older legacies” that gave rise to the diverse interpretations of its basic components.
Intercivilizational encounters presume a selective acquisition and possible mutation of
originally borrowed patterns incorporated into a civilizational context with its local
cultural traditions and institutional premises.
[…] in societies belonging to the other major Eurasian civilizational complexes,
the modernizing transformations induced or at least accelerated by Western
influences were at the same time conditioned by socio-cultural backgrounds that
left enduring marks on the resultant patterns of modernity14.
As Arnason suggests, the encounter between the West and the rest should not be
regarded as “the Westernization of the world,” or a triumph of civilization in the
singular, but they should be understood as “the global projection of a problematic that
remains open to diverse interpretations in the West and alternative ones in the nonWestern arena”15.
The multiplicity of forms of modernity arises from the ambiguity of interpretations and
responses to the constituent problematiques of modernity (self-determination, human
autonomy and emancipation, rationality, reflexivity, progress, etc.)16 are open to rival
interpretations, since modernity itself is poly-interpretative. The variety of competing
versions of political, social and economic orders may derive from the different reactions
to Western modernity, and its internal tensions between different conceptions of
civilizational identity and imaginaries (e.g. Slavophile, Westernizers, Eurasian), etc.17
13

Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129(1) (2000): 1-29; Shmuel N.
Eisenstadt, “Some Observations on Multiple Modernities,”in Reflections on multiple modernities :
European, Chinese, and other interpretations, ed. by Dominic Sachsenmaier, Shmuel Eisenstadt, and
Jens Riedel (Brill, 2001), 27-41.
14
Johann P. Arnason, “Civilizational Analysis as a Paradigm in the Making,” in Encyclopedia of Life
Support Systems (Paris: Eolss Publishers, France, 2007). http://www.eolss.net/SampleChapters/C04/E6-97-01-00.pdf
15
Johann P. Arnason, “Understanding Intercivilizational Encounters,” Thesis Eleven, 86(1) (2006): 51.
16
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Modernity and the Construction of Collective Identities,” International
Journal of Comparative Sociology 39(1) (1998): 138-158; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “The Paradox of
Democratic Regimes: Fragility and Transformability,” Sociological Theory 16(3) (1998): 211-238;
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129(1) (2000): 1-29.
17
For the historical examples, which demonstrate the plurality of responses to the Western project, see:
Sudipta Kaviraj, "Modernity and Politics in India," Daedalus 129, no. 1 (2000): 137-62; Blokker, PostCommunist Modernization; Paul Blokker, “Confrontations with Modernity: Openness and Closure in
the Other Europe,” Eurozine Online, 2010 http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2010-06-15-blokkerhttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20
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The intercivilizational encounter framework allows for studying the post-Soviet version
of modernity as a reinterpretation of the original Western institutional models and
cultural ideas. In his study of diverse experiences of modernity in several postcommunist Eastern European countries, Blokker18 acknowledges the importance of the
communist legacy, which in various ways shapes transformations in these societies.
However, he disregards the significance of the pre-Communist traditional structures,
histories of long-term intercultural contacts, and the imperial background that have left
their marks on the post-Communist experience. In the case of post-Soviet Russia, both
the pre-revolutionary legacy and the Soviet Communist experience must be taken into
account. Some of the features of the Russian civilizational complex define the context
in which the post-Soviet reception of the Western modernity takes place. There are
some crucial differences between Russian and Western civilizational complexes,
among them religious, legal, and how power is used.
Donald Nielsen identified a set of differences between Russia and Western Europe
which shaped the specificity of Russian civilizational structures. They include: the
Byzantine path of inheritance and reception of classical and early Christian traditions;
the interconnection and quasi-separation of church and state; religious sects and
movements that “failed to sustain ‘liberal’ political ideas, rationalized and universalistic
orientations”; and the patriarchal and communal orientations that differ from the notion
of “associations” that predominate in the Western social structures and institutions19.
Medieval Russia was mostly unfamiliar with the antique classical legacy (the works of
Plato, Aristotle, late Greek philosophy, Hellenic science, Roman law), and aware only
to a limited extent of early Christian theology, all of which had an immense effect on
the cultural orientation of Western Europe and carried marked civilizational
consequences20.

en.html; Jeremy, CA Smith, “The Many Americas. Civilization and Modernity in the Atlantic World,”
European Journal of Social Theory 13(1) (2010): 117–133; Peter Wagner, “From interpretation to
civilization – and back: Analyzing the trajectories of non-European modernities,” European Journal of
Social Theory, 14(1) (2011): 89–106; Mota, Aurea, Delanty Gerard. “Eisenstadt, Brazil and the
Multiple Modernities Framework: Revisions and Reconsiderations,” Journal of Classical Sociology, 15
(1) (2015): 39-57.
18
Blokker, Post-Communist Modernization.
19
Donald A. Nielsen, “Sects, Churches and Economic Transformations in Russia and Western Europe,”
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 2(4) (1989): 493-522.
20
Nelson, On the Roads; Toby E. Huff, The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China, and the West.
2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Toby E. Huff, “Europe as a Civilization: The Revolution
of the Middle Ages & The Rise of the Universities,” Comparative Civilizations Review 69 (2013): 6586.
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The profound formative influence of Byzantium on the Russian civilizational complex
is widely accepted. The diffusion of Byzantine civilization (its law, religion, political
and ideological forms, literature, and art) was welcomed by the Russians of the Middle
Ages, however, their adoption was remarkably selective. Various elements of the
Byzantine complex were accepted, rejected and transformed21. Although Russian legal
proceedings and codes of the 10th -17th centuries contain some norms of the Roman Law
adopted through the translation of the Byzantium legal texts22, Russian secular law
showed few signs of direct Byzantine influence23.
The systematic reception and incorporation of Roman law into the Russian legal code
and practices happened only in 18 th -19th centuries. The legal modernization and
codification of the late imperial period in Russia tended to admit the European ideas of
human rights and freedom, but at the same time the vision of the traditional monarchical
and autocratic power structure remained mostly intact. “Legal dualism,” that is, the
controversial coexistence of the rational law imposed by the state versus the traditional
common law based on popular practices of justice and paternalism, is a characteristic
feature of the Russian legal tradition24. The legal system has little autonomy while the
principle of “informal justice [that] is above any formal law,” is still conventionally
accepted25.
The impact of Byzantium and the Mongols on the evolution of distinct cultural and
political patterns appear to be the most significant. According to Obolensky, Byzantine
civilization was more efficiently assimilated in the Eastern European countries
characterized by an evolving or already established centralized form of government.
Another important observation is that the relationship between the development of
monarchical institutions and the acceptance of Byzantine culture was often reciprocal
– “not only did political centralization pave the way for Byzantinization; the reverse
was equally true”26.

21

Dimitri Obolensky, “The Relations Between Byzantium and Russia (11th–15th Century),”in XIIIth
International Congress of Historical Sciences (Moscow, 1970), 1–13.
22
E.V. Salogubova, “Elementy rimskogo prava v rossiyskom sudoproizvodstve X-XVII vekah,” IVS
ANTIQVVM. Drevnee parvo, 1 (4) (1999): 173-179.
23
Obolensky, The Relations Between Byzantium and Russia.
24
Andrei N. Medushevsky, Rossiyskaya pravovaya tradicia – opora ili pregrada? (Moskva: Fond
“Liberalnaya missia”, 2014).
25
Tatiana B. Koval, “Elita i nravstvennost (religiovedcheskie zapiski),” Mir Rossii 3-4 (1995): 131157.
26
Obolensky, “The Relations Between Byzantium and Russia,” p.11.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20

68

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

65

The Muscovite state formation and its power structure is undeniably the major domain
where Byzantium and Mongol influences coalesce and where the Oriental tradition of
political culture culminated. It is only possible to name briefly some of those
peculiarities that shape the contour of the Russia state-society pattern: fusion of secular
and sacral power; patrimonialism; centralization and concentration of power and
resources of control; a tight connection between state formation and territorial control
and expansion; and cultural distance between the rulers and the masses; and
establishment of a “state-conditioned society”, an institutional framework which
presupposes the systematic subordination of society to the imperatives of state
formation, etc. (Arnason 1993).
Peter the Great fundamentally reformed the state in accordance with the Western model
of the “well-ordered-society.” His epoch is marked by an articulated imperial project
and a practice of transformation-from-above with deliberate assimilation of Western
forms. The radical Westernization and modernization of Peter the Great contributed to
the rationalization process, and to secularization, as well as scientific and technological
development. Nevertheless, there exists a persistent internal contradiction underlying
the incentives to impose the rule of law, with its associated codification, modernization
and liberalization of the legal sphere. The centralized autocratic state system requires
submission of the person to the state that maintains almost unlimited power. State
domination continues to be the legitimate embodiment of all power. In this context, the
emergence of a public sphere, legally autonomous entities and the development of
human rights, along with individual and collective autonomy, have always been
complicated by the traditionally strong patrimonial state that intruded, absorbed and
controlled the society.
European modernity with its “the disembodiment of power” (in Claude Lefort’s
terminology) has never happened in Russia. The ruler has always been a physical and
symbolic incarnation of the state, society, and law. Historically, Russia has evolved as
a patrimonial-bureaucratic state with a sacralized authority and power, organized
around a single ruler/leader. One of the most important adoptions came from the late
Byzantine era conception of Caesaro-papism, that is, a subordination of Church to the
secular ruler as a cornerstone of Russian absolutism.
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The Orthodox Christian worldview, which is characterized by a general otherworldly
orientation found their reflection in the relevant “structures of consciousness,” and in
visions of secular social orders. These frameworks were applied to government, to
images of power, to the roles of authority and elites, and to the definition of economic
ethics and rationality27. In comparison to Protestantism in Western Europe, Russia’s
ascetically oriented sects of the 17th century did not become a driving force in the
formation of “modern” structures, and exerted a very limited influence on the main
aspects of life. The traditional structures continued to dominate, including the mysticcontemplative nature of Orthodox Christianity28.
Russian particularism, the notion of “sobornost” (conciliarity), as well as the distinct
social, cultural and political orientations of a more communal and patrimonial type,
contributed less to social differentiation and rationalization in Russia, and in fact
opposed “universalism” and social, cultural and political institutions of a more
"associational" character “rooted in a series of historical transformations towards a
more rationalized, differentiated, universalistic and individuated system” of the West29.
In Russia, a service state system evolved that corresponds to the “liturgical state”30
described by Max Weber. This is a state whose needs are met by a contrived system of
duties and the individual’s position in the social structure. The Russian state is also
characterized by a unification of authority and property, sacralization of power, and the
role of authority in distribution of wealth and in the implementation of radical
reformation “from above.” According to Medushevsky, this system reached its apogee
during the Stalinist era31.
The Soviet experience in the creation of communist society and its modernization
program demonstrates the continuity of certain traditional pre-revolutionary Russian
models. The pre-revolutionary complex of the patrimonial rulership, caesaro-papist
state and church continued in the Soviet period in “the new Communist ideological
form of articulation of “religion,” state, and society.”32
27

See Koval, Elita i nravstvennost; Tatiana B. Koval, “Trudovaya etika v pravoslavii,” Obschestvennie
nauki i sovremennost 6 (1994): 55-70; Tatiana B. Koval, “Lichnost i sobstvennost. Christianstvo i
drugie religii mira,” Mir Rossii 2 (2003): 3-45; Andreas Buss, “The Economic Ethics of RussianOrthodox Christianity: Part I,” International Sociology 4 (3) (1989): 235-258, and Part II: “Russian Old
Believers and Sects,” International Sociology 4(4) (1989): 447-472.
28
Buss, “The Economic Ethics,” Part I and Part II; Nielen, “Sects, Churches and Economic
Transformations.”
29
Ibid, pp.499-501.
30
Andrei N. Medushevsky, Proekty agrarnych reform v Rossii, XVIII - nachalo XXI veka (Moskva:
Nauka, 2005); Andrei Medushevsky, Russian Constitutionalism: Historical and Contemporary
Development (Routledge, 2006), p. 68.
31
Andrei N. Medushevsky, Rossiyskaya pravovaya tradicia – opora ili pregrada? (Moskva: Fond
“Liberalnaya missia”, 2014), p. 34.
32
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The core of the Soviet model was a fusion of an imperial and revolutionary traditions33.
The Soviet program of modernity was characterized by integration of ideological,
political, and economic power represented by the party-state; “interconnected principles
of organization”: party-state, command economy, and ideological orthodoxy; the
conception of “socialism in one country”; the fantasy of a shortcut to affluence through
total social mobilization; an ideology analogous to a secular religion. At the same time,
the Soviet model attempted to embrace rationality, the ideas of progress, and mastery
of nature34. It adopted a superficial universality and introduced a selective and
repressive “socialist law.” This complex legacy, together with diverse cultural
interpretations, evoke a reshaping of the assimilated Western models and suggest the
character of the resultant modernity patterns in post-Soviet Russia.
Post-Soviet “re-encounter” with the West: political discourse on the Western
project of liberal democracy
As mentioned before, the multiplicity of modernities resulted from the diversity of
civilizational backgrounds; it is inspired by the societal reflexivity represented by
various visions of societal development and evaluations of Western innovations that
grow in different discourses and comprise the interpretative-discursive dimension of
“intercivilizational encounters.” Discourses may reflect indigenous structures of
consciousness, with ideas and images of the historical experience and collective identity
that resonate with preconditions of the political and economic models of the Western
project.
Although diverse responses emerged in different discourses outside of the political
realm and agents of modernization come from various fields, the ideas and visions that
were articulated by the political officials have had a profound impact on the policymaking process and the shape of post-Soviet Russia’s institutional landscape; indeed,
more so than non-political elites. Compared to the various political and public actors
who have limited access to the main communication arenas, state officials have
acquired more communication resources to express and propagate their ideas, to control
and dominate the discourse. In present-day Russia, the political arena tends to be more
isolated, homogeneous and state-regulated. Critical reflections on Western democracy
and liberalism are expressed through different genres of political communication.
These include presidential addresses, interviews, political articles, official statements
and documents, and the like.

33

Johann P. Arnason, The Future that Failed: Origins and Destinies of the Soviet Model (Routledge,
1993).
34
Johann P. Arnason, “The Soviet Model as a Mode of Globalization,” Thesis Eleven 41 (1995): 36–
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An important aspect of the debates on the direction of post-Soviet modernization and
the question of the relevance of the Western project, is the broad civilizational discourse
and the competing frameworks of the Russian civilizational identity, for which the
Western conception is a crucial reference point. Such discourse was revitalized during
perestroika, when a critical revision of the Soviet project of modernity and
reconsideration of Western capitalism took place.
In the 1980s, the idea of a “common European home” and the concept of Russia’s
civilizational identity as part of Western civilization, were articulated along with the
novel political paradigm of “new thinking.”35 By the late 1980s, the possibility of
implementing the Western capitalist model in Russia was introduced. On the eve of the
USSR’s collapse and throughout the early post-Soviet years, the idea of the universality
of the institutional forms and cultural orientations of Western modernity dominated. As
it was proclaimed, and having acknowledged the necessity of modernization according
to Western standards, Russia had “returned to civilization.” Even after the dissolution
of the USSR, this concept and the scenario of Russia’s integration into the European
“civilized community” retained its relevance.
Boris Yeltsin’s Addresses to the Federal Assembly of 1994-1999 reflect Russia’s
aspiration to assimilate the Western-European civilizational variant and the necessity
of introducing the “civilized” institutions and practices such as a market economy, rule
of law, civil society, and private property. However, by the mid-1990s, this vision of
Western modernity was supplemented with Russian particularism. In his Address of
1996, he noted that Russia is following the common developmental path of civilization,
but in its own distinct way. Yeltsin argued that Russia is a unique country with its own
interests and its own logic of development36.
Yeltsin’s presidency ended with the Address called, “Russia at the Turn of the Epoch”37.
He concluded that the choice of the pathway toward a market economy made in 1991
“was and still is right” and “we do not have another path.” Vladimir Putin’s article,
“Russia at the Turn of the Millennium” continues this narrative: Russia “has entered the
highway by which the whole of humanity is travelling”38. It has no alternative and
characterizes the Soviet period as a wrong “dead-end route.”
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Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika i novoe myshlenie dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira (Moskva:
Politizdat, 1988).
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Poslanie prezidenta Federalnomu sobraniyu 1996.
http://www.intelros.ru/2007/02/05/poslanie_prezidenta_rosii_borisa_elcina_federalnomu_sobraniju_rf_
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Vladimir V. Putin, “Rossiya na rubezhe tysiacheletiy,” Nezavisimaya gazeta 20.12.1999.
http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20

72

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

69

That political discourse highlighted Russia’s strong cultural connection with Europe.
Putin noted that Russia is a part of Western European culture, and Russians are
Europeans. This position supports Russian borrowing of the “universal economic
mechanisms and democracy” from the West.
Since the mid-2000’s, “modernization” has become one of the key topics of the
government’s economic and political programs integrated into the universalist
civilizational discourse. This modernization is based on democratic values that
themselves will allow the country to proceed to the next stage of civilization39.
Since the mid-1990s, radical Westernism has competed against exceptionalism and
nationalist trends in the discourse identifying Russia as a distinct civilization. Although
Yeltsin claimed Russia to be “an integral part of the civilized world,” he also stressed
that Russia “cleaves to the traditional values”40. The idea of a Russian civilizational
uniqueness continued to grow in the late 2000’s, along with the conception of a multipolar global political architecture.
“The multiple forms of the contemporary world reflect its more fundamental
characteristic–cultural and civilizational diversity.”41 It was argued that global
competition acquired a civilizational dimension. Russia’s mission lies in its
“contribution to the cultural and civilizational diversity of the contemporary world and
to the development of an intercivilizational partnership and dialogue”42. The ultimate
point of this argument is that Russia is a unique “state-civilization”43.
This conception of Russia’s distinct civilizational status among other existing historical
civilizational complexes justifies its “special path” to modernity. This civilizational
framework incorporates ideas that subsequently entailed original interpretations of
democracy and the market economy.
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Dmitry A. Medvedev, “Go, Russia!” President of Russia, 2009.
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Sergey Lavrov, “Russia and the World in the 21h Century,” Russia in Global Affairs 3 (2008).
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Koncepciya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federacii 2008. President of Russia.
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Putin began his presidency with the claim that Russia needed to search for its own way
of renewal, not to copy the experience of others or transfer “abstract models and
schemes to the Russian soil.” It should also combine “the universal principles of market
economy and democracy with Russia’s reality.”44
There is not and could not be a political choice for Russia other than democracy.
At the same time, I would like to say and even stress: we share the universal
democratic principles that are accepted across the world. However, the Russian
democracy is the rule of the Russian people in particular, with its own traditions of
self-government, and not at all an implementation of the standards that were
imposed upon us from the outside45.
“Adaptation” marked the beginning of a decisive turn towards a revisionism and
critique of the Western liberal democracy. The revisionist trend in political discourse
summed up several fundamental “values” rooted in Russian traditions: the concept of
the “Russian idea” (Rossiyskaya ideya)46. It proclaimed that Russian democracy should
rest upon traditional orientations.
“Traditional consolidating values” highlighted in the late 1990s have turned out to be
key for the political discourse and institutional development of the following years47.
It took the form of accenting
 Patriotism,
 “Greatness of authority” (derzhavnost),
 Social solidarity with an “inclination to collective forms of life that dominate
over individualism,” along with
 “Statism” (gosudarstvennichestvo), a deep-rooted paternalistic disposition.
The idea of a “strong state” is crucial for the post-Soviet political discourse. The
traditionally important role of the state and state institutions was proclaimed as Russia’s
major difference from the developed Western countries, such as Great Britain and the
US.48
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48 Ibid.
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The state, its institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally
important role in the life of the country and its people . A strong state is not an
anomaly for a Russian man, not something to be fought, but, on the opposite, a
source and a guarantee of order, an origin and the major driving force for any
changes. Society desires a reinstatement of the regulatory and leading power of the
State to the extent, which would be required, considering the traditions and the
current condition of our country49.
The “strong state” is seen as a prerequisite for Russia’s democracy since “many Russian
democratic institutions are created from above.” “Civil society requires a strong state
as an instrument of development and maintenance of order, for defense and
strengthening of democratic institutes.”50
Despite public activism, wide social support and contribution to democratic changes in
late-1980s and early 1990s, the introduction of democratic institutions and practices or
reformation of the state on democratic grounds after the collapse of the Soviet Union
was to a greater degree a state-supervised policy. The articulated vision of the state and
its central role in the democratic reformation of post-Soviet Russia suggests the
continuity of the transformation initiated from above, much as it was in prerevolutionary imperial Russia and the Soviet “revolution from above” and Gorbachev’s
reformist project.
These ideas articulated and elaborated in political discourse laid the foundation for
alternative interpretations of the original Western models. Disagreements with Western
democracy, reconsideration of the relevance of the Western-type democracy to Russian
society, and a critique of the West for its hegemony and monopolization of the
democratic model (dissemination and intrusion of a specific form of democracy),
became more pronounced after the mid-2000s.
The conception of a “sovereign democracy”51 was introduced that suggested an
independent character for Russian democracy and that negated the relevance of other
democratic models. The new ideological framework became the climax of the political
discourse on the unique and national character of Russian democracy. The concept of
“sovereign democracy” was invented to propagate the Russian version of a “political
language” or “philosophy” that competes with other “languages” and “discourses”
(predominantly the Western ones) and communicates Russian-born ideas and
interpretations.
Ibid.
Poslanie prezidenta Federalnomu sobraniyu 2008.
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/19825
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This conception emanates from the notion that the foundation of the “sovereign
democracy” lies in the “cultural matrix” defining political practices: “striving toward
political wholeness through the centralization of power functions,” “idealization of the
goals of political struggle,” and “personification of political institutions”52. In the
present context, Russia’s modern political arrangement focuses on patrimonialism
embedded in a strong centralized state with personified authority. Power and authority,
embodied by President Putin, is again recognized as the source, the producer, and the
guarantee of the modern reforms.
The personification of political institutions is obvious. People say that in our
country personality displaces institutions. It seems to me that in our political culture
the individual personality is an institution—by no means the sole institution but a
very important one. The holistic outlook is emotional. It demands the literal
embodiment of images. Doctrines and programs do, of course, matter. But they
find expression, above all, through the image of a charismatic personality, and only
then with the aid of words and syllogisms53.
A special place in the discourse is devoted to the formula “if there is Putin – there is
Russia, if there is no Putin – there is no Russia.”54 In this statement, the President is
recognized as a condition for the Russia’s very existence in the current historical epoch,
and also as an embodiment of power and the nation. This contradicts the principle of
the “disembodiment” of power, law, and knowledge as a fundamental orientation of
Western democracy55.
The fundamental principles of the Putin state — the primacy of the state, the
consolidation, centralization and monopolization of power through the personification
of authority in the figure of the President as the embodiment of Russia, and as a
condition for the existence of the state — imply a fusion of the spheres of politics, law,
economy and culture. All this stands in opposition to the autonomy and independent
functions found in democratic societies.
Personified centralized authority concentrates resources and monopolizes the functions
governing these realms. It also awards itself the right to know and understand the needs
and paths of development of each sector, oftentimes ignoring public opinion, while coopting institutions of civil discussion and participation.
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Apart from this, the centralized structure of political life is in contention with the
pluralist dispositions of Western modernity, its ideals of openness and accessibility of
the political arena, distributed decentralized power and blurring of borders between the
center and the periphery56.
Political officials still pay lip service to the Western democratic ideals of a civil and
open society, the primacy of law, respect and support for human rights, although they
support the concept of "the special path” and the “Russian world.” Conservative and
traditionalist values emphasized in Putin’s last presidential term, along with antiWestern rhetoric and the critique of Western liberalism, stress the distinction between
“we” and “the Western Other.” Conservatism, traditionalism, and the increased
intolerance of “multiple forms of life” reveal a tension between traditional and modern
orientations. Interactions with the West assume a more revisionist shape.
Nationalistic and patriotic discourses in Russia respond to the lack of social solidarity
and a search for a national idea that integrates and unites numerous regions with diverse
cultural, religious, and historical backgrounds and different ways of interacting with the
central authority. Apology for the Soviet period and its imperi al imaginary and
continuing nostalgia for that very period remain key themes, along with patriotism and
Russian historical and cultural greatness.
According to Blokker57, “the dual return of nationalism and religion” in some European
post-Communist societies where it had gained wide social support is a “form of critique
and response to the predominant narratives of liberalism and Europeanism, bemoaning
the lack of local autonomy, the fragmentation of societies, and the undermining of
traditions and social cohesion.” Two types of responses compensate for the state of
uncertainty and lack of identity accompanying the post−Communist transformations:
reliance on the universality of Europeanness and liberal democracy, or invocation of
local traditions and identities. In reality “this dual understanding of modernity is
strongly intertwined” as “a duality of openness and closure”58. The case of Russian
post-Communist experience of modernity clearly approves of this ambivalent and
contradictory orientation.
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Conclusion
The modernization that took place in Russia in the post-Soviet period cannot be
considered in the normative perspective of a replication of the Western model of liberal
democracy. The experience of other post-Soviet and post-Communist countries
demonstrates a variety of responses to the Western modernity project. The post-Soviet
transformations should be regarded as a version of modernity originating and unfolding
in response to the post-Communist “re-encounter” with the Western democratic project.
It entailed complex interactions between traditional and modernizing forces, new
understanding and creative interpretation of modernity inspired and derived from
certain aspects of enduring civilizational forms, traditional structures, and historical
legacies.
The Western project of modernity was a factor in Russia’s turn toward liberal
democracy and market economy, along with its themes of individualization, autonomy,
emancipation, and pluralism. In 1994, Yeltsin defined Russia as a “democratic, federal,
constitutional, social and secular state.”59 Political discourse of the early 1990s was
characterized by a positive perception of Western ideas and models as constituents of a
reliable universal project of a modernization that might be able to open and emancipate
Russia from a totalitarian past. This initiative was supported by a civilizational
discourse stressing a “return to civilization”. However, since the end of 1990s, the
Western program has been criticized. It was challenged by the concept of Russia’s
“special path,” the “Russian idea” (Rossiyskaya idea), “Russian world” (Russkiy mir),
Russian “state-civilization”, and a messianic framework.
The political discourse on Western modernity strongly corresponds with the discourse
on Russia’s civilizational identity (European, “unique civilization,” Eurasian, “statecivilization.”) It revives traditional orientations and representations (“collective forms
of life”, statism, paternalistic attitudes, the “strong state,” transformation from above,
and imperial imagery.) They provide contextual interpretations of some basic
components of the Western project (e.g., the conception of “sovereign democracy”) that
support and legitimize a reshaping of the Western models. At the same time, the
exceptionalist political conceptions are dissonant with the universalistic orientation of
Western modernity.
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The imperial legacy and the experience of Soviet modernity have intervened to confront
the Western program with the local Russian traditions of political culture and political
participation. The repercussion of imperial imaginary is noticeable in the culturalpolitical frameworks of Eurasianism and Russkiy mir (Russian world), apology and
nostalgic images of the USSR as a superpower, and in the political messianism designed
to oppose the Western hegemony.
Official discourse presents the West in terms of messianism, universalism, absolutism
and imperialism and defines Russian/ Eurasian/ Orthodox civilization in opposition to
these aggressive tendencies60. The opposition of the “Russian world” to the West and
the idea of an external threat to Russian sovereignty, traditional values and uniqueness,
are apparent in the new ideological project and discourse that emerged in recent years.
However, on the historical “fork in the road,” signified by “Russia has chosen
democracy”61 and self-isolationism is “the way we will never follow”62. Democratic
values are understood to be universal, although the universality of the Western
framework for the construction of a democratic society and its relevance for
contemporary Russia are now contested.
Retraditionalization and restoration of the symbolic and ideological repertoire from the
recent non-democratic past are on the march with the introduction of a series of legal,
political, and social reforms that strengthened state capacity, promoted centralization,
and consolidation of power and constrained the public sphere and autonomy. The
modern Russian political system model has evolved into a super-presidential republic,
which is characterized by the lack of any considerable separation of powers, as the
president is vested with near-absolute executive and legislative powers. Such a system
resembles the preceding historical forms of absolutism and constitutional monarchy and
restores historical continuity of the legal tradition 63. This regime can be defined as
“authoritarian democracy”. The definition expresses “an opinion made up of a unique
combination of democracy and authoritarianism, whose contradictory relations are
dialectically reproduced at a new convolution, each time creating a similar synthesis”,
and “there can emerge and exist various forms of restricted democracy and
authoritarianism.”64
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The idea of a strong state is characteristic of some modern democratic regimes, although
“high-capacity states” always run the risk of de-democratization65. The civilizational
dimension of this problem is fundamental, although “fragility and instability are
inherent in the very constitution of modern constitutional-democratic regimes”66.
The revival of the meanings and ideas of the traditional political culture is a twofold
issue. It is instrumental in the sense that it provides cultural infrastructure that is able
to legitimize the restauration of the patrimonial-authoritarian configuration behind a
democratic façade. However, in Russia, it is also a reflection and an effect of a broader
cultural context of meanings and imaginaries integrated into the long-term civilizational
pattern of culture and power.
Although one may conclude that Russia cannot escape her non-democratic historical
path, the post-Communist era is notable for a renewed and expanded horizon of
meanings enriched by the democratic imaginary. Along with creative interpretations of
traditions, this intensifies the tension and competition between different perspectives
and social imaginaries that may inform and produce new societal forms and projects.
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The Challenge to Religious Tolerance:
Fundamentalists’ Resistance to a Non-Muslim Leader in Indonesia
Hisanori Kato
Introduction
The largest mosque in Southeast Asia, called Istiqlal, stands across the street from a
Catholic cathedral in the center of the Indonesian capital, Jakarta. These two major
religious buildings in Indonesia stand in a rather peaceful setting. In addition, Candi
Borobudur, which is located in Central Java, is the largest and oldest single Buddhist
monument in the world, with more than a 1,200-year-long history. Despite the fact that
Indonesia is the most populous Muslim nation in the world,1 Indonesia has boasted of
its religious tolerance for centuries.
Indonesia’s multi-religious character has necessitated mutual respect and harmonious
co-existence among religions throughout its recorded history. Indonesia’s national
motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which means unity in diversity,2 constitutes an
ideological pillar of the country. Not only do cultural heritages express mutual
tolerance, but also the political arrangement of the country has been pledged to religious
tolerance since the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia.
In fact, at the end of World War II, the preparatory committee for Indonesia’s
independence drafted a constitution that promised the implementation of Sharia law for
Muslims. However, the sentence that stated this constitutional obligation was deleted
when the constitution was officially promulgated.3 Moreover, the national policy to
respect all religions has been installed as Pancasila in the constitution of the Republic
of Indonesia.4 This political disposition clearly shows Indonesia’s commitment to the
creation of a harmonious society, in which the majority religion, Islam, and other
minority religions can coexist peacefully.

1

According to the official statistics, the proportion of the followers of the six major religions in
Indonesia is as follows: Islam 87.18; Protestant 6.96; Catholic 2.91; Hindu 1.69; Buddhism 0.72;
Confucianism 0.05 and others. See, the official website of National Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat
Statistik) at: http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?searchtabel=Penduduk+Menurut+Kelompok+Umur+dan+Agama+yang+Dianut&tid=320&searchwilayah=Indonesia&wid=0000000000&lang=id
2
This state motto was mentioned in the poetry of Tantular in the time of the Majapahit Kingdom
(1293-1527). The original meaning is “they are different, but they are same”.
3
Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, Modern Indonesia, (London: 1995), 15.
4
Pancasila includes five major principles: Belief in God; National Unity; Humanitarianism; People’s
Sovereignty; Social Justice and Prosperity. The first principle “Belief in God” refers not only to Allah
but also to God of any religion.
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Nonetheless, it is also true that religious tolerance in Indonesia has been disturbed from
time to time in history, such as the nationwide 1998 riots at the time of the fall of the
Suharto regime.5 We witness another example that challenges religious tolerance in
Indonesia in 2017: a politician who is a non-Muslim Christian (Protestant) and of
Chinese descent was running for the governorship in contest with Muslim candidates.
This Chinese-Christian politician, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, or popularly known as
Ahok, has been criticized and accused of blasphemy for his comments on al-Quran
during his campaign in September 2016. As a result, he was defeated in the
gubernatorial election in April 2017 and was sentenced for two years imprisonment for
blasphemy after the election.6
It is important to question whether a long-standing tradition of religious tolerance in
Indonesia has been overturned by this political event. Equally important is that we
explore the influence of religion in relation to the socio-political behavior of people. In
the following parts of this paper, we attempt to find answers to these questions and to
comprehend the meaning of this political event thoroughly.
The Background of Ahok
Ahok rose in political prominence when he paired with Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi,
then the mayor of Surakarta, for vice-governorship of Jakarta in 2012, although his
political career started in 2005, when he was elected to serve as the regent of east
Belitung.7 He was also a member of parliament between 2009 and 2012 until he joined
the gubernatorial race with Jokowi. This newly emerging pair from outside of Jakarta
with business backgrounds gained a great amount of popularity with the masses and
were successfully elected governor and vice-governor, respectively, of Special
Designated Capital Jakarta (or DKI Jakarta) in 2012.
The political path of Jokowi, however, continued to the highest position of the republic,
when he was elected the president of Indonesia in 2014. Consequently, the vicegovernor, Ahok, was elevated to become governor of DKI Jakarta. It was his first
gubernatorial election as a governor in 2017, when he paired with a former mayor of
the east Javanese town of Blitar, Djarot Saiful Hidayat, who became a deputy in Ahok’s
administration in 2014.

5

During that time, ethnically Chinese Indonesian became a target, and a vast amount of Chinese
descendants were victimised by murder, plunder and rape.
6
Ahok is preparing to appeal to the higher court in May 2017 (the time at which this paper is being
written).
7
Belitung is an island near Sumatra and belongs to the province of the Bangka-Belitung Islands.
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During his governorship, Ahok confronted DKI Jakarta parliament members accused
of corruption. He made the decision to make the process more transparent by
broadcasting the meetings live via YouTube. With these novel means regarding
governing DKI Jakarta, Ahok, in spite of his religious and ethnic background, has
become one of the rising stars in Indonesian politics. On the other hand, Ahok has often
been criticized for his outspokenness and straightforwardness, as it is culturally thought
to be more acceptable and polite if one is modest and indirect in Indonesia. However,
Ahok believes it is far more important to be professional than to follow traditional
Indonesian manners.8
Controversial Comment and the Reaction from Muslims
It was widely expected that Ahok would be the first non-Muslim and non-pribumi9
governor of Jakarta until the end of September 2016, as his popularity was high.
However, the tide started to drastically turn for him after he delivered a speech on Pulau
Seribu, an island near Jakarta, during his campaign on 27 September 2016. He explained
the social welfare programs that his government intended to implement and encouraged
the constituency of the island to vote for him. However, during his speech, he
mentioned one of the verses of al-Quran related to the relationship between Muslims
and non-believers such as Christians and Jews. The following is the script of his
comment:
Bapak/Ibu (ladies and gentlemen) may not vote for me, because (you have been)
lied to by (someone using) Surah al-Maidah verse 51 etc. … So if you cannot vote
for me because you are afraid of being condemned to hell you do not need to feel
uneasy as you are being fooled. It is all right.10
Verse 51 of al-Maidah reads as follows: “Believers, take neither the Jews nor the
Christians for your friends. They are friends with one another. Whoever of you seeks
their friendship shall become one of their number. God does not guide the
wrongdoers.”11 This verse is often cited as a theological ground to reject a non-Muslim
leader in a Muslim-dominated community.
After the edited footage of his speech was uploaded on YouTube, severe condemnations
and criticisms of Ahok became ubiquitous, in which Ahok was accused of “insulting”
Islam. Ahok swiftly made a public apology for his comment and attempted to subdue
the antagonistic sentiments targeted at him. His own words read as follows:
8

The author of this paper was told this by Ahok during a meeting with a group of Presidential Friends
of Indonesia on 13 August 2014.
9
Pribumi means native, and it usually refers to an ethnically Indonesian Muslim.
10
Jakarta Post, 10 October 2016. The original script of his speech in Indonesian can be found on the
BBC website at: http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-37996601 (last accessed 5th June 2017)
11
Al-Quran 5-51
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I apologize to Muslims or other people who feel offended. I never intended to insult
Islam or al-Quran. I am not an Islam specialist…. If you watch it (the video), you
know that I have no intention to insult Islam. …. Even people (Muslims) who were
there laughed over my comment.12
Despite Ahok’s effort to minimize the political damage caused by this incident, the
situation became threatening to him as the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI), the
highest Islamic authority in Indonesia, issued a statement to condemn him. The MUI
concluded that Ahok was subject to punishment, as he insulted both Islam and the ulama
(Muslim scholars) in the statement. In the same document, the MUI also encouraged
judicial authorities to take a swift legal action against Ahok.13
It seems that MUI’s statement played an important role in bringing about an emotional
reaction from umat Islam (Islamic community) in Indonesia in the face of Ahok’s
comment. The first mass rally condemning Ahok took place in Jakarta on 14 October
2016, and it is said that around 30,000 to 50,000 people joined the demonstration.14 A
greater number of people joined another Islamic mass movement in Jakarta on 4
November 2016. About 100,000 people gathered at the Istiqlal Mosque for their Friday
prayer and marched to the State Palace nearby. Another mass rally was held on 2
December with about 500,000 participants. These demonstrations were organised by
one of the radical Islamic groups called Front Pembela Islam, better known as FPI.
The concern of President Jokowi’s government was that a possible religiously-driven
riot would cause a serious social division in Indonesia. However, the government
managed to prevent the participants from becoming violent, and thereby avoided
physical destruction of Jakarta. The police and the military deployed 20,000 and 5,000
personnel respectively in order to maintain security in the areas of demonstration. In
addition to the tight security measures, a sermon given by Masaruddin Umar, the imam
of Istiqlal Mosque, seems to have contributed to a rather peaceful movement, for he
emphasized the importance of Muslims not to be “excessive”, as it is stated in alQuran.15

12

Republika, 10 October 2016; The Jakarta Post, 10 October 2016. Some Indonesian parts have been
translated by the author of this paper.
13
The original text is available at: http://www.berita.islamedia.id/2017/02/inilah-tanggapan-lengkapmui-atas-tuduhan-pengacara-ahok-terhadap-ketua-MUI.html
14
Jakarta Post, 3 November 2016.
15
Jakarta Post, 4 November 2016.
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It is possible to understand the demonstrations as opportunities for Muslims to express
their indignation and hatred towards a non-Muslim leader, Ahok. Yet, it is also true
that it was an occasion for the whole umat Islam in Indonesia to reaffirm their solidarity
among Muslims, although we cannot deny the fact that there was sentiment against
Ahok during the rally. Ahmad Rais, an executive member of the Ma’arif Institute in
Jakarta stated that “many people joined the Friday prayer and rally on 4 November
because they merely like to feel the religious atmosphere.16 Andi Makmur Makka, a
noted writer and journalist, also expressed his view that the motivation of the
participants of the mass rally on 4 November was not necessarily a merely “anti-Ahok”
sentiment, but rather they were willing to be a part of a “trendy” religious movement
without knowing the substance of the issue.17
Having said this, the political damage that Ahok incurred was by no means trivial. The
popularity of Ahok dropped swiftly, and one of the surveys conducted after Ahok’s
comment showed that any of the three pairs competing for the governorship of DKI
Jakarta, Ahok-Djarot, Anies-Sandiaga, and Agus-Silviana, could win the election.18
Umat Divided over the Ahok Issue
The hailstorm of criticism and the demand for punishment against Ahok were
spontaneously promoted by quite a few fundamentalist groups apart from the FPI. One
of these groups was Jamaah Anshorusy Syariah (JAS). They expressed their distress
and demanded a public apology from Ahok in a statement issued on 7 October 2016.
H. A. Fallah, the leader of the Jakarta Charter of JAS, explained that the punishment
against Ahok should be twofold: religious and secular. Fallah said that although the
apology made by Ahok can be accepted, there remains the possibility of punishment
based on the national secular legal system.19 Fallah also admits that, should Ahok be
elected governor, there would be no choice for him but to accept him, as Shari'a has not
been implemented in Indonesia.20
Abdul Rohim, another prominent leader of JAS, expressed his distress that president
Jokowi is close to communist China.21 The implication of this statement is that the team
of Jokowi and the Chinese-Indonesian Ahok would weaken the position of Islam in the
country. It should be noted that the anti-communist campaign at the end of 2016
became more prevalent, with quite a few banners posted in various parts of the country.
The political nature of the Ahok issue will be discussed in the later part of this paper.
16

Interview with the author in Kalibata, 27 December 2016.
Interview with the author in Kebon Juruk, 25 December 2016.
18
According to the survey conducted by the Populi Centre, the approval rate of Ahok-Djarot is 36.7%,
while Anies-Sandi’s is 28.5% and Agus-Sylviana’s is 25%. Jakarta Post, 30 January 2017.
19
Interview with the author in Depok, 25 December 2015.
20
Interview with the author in Depok, 25 December 2015.
21
Interview with the author in Solo, 3 January 2016.
17
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Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which aims to establish a “legitimate caliphate,” also
severely rejected Ahok. Ismail Yusanto, one of the highest executives in HTI, explained
that HTI never accepted non-Muslims as leaders and never tolerated anyone who insults
al-Quran.22 Unlike some political parties such as Partai Kadilan Sejathera (PKS), HTI
has never supported non-Muslim candidates for the provincial elections.23 Yusanto
genuinely believes that the anti-Ahok mass rallies are the expression of Muslim
determination to defend Islam. At the same time, Yusanto understands there might be
political interest behind the anti-Ahok movement; however, he believes it is still more
important to follow the Islamic duty of condemning blasphemy.
In contrast to those who reject Ahok, there are still some who support and legitimize
his political position. Abdurrahman Wahid, also known as Gus Dur (who was the fourth
president of Indonesia and a respected Muslim scholar), once conveyed his view on
non-Muslim governorship in 2007.24 Gus Dur clearly stated that one could not connect
religion and secular governorship; thus, there was no obstacle for Muslims to elect a
non-Muslim as a governor. He also added that this does not imply Muslims should
convert to Christianity when choosing a Christian governor. 25 Gus Dur’s view was
echoed by the fifth and first woman president of Indonesia, Megawati Sukarnoputri,
who stated that “we’re not voting for a religious leader. We will vote for an
administrative leader.”26
Arif Safri presented a theological argument, saying that Muslims are allowed to have
their own political decisions. He cited one of the verses of al-Quran to substantiate his
argument, that is, “If Allah so willed, He could make you all one People: but he leaves
straying whom He pleases, and He guides whom He pleases.”27 Arif also sees a
semantic problem in the Ahok issue regarding the content of al-Maidah-51. According
to Arif, who is an Arabic expert, the word “awlya” ( translated as “friends” in the
English version of al-Quran) means “close friends,” not “leader,” although some
conservative Muslims understand awlya as leader as well. Thus, Arif believes that the
anti-Ahok movement, which is attempting to delegitimize Ahok as a governor of DKI
Jakarta, has lost ground.

22

Interview with the author in Kalibata, 28 December 2016.
For example, PKS supported a non-Muslim candidate for the governor of the province of Papua
Barat in February 2017.
24
Abdurrahman Wahid was a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia;
he died in 2009.
25
Gus Dur delivered this speech, joining Ahok’s campaign when Ahok ran for the governor of BangkaBelitung province in 2007. Full footage of his speech can viewed at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9sSAksVZFk
26
Jakarta Post, 15 March 2015.
27
al-Quran: 16-93
23
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These less-conventional interpretations of theology presented by Arif are the reflection
of his ideas that one should have a contextual understanding of Islam rather than a literal
understanding.28 This stance is echoed by other scholars who believe that contemporary
social conditions should be considered in relation to the interpretation of Islam. For
example, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im stated that “what is suggested is that the Qur’an
and Sunna have been the source of Shari’a as the Islamic response to the concrete
realities of the past and must be the source of modern Shari’a as the Islamic response
to the concrete realities of today.”29
R. Ghannouchi also believes that it is possible for Muslims to have a broader
perspective and that they could support a non-Islamic government prior to establishing
their religious government.30 Both Gus Dur and Arif seem willing to bring about a more
inclusive society with Indonesia’s socio-cultural reality in mind.
Ahmad Syafii Ma’arif, a respected Muslim scholar and former leader of the nation’s
second largest Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah, also expressed his support for
Ahok and criticised the statement issued by MUI. He expounded that Ahok had no
intention to insult al-Quran or ulama when making his speech on Pulau Seribu in
September 2016. In his own words;
Ahok was talking about people who use al-Maidah to discourage people to vote for
him. That is why the word, “pakai” (use) is mentioned in his speech. Ahok himself
did not question the credibility of al-Quran itself at all. He did not insult al-Quran
or ulama.31
He also deplores that an exclusionary attitude of Muslim thinkers is becoming more
pervasive in Indonesia, saying that the core principle of Islam is that all existence in this
world created by Allah should be blessed and appreciated. He cites one of the verses
from al-Quran, that is, “We sent thee not, but as a Mercy for all creatures.”32 He hopes
that there will be a new generation with a “calmer” and “wiser” attitude regarding
understanding Indonesian politics, implying that a political motive is behind the Ahok
issue.33

28

Interview with the author in Kota Gede, 1 January 2017.
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation , (New York: 1996), 143-144.
30
Rachid Ghannouchi, “Participation in non-Islamic Government”, in Liberal Islam, ed. Charles
Kurzman, (New York: 1998), 91-93.
29

31

Interview with the author in Yogyakarta, 2 January, 2017.
al-Quran: 21-107
33
Ma’arif, Syafii Ahmad, Tempo, 2 December 2016
32
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The Political Side of the Ahok Issue
It is true that the momentum of the anti-Ahok movement is endorsed by a religious
sentiment of the masses. However, we still need to understand this religious
phenomenon within the political climate of Indonesia. We, in fact, find complex
political elements behind the gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta in 2017, which was
widely believed to be the preliminary skirmish for the presidential election that will take
place in 2019. The popularity of Ahok is tacitly regarded as the approval of the
constituency for Jokowi, and it is vital for those who intend to compete with current
president Jokowi in 2019 to overtake Ahok.
Each gubernatorial candidate for DKI Jakarta in 2017 seems to have his own political
agenda. Anies is supported by a political party called Gerakan Indonesia Raya
(Gerindra), chaired by Prabowo Subianto, a former son-in-law of Suharto. The origin
of the political rivalry between Prabowo Subianto and Jokowi was firmly seeded in the
time of the presidential election in 2014, when both ran for the highest position of the
Republic of Indonesia. Despite the fact that Jokowi, then Jakarta governor with his
deputy Ahok, was declared the winner of the election, Prabowo Subianto refused to
accept the results.
Although Prabowo had to accept the decision of the Constitutional Court that
acknowledged the victory of Jokowi in the end, we can assume that Prabowo Subianto
still holds his firm ambition to take Jokowi’s position in the next presidential election
in 2019. Therefore, it was crucially important for Anies, as a representative of Prabowo,
to win the gubernatorial election in order to display the political potential of Gerindra.
Agus Yudhoyono, another candidate in the gubernatorial election of DKI Jakarta in
2017, is a son of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono desperately
needs to maintain his party’s presence in the national political arena in order to face the
presidential election in 2019. We can easily imagine that Ahok’s comment on al-Quran
could be utilised by his competitors as a political weapon to discredit Ahok. Thus, the
mobilisation of anti-Ahok rallies in October, November, and December could be the
result of a political manoeuvre to curtail the political credibility of Ahok by his
opponents.
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Knowing this political nature of the Ahok issue, we need to remember one of the darkest
political memories in Indonesia, that is, the killings of Communist Party (PKI) members
in the mid-1960s.34 This incident, called Gerakan September Tiga Puluf or Gestapu, is
still regarded as taboo in Indonesia, which results in “the absence of public discussion
and careful study of the killings.”35 For Indonesians, should one be branded as a
communist or should one’s family be related to Gestapu, this means a termination of
social life in the country.
The term Gestapu invariably reminds Indonesians of the influence of China. Thus, the
combination of being Chinese and Communist is the worst social status in the country.
The greater presence of Chinese, including manual laborers, in Indonesia has been a
much debated political issue since 2016, which was the time of the gubernatorial
election. Jokowi’s administration,36 in fact, has been troubled by so-called “fake news”
in relation to Chinese migrant workers by his political opponents.37 Ahok, with his
Chinese background, is vulnerable to tacit antipathy of Gestapu and the Chinese
presence in Indonesia.
It is true that banners that read “Waspadai Bangkitnya PKI! ” (Be careful with the
revival of PKI) were ubiquitous in various parts of Indonesia in the time of the election
campaign. Needless to say, this trend can be seen as a patriotic movement that intends
to safeguard Indonesia from Communism and the economic invasion of China.
However, it is also plausible to regard this as the attempt to discredit Ahok, implying
that he is a symbol of the Chinese invasion into Indonesia and the revival of
Communism.

34

On 30 September 1965, it is said that some Communist members attempted to seize power in a coup
d’état. However, they were swiftly subdued by General Suharto, and it resulted in the fall of Sukarno,
the first president of Indonesia, and the mass killing of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
members and their sympathisers.
35
John Rosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, (London: 2006), 24.
36
For example, Fadli Zon, vice-speaker of the parliament and secretary general of Gerindra expressed
his concern that an increase of the Chinese labour force would be a “threat” to the Indonesian local
labour market. See, Parlementaria, Edisi 145th, XLVII 2017, pp.8-9.
37
In December 2016, Joko Widodo gave instructions to investigate the source of the “fake news” that
reported that 10 million Chinese workers had already entered Indonesia, which was untrue. The Straits
Times, 10 January, 2017
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The End of Tolerance?
Ahok appeared to be the most popular candidate among the three contenders, with
42.96% of the vote, while Anies and Agus obtained 39.97% and 17.06% respectively
when the first round of the election took place on 15 February 2017.38 As none of the
candidates were successful in obtaining 50% of the vote, the first two candidates, that
is, Ahok and Anies, proceeded to the final round of the election on 19 April 2017. The
final choice of the constituency of Jakarta was Anies, who received 57.95% of the votes,
while Ahok obtained 42.05% of them.39
Some may perceive this as an apprehensive development in the country in relation to
religious harmony.40 However, it is too hasty to conclude that this is the end of religious
tolerance in Indonesia. First of all, we should remember that the margin between the
two candidates in the final round of the election was rather slim, with a difference of
less than 900,000. This suggests that there is still a vast amount of Muslims who voted
for Ahok, a non-Muslim.
Secondly, Nahdulatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which are the two most
influential Muslim organisations in the country, have maintained carefully disciplined
composure regarding the Ahok issue. Both organizations cautiously called on their
members not to be influenced by political propaganda.41 For example, Said Aqil Siradj,
the chairperson of NU, clearly stated that the members of NU would not be allowed to
participate in an anti-Ahok Rally in November, while Muhammadiyah discouraged their
members from joining it.42 In addition, NU warmly accepted Ahok to their prayer,
which was held at al-Huda Mosque, even after Ahok made a comment on al-Quran in
September 2016.43

38
Indonesian Election Commission Official website:
https://pilkada2017.kpu.go.id/hasil/t1/dki_jakarta( last accessed on 3 May 2017)
39
Indonesian Election Commission Official website:
https://pilkada2017.kpu.go.id/hasil/2/t1/dki_jakarta (last accessed on 3 May 2017) The website also
shows the total number of votes for the two candidates, that is, 3,240,332 votes for Anies and 2,351,245
votes for Ahok.
40
The Economist reported on this election with a headline that reads: “A tense election threatens
Indonesia’s religious tolerance”. It also says that “Mr Baswedan(Anies) is not about to impose Islamic
law in Jakarta. But hardline forces helped him win. That genie is not easily returned to the bottle”. See,
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21721144-hardline-muslim-agitators-help-defeat-christianincumbent-tense-election-threatens
41
Prior to the final round of the election, Said Aqil Siradj, the chairperson of NU, expressed the
political neutrality of NU, saying that “if you are happy with Ahok, choose Ahok, and if you are happy
with Anies, choose Anies. http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/76818/kiai-said-islam-agama-mulia-belalahdengan-cara-mulia (last accessed 4 June, 2017)
42
Jakarta Post, 1 November 2016.
43
Jakarta Post, 6 February, 2017.
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Taufiq Damas, a young NU activist, also showed his support for Ahok, saying that
“Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) has shown great attention to Muslims in his
achievement…” 44 Taufiq also emphasised that the Republic’s constitution, which has
never prevented anyone from taking a governmental position regardless of religion,
should be appreciated.45
Thirdly, we need to understand the temperamental influence of religion over the attitude
of the Indonesian people. Before Ahok made his comment on al-Maida 51 in
September 2016, his popularity was high enough to assure his governorship.46 The
author also conducted unofficial interviews with some residents of Jakarta in March
2016; the interviewees included taxi drivers, food venders, and shop clerks. It is no
exaggeration to say that 8 out of 10 of these people showed support to Ahok. However,
Ahok’s popularity dropped rapidly after the Pulau Seribu incident in September 2016.
This means that his comment on al-Quran offended the feelings of Muslims.
Nonetheless, we have already observed that Ahok managed to secure most of his votes
in the first round of the election, and much of Ahok’s support came from Muslims.
Muslims who still support Ahok after the incident of September 2016 possess their own
steadfast religious and political attitudes, which are on their face tolerant and moderate.
However, it is important to note that there are certain Muslims who swung to the antiAhok camp after the incident. It can be assumed that these Muslims have not
established their own firm religious and political positions, and we might call them the
“vacillating mass.” They are by no means so-called fundamentalists who endorse
religious rigidity. They are, however, more vulnerable to “fake news.”
It is more precise to say that their emotions have been stirred by Ahok’s comment, and
they feel that Islam was insulted. Furthermore, religion has a way of making people
emotional, for they feel that their existence itself is denied when their faith is
downplayed. This “offended feeling,” in fact, brought the vacillating mass to the antiAhok side, without a serious examination of what was intended by Ahok. In other
words, should there be an event that reflects positively on Islam, they would have a
favorable emotional response towards whoever brought about that event.

44

Jakarta Post, 22 October, 2016.
Ibid.
46
According to one of the surveys, the approval rate for Ahok in March 2016 was 59.3%. See: Jakarta
Post, 7 October 2016.
45
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It is interesting to see the survey that shows the degree of satisfaction of Jakarta
residents towards the performance of Ahok’s government. Although Ahok was not
chosen as a governor, the survey conducted by Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesia
Survey Organization) right before the election shows that the satisfaction rate towards
Ahok’s administration reached 73 %.47 This might suggest that the trend against Ahok
is caused by impulsive emotional reactions and is, thus, temporary. Furthermore, the
emotional effect of religion might have diverted some Muslim voters from supporting
Ahok.
Conclusion
The Ahok issue is far from over as the North Jakarta District Court found Ahok guilty
of blasphemy and sentenced him to two years of imprisonment on 9 May 2017. After
the verdict, Ahok expressed his intention to appeal to the higher court. It will take a
rather longer period to bring his struggle to an end.
It is true that the Ahok issue has presented a serious challenge to religious tolerance in
Indonesia; however, it is misleading to conclude that the result of the gubernatorial
election in 2017 automatically means the termination of Indonesia’s tradition of
religious harmony. Statistics shows that Ahok still has a significant supporters who are
presumably Muslim. In addition, influential Islamic organizations, such as NU, still
maintain a rather tolerant attitude towards Ahok. The Ahok issue is deeply related to
secular politics, including the presidential election in 2019. It is more correct to
understand the anti-Ahok movement in relation to the political reality in the country
rather than the substantial religious attitude of the people.
Most important, however, we should remember that the anti-Ahok trend has been
influenced by a volatile aspect of religion, which incites the emotions of its followers.
This factor moved the vacillating mass to adopt a seemingly intolerant attitude.
Nonetheless, this sort of emotional reaction can be impetuous. Yet, the possibility of
the most populous Muslim country, Indonesia, becoming more intolerant cannot be
ruled out, for the “vacillating masses” could come to possess a more exclusive ideology
towards non-Muslims. Thus, it is vital that Muslim scholars such as Syafiie Ma’arif
and Afrif, mentioned above, constantly exhibit their inclusive and tolerant views
towards non-Muslims, reminding all Muslims of the importance of being rational in
relation to Islamic practice, just as a noted Muslim scholar, Nurcholish Madjid,
encouraged Muslim intellectuals to pursue a progressive attitude in thinking.

47

13 April 2017, Detik.com News
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Workplace Bullying II:
A Civilizational Shortcoming Examined in a Comparative Content Analysis
Leah P. Hollis
Abstract
According to Freud, civilization is meant to protect humans from the forces of nature,
to protect human frailty; but then, paradoxically, it falls short of such protection by its
lack of concomitant regulation (1991). In fact, civilized service to society, delivered
via organizations, creates strife and anxiety. While civilization is a structure created to
protect people from nature and to support a frail humanity, its rules and power structures
yield aggression, spawning the need for people to control each other (Freud & Strachey,
1991).
Such control and the power structures that arise within organizations can be considered
the root of workplace bullying, aggression, and incivility in our putatively civilized
structures of work. Consequently, global researchers strive to make sense of incivility
within civilization, a structure that generates aggravation although it was originally
developed to provide protection.
Northern Europeans have led research efforts to analyze the psychological impact of
workplace bullying for employees, observing the protection of human frailty as
described by Freud. While researchers in the United States over the last twenty years
have also paid considerable attention to workplace bullying, within the legal lexicon of
the United States many consider workplace bullying as a status-free harassment, and
other researchers consider bullying as but another form of harassment. The American
approach aligns with Freud’s assertion that civilization ̶ with its “sum of achievement
and regulations” ̶ still yields unhappiness among mankind.
Thus, there are different approaches to considering workplace bullying.
Methodologically, this article utilizes a content analysis of sixty articles to present some
differences in how two civilizations analyze workplace bullying. The content analysis
reveals that European researchers are more likely to discuss workplace bullying as a
health and wellness issue, while United States researchers tend to focus on
organizational policies and legal issues.
While this content analysis presents a difference in approaches, it is not intended to
establish that a mutually exclusive approach to workplace bullying exists between these
two cultures.
Keywords: Workplace bullying, chronic health issues, legal issues, civilization
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Introduction
In June of 2014, I presented a lecture during the “9th International Congress on
Workplace Bullying and Harassment” at the University of Milan. With the theme
“promoting dignity and justice at work,” the International Association on Workplace
Bullying and Harassment hosted scholars from over twenty countries. The conference
offered different perspectives related to workplace bullying, such as legislative
considerations, cyber-bullying, and prevention.
The health results and psychological effects of workplace bullying were typically
presented by European scholars. These European papers offered research beyond the
litigious consternation that has an impact on organizational cost and productivity.
Examples of such papers are as follows: “Sleep problems and workplace bullying: Is
leisure-time physical activity a mediator or moderator?” authored by Asa Marie Hansen
from Denmark; “Daily interpersonal conflicts and positive and negative effects among
naval cadets: the moderating role of neuroticism,” authored by Jorn Hetland of Norway;
and “Psychological distress is associated with reduced cognitive performance victims
of workplace bullying,” authored by Luca Neri, from Italy. Such perspectives from the
Europeans considered how the target’s health and wellbeing are eroded through
workplace bullying.
Since this conference, I have had the opportunity to present at various colleges and
universities across the United States. Participants in the United States typically ask
about legal action to deter a bully, or whether workplace bullying is actionable in court.
Those suffering targets seek ways to bring justice to the bully, yet they seem startled
when we discuss the impact of such abuse on the target’s health and well-being.
For Americans, the discussion of health issues pales in comparison to the desire to exact
damages from the organization that allows for bullying. During such campus visits,
targets complain, nevertheless, of the escalating health costs that result from workplace
bullying: inflamed nerves, sleep problems, and migraine headaches. However, while
targets of workplace bullying in the United States ask about referrals to lawyers they
typically do not ask about doctors or psychologists to mitigate the stress-induced health
problems. The American culture focuses on steps to resolve workplace bullying issues
in court; often the health-related issues are viewed as a happenstance or by-product,
instead of a compelling consequence of working in an aggressive environment.
Referring to Freud, we may reflect on how the focus in the United States is on the lack
of regulation, instead of a primary focus falling on compromised human frailty in the
face of workplace bullying.
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Literature Review
Global scholars consider workplace bullying using disparate terms. In Europe, scholars
have used a “negative acts” questionnaire to capture data about workplace aggression.
Researchers have used terms such as “incivility” and “aggression” (Cortina, Magley,
Williams, & Langhout, 2001); yet American scholars use “status-free harassment”
(Yamada, 1999) to describe workplace bullying. Other terms such as “psychological
harassment,” “harassment moral,” or “mobbing” are also used to discuss workplace
bullying (Crawshaw, 2009).
As workplace bullying remains a global problem, researchers have examined the effects
of incivility and workplace bullying (Björkqvist, Österman, & Hjelt-Bäck, 1994;
Branch, Ramsay, & Barker, 2013; 2012; Einarsen, Hotel, Zapf, & Cooper, 2011; Hollis,
2016b; Namie & Namie, 2009; Zabrodska & Kveton, 2013). More specifically, some
European scholars have considered the effect on the targets’ health and wellness
(Djurkovic, McCormack, & Casimir, 2008; Hallberg, & Strandmark, 2006; Rayner,
1997).
Workplace bullying creates a psychological stress within those targeted by such
aggression. Stressful experiences can lead to depression, anxiety, and sleep disorders.
Psychological stress and poor health were found in Vartia’s (2001) study of 949
Norwegian employees who dealt with bullying. In turn, these employees were more
likely to use medication to sleep or rely on sedatives. In a study of 1100 British National
Health Service employees, Quine (1999) confirmed that 42% of workers experienced
workplace bullying that led to clinical depression. Other European researchers,
Rodríguez-Muñoz, Notelaers and Moreno-Jiménez (2011) and Vartia (2001), also
reported a relationship between workplace bullying and the targets’ subsequent
depression and sleep issues.
These European examples align with Freud’s notion that a “person becomes neurotic
because he cannot tolerate the amount of frustration which society imposes on him in
the service of cultural ideas” (Freud & Strachey, 1991, p. 16). In short, the European
focus seems to lean toward examining how the presence of bullying within civilization
is part of civilization’s failure to protect human frailty.
Despite the attention that Europeans give to workplace bullying and its association with
health issues, United States scholars seem to have a stronger focus on bullying and its
impact on the organization. The groundbreaking Namie and Namie study (2009),
reflecting on the general population, stated that 37% of workers face workplace bullying
in their careers, costing organizations over $54 billion.
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In a study of 359 United States workers, Valentine, Fleischman, and Godkin (2015)
called for clearer communication of organizational ethics to minimize the negative
relationship between workplace bullying and employee job satisfaction. Goodboy,
Martin, Knight, and Long (2017) considered 314 United States workers to analyze job
demands and high stress environments. In their study, workplace bullying was related
to job dissatisfaction and job stress.
United States studies on higher education confirm that approximately two-thirds of
employees face workplace bullying, and relate such behavior to the costs from the
activity to the organization (Hollis, 2016). Within the legal and economic focus of the
American studies is a nod to Freud’s assertion that civilization has an “inadequacy of
the regulations which adjust the mutual relationships [in] society” (Freud & Strachey,
1991, p. 15). In other words, though such structures are civilized, the laws of the land
developed in this civilization fail to truly protect the population. Hence, the
proliferation of workplace bullying continues to bring unhappiness without effective
regulations to mitigate the problem.
Though the studies undertaken in the United States lean toward analyzing relationships
between workplace bullying and organizational factors, American health organizations
do note the levels of stress-related ailments in the United States population. According
to the Anxiety and Depression Association of America (ADAA, 2016), 18% of the
United States population, or 40 million Americans, struggle with anxiety and
depression. Consequently, those affected seek medical attention at a rate three to five
times more than the general population. Further, they were subject to more sleep issues,
more substance abuse and higher rates of post-traumatic stress. As confirmed by
Volkow’s study (2009), substance abuse was one of the leading health care issues in the
United States, affecting one tenth of the 307.8 million United States citizens, close to
31 million people. Within this statistic, alcohol abuse specifically is the third leading
cause of American death (American Center for Disease Control (CDC), 2013). Such
health issues are associated with stress and anxiety, with substance abuse as an escapist
coping mechanism.
Given the extensive number of people in the United States who face workplace bullying
and the association between workplace bullying and subsequent health issues as
established by various European researchers, reasonably, Americans are also facing
health issues because of workplace bullying. In turn, while United States government
agencies have documented the stress related to the United States workplace, and United
States researchers have considered the extent of workplace bullying in the country,
United States researchers could expand their scope to consider the human frailties
advanced by Freud, relating stress to civilizational conditions. A consideration of
regulations and protecting health would be a more holistic approach to creating a
civilized solution to workplace bullying for United States workers.
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Purpose Statement
Based on an initial reflection of the different approaches scholars take in researching
workplace bullying ̶ the European approach which leans toward protecting human
frailty, and the United States approach which leans to strengthening regulation ̶ this
content analysis considered the abstracts of 60 articles on workplace bullying. Thirty
articles were from United States scholars and thirty articles were from European
scholars. This comparative analysis considered European and United States
perspectives in studying workplace bullying. Just as the United States has a set of 50
states, with different populations and legislative functions; Europe has 50 countries with
different populations and legislative functions. In turn, this comparison might inspire
an expanded scope in United States research regarding workplace bullying.
Significance
As a United States researcher studying workplace bullying, I recognize previous work
has focused on the cost to organizations, and the impact on different populations and
potential solutions (Baillien & De Witte, 2009; Hollis, 2016; Hollis, 2016a; Tehrani,
2013). Other American scholars have called for stronger regulations such as status-free
legal protection from workplace harassment and aggression (Yamada, 1999), or studied
the cost to organizations (McTernan, Dollard & LaMontagne, 2013; Murray, 2009).
American scholarship that further incorporates the health and wellness detriments of
workplace bullying could influence policy to protect workers in the United States by
considering human frailty, health, and wellness. Such a focus on workplace bullying
research could advance the need to protect American workers’ human frailty just as
European researchers have influenced policy to protect European workers’ human
frailty.
Data Collection
The 60 articles were collected from EBSCO Host, ProQuest, Researchgate, and
academia.edu using “workplace bullying” as the keyword in the query. The articles in
the analysis were published between 2000- 2017. United States researchers and
European researchers wrote the articles that were the subject of this content analysis.
The abstracts from these articles, thirty from European researchers and thirty from
United States researchers, were used to support the content analysis. The analysis
included coding keywords from the problem statement, purpose statement, or findings
discussed in the abstracts. The key phrases were highlighted and then coded for themes
to determine if there was in fact a different focus or scope in studying workplace
bullying between European researchers and United States researchers.
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Research method
This study utilized data sampling, data reduction, and data analysis as part of
Krippendorf’s (1980) content analysis procedures. First, I used a purposed collection
of data, the articles focusing on workplace bullying from United States and European
authors. The data reduction phase involved excluding articles outside the stated scope.
As the scope of this analysis was to compare European and United States research,
studies from Japan, Canada, Australia, and Nigeria were excluded. The data analysis
phases included highlighting common phrases in the abstracts of each article that lead
to an open coding process that yielded the emergent themes (Creswell, 2014).
Research question
European and United States scholars potentially have different approaches in studying
workplace bullying. To address this potential difference, the following research
question was developed for this content analysis. How does European and United
States research on workplace bullying potentially differ in the consideration of human
frailty and regulation in the scope of the respective studies?
Findings
The review of keywords in abstracts of sixty articles showed a difference in the
approach taken by United States researchers and European researchers who focused
on workplace bullying. As the topic involved the workplace, the keyword
“organization” was a primary theme. However, based on this content analysis, United
States researchers focused on the “organization” three times more often than did
European researchers. See Table 1.
Table 1: Comparative analysis of keywords between United States and European
studies on workplace bullying
United States: n=141 keywords
76 – Organizational
25 – Harassment
21 – Protected Class (demographics)
9 – Psychological/Emotional
10 – Health/Stress

Europe: n=130 keywords
23 – Organizational
1 – Harassment
3 – Demographics
45 – Psychological
37 – Health/Sleep
21 – Suicide Ideation/Depression

United States and European research on workplace bullying shared a common theme of
the organization being a salient focus of the research. The power dynamics and policies
within organizations can support or deter aggressive workplace behaviors. In other
words, the very organizational structures for work which emerge from creation of a
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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civilization are at the root of the workplace bullying problem. The social structure of
an organization would presumably protect humans from nature, from poverty, from
illness; yet, as Freud comments, such civilized structures control people’s selfdetermination, and they result in the power struggle which gives rise to anxiety and
aggression between workers.
Conversely, those who are self-employed, entrepreneurs, are striving to escape such
contentious and presumably civilized work structures to instead forge a path guided by
their own vision. See Table 2 for a sample of phrases from United States and European
research focusing on the organization.
Table 2: Theme #1: Organization (United States and European)
US: “organizational culture can be both indirectly and directly related to workplace
bullying” (Pheko, Monteiro, & Segopolo, 2017, p. 1).
US: “working in various organizations completed a questionnaire about their
bullying experiences, working environments, and occupational outcomes.
(Goodboy, Martin, Knight, & Long, 2017, p. 24).
EU: “yielding severe consequences for both the individual and the organisation”
(Broeck, Baillien, & Witte, 2011. p. 40).
EU: “The article concludes by mentioning the likely legal and economic
implications for Organisations and society” (Sullivan, 2010, p. 1).
As observed in Table 1, United States researchers assign more attention to the lack of
legislation to protect employees from workplace bullying. In contrast, some European
countries have already prohibited “harassment morale” (EU-OSHA 2009).
Consequently, the existence of European legislation may have influenced how
Europeans focus on workplace bullying. As the Europeans may have resolved a lack
of regulation within their civilization, perhaps the focus then turned to the human frailty
that is left unprotected at work through bullying.
Two other themes emerged from the United States content analysis. Theme #2 was
“legal issues.” Theme #3 was “protected class,” referring to the protected classes found
in Title VII Civil Rights legislation. This focus can be the attempt to address the
“inadequacy of the regulations” (Freud & Strachey, 1991, p. 15).
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Table 3: United States: Theme #2- Legal Issues
“There is a business case for workplace bullying legislation” (Yamada, 2009, p. 1).
“Striking finding was that 73.3% of the cases were found in favor of the employer
as the defendant” (Martin & LaVan, 2010, p. 175).
“Bullying is not illegal in the United States, whereas it is illegal in many other
countries” (Vega & Comer, 2004, p. 183).
American researchers also focused on how some people who have historically been
disenfranchised and disempowered were more likely to face workplace bullying.
Aligning with the litigious focus in some United States research, if a savvy target can
tie workplace bullying to national Civil Rights legislation, that target might be able to
seek relief through legal action. The theme of protected class (race, gender, disability)
was essentially a subset of the legal arguments made by United States researchers to
develop legislative protections against workplace bullying. See Table 4.
Table 4 United States: Theme #3 - Protected Class
“While a general form of bullying has been focused on by contemporary scholars,
specific types of bullying (racist bullying and homophobic bullying) have not well
been studied” (Misawa, 2010, p 7).
“Demographic minority groups are more likely to be victims of workplace injustice
“(Okechukwu, Souza, Davis & de Castro, 2014, p. 573).
“Approximately 41% of those with disabilities face workplace bullying despite
United States protections for those with disabilities” (Bernard, 2017, p. 41).
The European researchers, while embracing the organizational dynamics that yield
workplace bullying, are more likely than United States researchers to associate
workplace bullying with health issues such as psychological distress, depression,
suicide, and general health issues. Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 are the European
themes that relate workplace bullying to health problems.
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Table 5: Europe: Theme #2 Psychological
“Relationship between workplace bullying and physical and mental strain”
(Maidaniuc-Chirila, 2015, p 147).
“Psychological symptoms are also associated with subsequent exposure to teasing”
(Nielsen, Magarey, Gjerstad, & Einarsen, 2014, p. 2).
“The findings show that exposure to bullying is associated with both job-related and
health- and well-being-related outcomes, such as mental and physical health
problems, symptoms of post-traumatic stress” (Nielsen & Einarsen, 2012, p. 309).
In addition to considering general psychological damage, European researchers
specifically considered suicidal ideation and depression in relationship to workplace
bullying. Table 6 offers a sample of statements that represent this emerging theme.
Table 6: Europe: Theme #3 Suicide/ Depression
“Nurse committed suicide over HSE probe” (Fallon, 2009, p. 4).
“Workplace bullying and subsequent mental health in the form of anxiety and
depression with a time lag of five years “(Einarsen & Nielsen, 2015, p. 131).
“Workplace bullying may be a precursor to suicidal ideation, whereas suicidal
ideation seems to have no impact on subsequent risk of being bullied “(Nielsen,
Notelets, & Einarsen, 2015, p. 105).
Examining human frailty within these work structures, European researchers continued
with a reflection on the health and wellness issues for targets facing workplace bullying.
Sleep disorders were among the sickness leave and health issues addressed by
researchers in this fourth European theme. See Table 7.
Table 7: Europe: Theme #4 Health/Sleep
“In this study, these consequences were examined prospectively by focusing on
sickness absence in hospital staff “(Kaimuki, Elvina, & Vaster, 2000, p. 565).
“All but one study found that exposure to workplace bullying was associated with
increased risk of sickness absence” (Nielsen, Indre Gard & Everland, 2016, p. 1).
“The associations between workplace bullying and subsequent sleep problems are
poorly understood” (Lallukka, Rahkonen, & Lahelma, 2011, p. 204).
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Discussion
“The first requisite of civilization, therefore, is that of justice ̶ that is, the assurance that
a law once made will not be broken in favour of an individual” (Freud & Strachey,
1991, p. 21). However, the tension between such civilized justice and the protection of
human frailty remains in conflict, as Freud commented that such laws, based on the
majority “implies nothing as to the ethical value of such a law” (Freud & Strachey,
1991, p. 21). The structure of civilization can and has created entities that unjustly
discount the human frailty of those outside the majority, those without the same power
or resources as the majority.
The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) and the World
Health Organization (WHO) consider workplace bullying, violence, and aggression as
a serious threat to employees’ health and wellness. Norway, France, Germany, Ireland,
Belgium, and Poland are some of the countries that have codified the problem and
declared workplace aggression to be an illegal threat that hurts workers (EU-OSHA,
2009). While many European countries have passed legislation, the emphasis through
EU-OSHA (2009) is to protect the health and wellness of European employees. Such
organizations can be viewed as part of a growing majority in Europe developing
structures to protect human frailty, to redefine what is just within the civilized structures
of work.
In comparison, by relying on the 1964 Civil Rights legislation and Title VII to protect
United States workers from harassment, the United States may fall short in providing
protection for anyone facing workplace aggression (Yamada, 1999). With advances in
technology, such workplace aggression and cyberbullying have spread to the Internet
and social media spaces, in turn bringing aggression into the target’s private space
(Hollis, 2016c). Nonetheless, while such anti-discrimination protections are needed to
provide equal access and opportunity (Hollis, 1998), United States researchers face a
gap in the literature about how workplace bullying jeopardizes the health and wellness
of United States workers. In other words, the American focus addresses the lacking
regulations but would need to further consider how such lacking regulations in the
American civilization further compromise American human frailty.
An American psychiatrist and anthropologist, Carroll Brodsky (1976), is often
considered the first to have studied workplace bullying in his book, The Harassed
Worker, a work that brought little attention at the time it was written. However, in the
late 1980s, Northern Europeans advanced the field of workplace bullying and
harassment with a series of studies that caught the attention of researchers in Britain,
Germany, Australia, and Southern Europe. In later years, about the first decade of the
2000s, United States researchers started examining harassment and aggression which
fell outside of federal regulations (Matthiesen, & Einarsen, 2010).
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Within this timeline, European researchers have lead the field in addressing workplace
bullying and aggression; hence, many European countries have developed regulations
to forbid such workplace bullying and aggression. As a result, European researchers
are advanced, within Freud’s context; the Europeans are way ahead in tackling the
“lacking regulations” and making major strides in addressing the human frailty that is
subject to injury within civilized work structures. In comparison, since 2014, while the
United States has some laws in Tennessee, Utah, Minnesota, and California that address
workplace bullying, the United States is still grappling with the lacking regulations and
is only now beginning a focus on how workplace bullying challenges human frailty.
This brief comparative content analysis of research studies on workplace bullying has
highlighted a civilizational disparity: the European focus is on health and the United
States focus is on litigious action. It is hoped that these findings will help push forward
the conversation on workplace bullying. How should cultures further consider and
address workplace bullying, from both a health perspective and a legal one, as it is seen
to be an unfortunate but inevitable by-product of a civilized society?
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Essays
Revolutions in History
Laina Farhat-Holzman
I saw the Iranian Revolution of 1979 up close and personally-- a revolution against a
modernizing authoritarian king. I watched otherwise clever intellectuals deceive
themselves that they would emerge the rulers of a democratic Iran, while the crafty
theocrats waited in the wings to seize power. How could all these leftists be so naïve
about how revolutions work? The trajectory of revolutions should be no mystery. Crane
Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution”1 spelled it all out in 1952, and his observations
have stood the test of time.
Of course, Brinton’s big picture of the most consequential revolutions in history do not
explore the revolutions that came after his death: the Islamist revivals, the “velvet” and
color revolutions of Eastern Europe, and even Indonesia, which followed the Brinton
models despite Indonesia’s Muslim population. Nonetheless, most of Brinton’s
observations are valuable.
Brinton compared four major revolutions: the English Revolution of 1640 (they
executed their king and established a 10-year religious dictatorship), the American
Revolution of 1776, the French of 1789, and the Russian of 1917. Brinton’s formula
also applies to the Chinese 1949 Revolution, but not the Iranian Revolution, which
occurred after his book was published. The American Revolution was the exception to
the usual templates about revolutions, which is why it was less bloody and horrific than
the others. It was the revolt of British settlers demanding representation in Parliament,
not an overturning of a government. But for the rest, the following elements hold true:




1

Revolutions in which an entire system of rule is replaced by another have
happened only since the 17th century; before that, there were revolts, which were
bloodily put down by the ruling class, or revolutions that replaced one dynasty
with another, as we see in China.
Revolutions do not occur when things are at rock bottom. Famines, plagues,
and natural disasters contribute to unrest, but a revolution will not happen until
a society perceives that progress has been thwarted by government
incompetence. The danger is keenest when rising expectations are not met.

Brinton, Crane (1952). The Anatomy of Revolution. Prentice-Hall.
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Revolutions do not come from the fringes—the far left or far right--they erupt
from the literate intelligentsia, children from the middle class. When the
intelligentsia of a country loses all respect for the country’s leadership, the
groundwork is laid for ending the regime. The scholar who illuminated this
process was Jacques Barzan, who wrote in his mid 90’s From Dawn to
Decadence, 1500 to the Present,2 a tour de force trek through 500 years of
Western cultural life.

I read this book in the late 1990s, and have watched our own country’s increasing
ignorance of our basic governing institutions with anxiety. Teaching civics in public
schools has largely disappeared, and in our recent election, when a populist and his
followers showed disdain for the press, courts, or historic norms of behavior that have
protected us from tyranny. Too often, the intelligentsia overlook movements roiling
among average or less educated voters. Aside from the American Revolution, however,
the other major revolutions have followed similar trajectories:




Once autocratic leadership is removed, the intelligentsia are the next to be
removed. A dictatorial cadre—from the fringes and often few in number—can
take over a country. The Russian Revolution is a model of this process, as were
the French, Chinese, and Iranian.
Economic issues may start the revolution, but ideological fanaticism finishes it
(the American and Indonesian being the exception).

Brinton did not live long enough to witness the Iranian Revolution, but his overview of
widespread discontent, alienation of the aristocrats, and radicalization of the college
students and professors all were issues he noted. But what was different with this
revolution was that it was the first to actually reject modernization. It was a retreat to
a religious past, a devolution, which attempted to undo all the modernization that had
came from the Pahlavis.

2

Barzun, Jacques (2000). . From Dawn to Decadence: 1500 to the Present: 500 Years of Western
Cultural Life. Harper.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20
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In the summer of 1978, left-wing students, many of whom had returned from studying
in the US and Europe, demonstrated in Iran’s urban centers to bring down the Shah.
The BBC radio and television broadcasts covered the demonstrations and appeared
sympathetic to their cause.3 The Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, never a decisive
person, was secretly suffering from cancer, which weakened him, while his competent
advisor and friend since childhood, Asadollah Alam, Prime Minister from 1962-64 and
Court Minister from 1964-1978, died the year before the revolution, leaving the Shah
without a rudder.4
Alam might have protected the Shah from his vacillation and uneven responses to the
growing anarchy. When the Shah applied force to stop the demonstrations, the world
press watched and condemned him. Thereafter, his response to events in the street were
uneven and ineffectual. The mobs were emboldened.
The intellectuals found support from an unexpected ally: the Ayatollah Khomeini, the
articulate cleric who had assumed leadership of the Iranian Shiite clergy and who had
long defied the Shah’s modernizations. He posed as a symbol of rectitude who just
wanted to see the oppressive Shah brought down. The intellectuals were fooled into
thinking that once the revolution succeeded, Khomeini would just be an honored elder
who would retire from the fray.
In February 1979, the Ayatollah returned from exile in Paris and immediately
established his headquarters in what had been a girls’ school, evicting the occupants.
Iranians were so euphoric about their revolution’s success that no one reacted in a timely
fashion to Khomeini’s swift seizure of power. Khomeini immediately pushed for a
referendum (again, before anyone had a chance to discuss this in the media) in which
voters would say yes or no to an “Islamic Republic.” The many revolutionary sectors
had thought that they were getting an Iranian Republic, an idea encouraged by the
Ayatollah himself. After he seized power, however, he acknowledged that lying in
defense of Islam was more important than Muslims themselves, or Iran itself.

3

Many observers later documented the process of this revolution. Among them were: Farhat, Laina
(2001) "Janus Blindsided: The Islamic Revolution," Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 45: No.
45, Article 9. Radii, Parviz C. (1983). In the Service of the Peacock Throne: The Diaries of the Shah’s
Last Ambassador to London, Hamish Hamilton, London. Shawcross,William (1988). The Shah’s Last
Ride: The Fate of an Ally. NY. Sick, Gary (1985). All Fall Down. Random House.Wilber, Donald N.
(1981). Iran Past and Present: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic: Ninth Ed, Princeton University
Press. Hoveyda, Fereydun (1979). The Fall of the Shah. Wyndham Books. Huysser, Robert E. (1986).
Mission to Tehran. Harper & Rowe.
4
Alam, Asodollah (1991). The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran’s Royal Court, 1969-1977.
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Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

111

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 77 [2017], No. 77, Art. 20

108

Number 77, Fall 2017

Establishing his headquarters in the girls’ school was his first message to women. The
next was to have his religious police beat women demonstrating in the streets for not
wearing headscarves (hijab). The women had believed that this rule was not ordered
by the Ayatollah, but by his underlings, a mistaken notion quickly disabused by the
beatings and arrests. This was followed by the first of hundreds of executions that
began with the woman who had headed the new department of social services. Women
judges were then fired and sent home.
He then held a referendum (not an election) that offered two choices: “yes” or “no” to
a new religious constitution. With no press to illuminate this horror and no time for
thought, the public voted yes. An entire program of social modernization painstakingly
executed over the four decades of Pahlavi rule was trashed.
It is necessary to understand that despite the zeal of the masses who support these
revolutions, revolutions and totalitarian dictatorships do not often have staying power.
The initial headiness that begins them morphs into corruption and cynicism and violent
repressions, which eventually breed backlashes. Studies suggest that most revolutions
quickly go from anarchy to dictatorships.
The “Arab Spring” appears to be a revolution against the perennial authoritarianism of
the Muslim World. The democratic revolution that idealists hoped for morphed instead
into the default position of Muslim-majority countries: either military or religiousfanatic dictatorships.5 (Exceptions might be Tunisia, one of the more secular Muslim
state and the overthrow of the Indonesian autocrat, Suharto.) Indonesia is always raised
as an example of a Muslim state that has become a democracy. For a period, this
became so. However, there are strong indications today that Islamism is increasingly
popular, which bodes ill for democracy.
Over time, resentment and underground humor in Egypt began the next cycle of revolt.
The quickly-called election put a member of the Muslim Brotherhood in power, and
this long-time Islamist cult, which the people seemed to support, was shortly voted out
because of incompetence and increasing anarchy, only to be replaced by an army
general.
The trajectories that characterize all revolutions (except for that of the United States—
Tunisia and initially Indonesia) should be no surprise to those who understand
revolutions. There is initial euphoria and often promises of real change in the early
stages of revolutions. In the French Revolution, for example, the young intellectuals
who considered this a time to put in effect enlightenment values, enacted several
progressive ideas: first, emancipating all slaves held in French Caribbean territories.
5

See Trager, Eric (2016). Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days.
Georgetown University Press.
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Then, granting benefits to women, such as serving in the parliament, rights to secure a
divorce, rights to inheritance, and even new dress styles that freed them from the
constriction of stays and exaggerated costumes and hair styles that required teams of
servants to produce. But these rights were quickly reversed when dictatorship replaced
the revolutionaries.
The Bastille prison had already been opened and destroyed, giving rise to the belief that
justice would finally be reformed.6 A modern tool of execution, the Guillotine, replaced
the traditional axe or sword, this considered more humane. Other revolutionary notions
included changing street names; changing weeks to 10-days long and the days renamed
numerically; a year of 12 months, each containing three weeks, and extra days added to
make the math work.
This exaggerated reform came to a quick end with dictatorial ideologues seizing power
and instituting a reign of terror in the country. Many of the freedoms promised by the
revolutionaries were reversed when dictatorships took power. The earliest example of
this occurred when a military general, Napoleon, seized power and crowned himself
Emperor. Even the emancipation of the Black slaves in the French colonies was
reversed when the planters protested. Money talks. In addition, the legal benefits
originally granted to women were revoked (rights of divorce, inheritance, and
individual autonomy).
In the case of France, it ultimately returned to its more democratic roots, largely because
of its uniquely Western cultural-legal context. These western values have not yet
thrived in other 20th century revolutions.
The 1918 Russian and 1949 Chinese Revolutions both followed the same trajectory as
the French, although neither so far has morphed to the liberal democracy that the French
have. The initial chaotic euphoria and hopes of participatory governance were
overtaken by small radical cells that seized power. Both Russia and China underwent
the horrors of dictators (Stalin and Mao) who stayed in power that grew ever more
dangerous as their minds deteriorated. Revolutions are complex; but even more
complex are the systems that sustain total dictatorial power. Such systems lack the
divisions of power, the independent institutions of press and the judiciary, which
protect liberal democracies. Dictatorships destroy these institutions upon taking
control.

6

A disillusioned eyewitness to the betrayal of the French Revolution was Mary Wollstoecraft; see
Gordon, Charlotte (2015). Romantic Outlaws: The Extraordinary Lives of Mary Wollstonecraft & Mary
Shelley. Random House, pp. 201-2.
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The Iranian Revolution followed suit. Most Iranians believed that they were getting a
liberal democracy. They believed the Ayatollah’s professions of belief in these values,
but he was willing to use deceit and to move swiftly to reach his goals. The academic
radicals never selected Khomeini to lead them. They actually believed (until it was too
late) that he would merely be a symbol of virtue who had no intention to do anything
other than return to his religious seminary to live out his days.
He quickly disabused them of this notion by seizing total power, and began the process
of arresting, executing, and doing what revolutions do: “eating” their young. Very
quickly, he organized a new “religious police” who would keep people in line, created
a parallel army of religious ideologues to watch the regular army (Russia’s Communists
did the same with their military), and set about executions that by 1988 were estimated
by Amnesty International, to reach 5,000 men, women and children.
Iran has today a limping, illiberal democracy, one based on a “constitution” hastily
confirmed by the referendum. Elections are held, people (including women) vote, but
they can only vote for a slate of candidates permitted by the clerics (council of experts).
The judiciary are an arm of the clerics, and any attempt at producing a fair press is met
with censorship or imprisonment of the journalists.
One attempt by the Iranian people to demonstrate their discontent with this system
(Iran’s so-called “Green Revolution” of 2009) ended in bloodshed and imprisonment
of the opposition leaders. Today, the grumbling is underground: defiance of women to
subvert the “modest” dress code, young college students defying the alcohol bans, and
the flourishing of a vibrant culture of underground humor and mockery of the clerics.
Dictatorships that have the longevity of the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian Revolutions
show the same signs of disillusionment over time. In Russia, the Stalin dictatorship
ended with his death (perhaps poisoned by his inner circle) and Khrushchev, his
successor’s determination to reveal the secret horror of Stalin’s concentration camps
(gulags). Eventually, the Russian Revolution disintegrated, mostly by its own
exhaustion and the good luck of having a modernizing leader (Gorbachev).
The Chinese Revolution changed with the death of Mao, and the decision of his
successors to diverge from Communist economic doctrine, instituting many of the
characteristics of Capitalism. The political orthodoxy, however, has remained intact.
The question will be to see how long the political order can resist the desires of an
increasingly educated, traveled, and prosperous Middle Class.
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Those who want to end a regime, even a dictatorship, should take a leaf from Jacques
Barzun’s observation: widespread humor and mockery can bring down a state. (This is
also a tactic many times noted in Gene sharp’s work on nonviolent action, ca. 1970s.)
Jacques Barzun’s From Dawn to Decadence tracks the fall of the French monarchy
during the French Revolution to the point where the French elites had no fear of making
jokes about the monarchy. One characteristic of nasty governments—theocracies,
dictatorships, and authoritarian monarchies, is that they have no sense of humor. The
one thing that can put a frightening government on the defensive is to know that their
subjects are laughing at them. This is a pattern that repeats.
Republics such as ours have little fear that making fun of the government or mocking
our leaders will bring down the walls—but dictatorships do have such fears. When
Romania’s dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, made a speech to his abused population on
December 21, 1989, he was startled to hear laughter and hoots—and the armed soldiers
in the square, contrary to his expectations, did not shoot them; they arrested him instead,
and he was dead by morning.7
Perhaps we miss the boat in dealing with the “hearts and minds” of the benighted
populations of the world when we do not use comedy and soap operas to get our points
across. Laughter, mockery, and serialized stories can be very destabilizing—and
effective. Examples are plentiful.
A few years ago, a Persian comedy group in Beverly Hills put on their hilarious weekly
TV program for their Persian-speaking audience. By a fluke, it was picked up by
satellite and beamed to Iran. The Iranian public was much entertained and the
government started to confiscate satellite dishes (a losing battle for them). In the
broadcast was a segment called “Ask the Mullah,” in which a ridiculous little turbaned
fellow gave answers to call-in questions that brought down the house — and were too
realistic for comfort of the clerics. Our own 60 Minutes picked this up and suggested
that our government sponsor this regularly. We never followed up on it! The tradition
of mocking clerics is old and honored in Iran—and we should build on it.
Nonviolent techniques have been successful in places where the authoritarian leaders
are reluctant to shed blood because the world is watching.8 This was true for the
nonviolent demonstrations at the end of the Soviet Union (the Velvet Revolutions of
Eastern Europe), even in such a terror state as East Germany. Tunisia and Indonesia
are examples of Muslim-majority countries in which dictatorships were brought down
by nonviolent means.

7
8

Watch Ceausescu’s final speech: htttps://www.youtube.co/watch?v=t6pvMFfQF50.
See Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 3 vols (Boston: P. Sargent, 1973.
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However, even when such revolutions succeed, their ability to survive as liberal
democracies depends upon a history of exposure to the values of Western Civilization
(legal-political values). We are already seeing liberal democracy in trouble in Poland
and Romania, and the jury is out if nonviolent demonstrations will be able to turn these
dictatorial movements around.
During the 1930s, almost every one of the new democratic republics created in the
aftermath of World War I morphed into fascist dictatorships (Poland and Germany) or
were quickly conquered by their Nazi neighbor (Czechoslovakia and Austria). We may
be seeing the same phenomenon in Eastern Europe now.
Modernizing movements in Muslim-majority countries that appeared ready to sustain
liberal democracies (Turkey, Egypt, and Indonesia) are under attack from dictatorial
leadership and resurgent militant Islamism. With no historic tradition embracing the
important elements of Western liberal democracy, there is little hope that nonviolent
demonstrations can save them.
The one country in this group that appears to be sustaining its democratic revolution is
Tunisia, perhaps because it had not faced population explosion as have its neighbors,
and because secular life and a burgeoning middle class supported its primary industry,
European tourism.
We are living in revolutionary times, and the history of revolutions has much to offer.
History has shown us that the more violent the revolution, the more difficult it is to
transition to a Western style liberal democracy. With the exception of the violent
French Revolution, which over time became a western style democracy, all of the other
violent revolutions led to reigns of terror followed by ferocious dictatorships. These
histories should provide us with some opportunities to understand how revolutions
really work, how to avoid the siren call of violent political revolutions, and how to help
bring down bad ones.
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Buried on Three Continents in Three Civilizations: A Jewish Fate
Yishai Shuster
I do not know if the story I am about to tell relates directly to the Holocaust, but I am
convinced, however, that a story like this could happen only to someone who is Jewish.1
I wish to dedicate this paper to my friend, my brother Wlodek (Wlodzimierz Przytyk),
who died of cancer on March 21, 2006 at the age of 57.
I have no idea if all the history recalled here occurred exactly the way it is narrated. A
few of events here were told to me by my parents; other parts come from relatives and
friends. This account includes some historically documented facts, but the rest has been
handed down to me by others. The second part of the story, however, centers on
Kibbutz Yad Hanna. It is based on my personal knowledge and from information
gleaned from Sarah Nomberg-Przytyk’s published memoirs.
Europe
I will begin with information directly relating to my family and myself. I was born on
September 16, 1946 in the town of Walbrzych in Western Poland. I was given the name
Seweryn, which means 'a gift'. My parents, Berl Shuster and Rywa Fabrikant, came
from Sarny in the Wolyn region, in eastern Poland, one ruled by many different
countries at various times, including the Poles and the Russians. After World War I,
the district was under Polish control and following the Molotov — Ribbentrop Pact in
1939, it was awarded to the Soviets.
In 1941, however, the entire Wolyn region was captured by the German army during
Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union. Towards the end of
the war, and with the German defeat, the district was annexed to the Soviet Union.
However, since the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Wolyn has been a part of the
Ukraine.
Both of my parent’s families were poor and Jewish. In their hometown of Sarny, Jews
made up ten percent of the population. It may be no surprise that both of my parents,
at a young age, became active in the newly-formed Communist Party. The party was
illegal then, and its activities were underground. The ruler of Poland after World War
I was Jozef Pilsudski, a man who hated the Communists even more than he hated the
Jews.

1

The following personal account was written originally for a Holocaust study program and has not
been published previously.
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In her youth, my mother was arrested by the Polish police for the crime of belonging to
the Communist Party, and she was imprisoned in notorious sites — Berezie Kartuskiej
Prison, where she met my father, and then in Fordon Prison. After serving a total of
three years and nine months in these prisons, she returned to Sarny and resumed her
political activities in the party. There, she and my father married.
At a very young age, my father Berl had begun working to support his family, first as a
tailor's assistant and afterwards as a tailor. He joined the Communist Party after he
became aware of their revolutionary activities in the Wolyn Region. When he was a
child of nine, the Bolshevik Revolution erupted. He, an assistant tailor who had been
consistently abused as a laborer, was immediately attracted to the principles of the
Communist Party and he began spending time with its members, much to the objection
of his entire family. My father, like my mother, spent time in various prisons of
Pilsudski's dictatorial regime.
My parents were married in a civil, rather than religious ceremony, despite objections
from their families. Eventually the families came to terms with the youngsters’
determination to engage politically. In exchange for this agreement, the two agreed to
a compromise, and they were wed in a religious ceremony in a distant city. I very
recently discovered the latter information from my cousin, because my parents never
spoke of their religious wedding.
My uncle Ya'acov Shuster, of blessed memory, told me that my parents and my paternal
grandparents had a terrible fight because of the refusal of my parents to have their first
son, my brother Marek, circumcised. When my parents had to travel to another town
for some political activities, his family quickly organized a circumcision. They had the
local mohel, who was also a butcher, come and perform the ceremony. Marek was
named after my mother's father, Menachem Mendel, who had died from a terrible illness
a few years earlier. Though they decided to name him Menachem, they called him
Marek — a proper Polish name. He maintained the use of that name until his death in
1997 and even though he lived in Israel, he never gave himself a Hebrew name.
Contrarily, my parents changed the names they had been given at birth. My father's
original name was Berl Dov which he changed to Boleslaw — again, a proper Polish
name. My mother, born Rywa, changed her name to Regina, and those are the names
that appear on their wedding certificate. When the family immigrated to Israel, they
did so using their Polish names.
My parents’ underground political activities weighed heavily on the young family, until
1939. Then, they received the happy news that their district, according to the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, would be annexed to the Soviet Union. The mere fact that my father
was arrested by the Soviet authorities — because of Stalin's anti-Semitic policies —
briefly after the annexation and sent to Siberia did not deter either him or my mother
from being faithful to the party.
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At the time, my mother was pregnant with my second brother Franek. He was born in
September of 1940, while my father was imprisoned in the Gulag. Like Marek, Franek
was named after a family member but he, like Marek, maintained the use of his Polish
name until his death in 1993 in Toronto.
With the beginning of Operation Barbarossa and Germany's attempted conquest of the
Soviet Union in 1941, my father was released from Siberia; he returned to Sarny and
immediately enlisted in the Red Army. My parents were together only briefly, as the
Germans were conquering Sarny and the entire district.
My mother, following Stalin's orders, moved to a kolkhoz (a Soviet collective farm,
structured somewhat like a kibbutz or communal village in Israel) in Uzbekistan, deep
within the Soviet Asiatic region, far from the reach of the Nazis.2 My father, on the
other hand, under the orders of the Red Army, enlisted in a Soviet Partisan unit which
operated in the forests surrounding Sarny. There he witnessed the murder by the Nazis
of almost his entire family along with most of Sarny's Jewish population. The victims
were then buried in a mass grave.
His mother, father, nine sisters, aunts, uncles and cousins were murdered. The only
survivors were a few cousins and his younger brother Yankel (Ya'acov), who like my
father had joined the Red Army.
Of the Fabrikants, my mother’s family, two older brothers survived — Ya'acov and
Yoseph; they had escaped earlier with their families deep into the USSR. In addition,
my uncle Hatzkel had been drafted into the Red Army; he survived the war and
remained in the USSR. Hatzkel was also an active communist, and he was the only
family member who had supported my mother’s political affiliations.
From the beginning of 1942, it became increasingly dangerous for my father to remain
within Nazi-occupied lands; he was a Communist, an officer in the Red Army, and a
Jew. After being ordered to cross the lines back into Soviet territory, he took a detour
to Uzbekistan to visit his wife and two young sons. He intended to join his new unit —
The Polish Division, under the leadership of Konstantyn Rokossowski. So, after his
visit he joined his unit, but unbeknownst to him, during his family visit he had been
tried and found guilty of desertion, and he was sentenced to be executed.
2
In a kolkhoz, a member, called kolkhoznik (колхо́зник, feminine колхо́зница), was paid a share of the
farm’s profits according to the number of workdays, while a sovkhoz employed salaried workers.
In addition, the kolkhoz was required to sell their crops to the state, which fixed prices for the grain.
These were set very low and the difference between what the state paid the farm and what the state
charged consumers for the food represented a major source of income for the Soviet government. Thus,
in 1948 the Soviet government charged wholesalers 335 rubles for 100 kilograms of rye, but it paid the
kolkhoz roughly 8 rubles. Nor did such prices change much to keep up with inflation. Prices paid by the
Soviet government hardly changed at all between 1929 and 1953, meaning that the state did not pay one
half or even one third of the cost of production. (Wikipedia)
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For some reason, the sentence never reached his division and he served with them as
had been previously ordered. My father held the rank of captain in the infantry and he
fought in the battle of Stalingrad. Together with his soldiers, he reached Berlin at the
end of the war in 1945.
Meanwhile, my mother lived in the kolkhoz in Uzbekistan with my two brothers. Their
life was very difficult. For a while, she and my father corresponded, but soon after his
return to the front, their correspondence ended. She received sporadic news about my
father, and then, during the freezing winter of 1942-43, she received the horrible news,
with no explanation or details, that my father was dead. (This probably happened
because of his being accused of treason.)
My mother worked picking cotton. (Forty years later, when I was picking cotton with
a modern mechanized picker in the fields of Kibbutz Yad Hanna, my mother told me
how she had become a “Soviet working heroine” as a result of being the fastest cotton
picker in her kolkhoz.) In the summer of 1943 my mother and her children left their
kolkhoz because of her son Franek's illness and they moved to another one on the
outskirts of the city of Bukhara, so that he could receive treatment. There, my mother
met a kind medic. Their hard lives bound them together.
As the world war drew to an end, my mother and brothers stayed on in Central Asia
because they did not want to move Franek, who was still recovering. (Perhaps, though,
this was just an excuse to stay with her new life partner.) In 1945, Regina Shuster was
chosen as the representative of her kolkhoz to hail the Soviet soldiers upon their return
from their victory over the Nazi oppressors. The victory parade was to take place on
November 7th in Red Square. Naturally, my mother's new boyfriend arranged to join
her at that event in Moscow.
According to my mother, the parade was very impressive. Then suddenly, and to her
amazement and shock, she saw mounted on a horse at the head of his unit her Berl -alive and well. Their reunion was obviously very moving. However, that very night
my parents received word from a close friend that the Soviet secret police were looking
for my father. The charges of desertion had never been dropped. My mother and father
immediately went into hiding. They hid for a few weeks with different friends.
Eventually my father used his Polish citizenship and managed to cross the border into
Poland.
My mother, as a result of their reunion, became pregnant. She returned to Uzbekistan,
took my brothers, and carrying me in her womb, she reached Poland as well. And so, I
came into the world on September 16, 1946, in Walbrzych, Poland, near the Polish
border with Germany. My parents first considered calling me Ishaiyahu because they
wanted to name me after my paternal grandfather who had been murdered in the killing
pits of Wolyn in 1941. However, they quickly abandoned that idea, because it seemed
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017
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inappropriate that highly recognized communists would call their son such an obviously
Jewish name. Since they felt that they had received me as a gift, they named me
Seweryn, an unusual name in Poland at the time. I dearly cherish, appreciate and love
my paternal grandfather with all of my soul, whom I knew only through stories and
feelings, but I am pleased that I did not inherit his name.
I used to think that my parents chose to settle in Walbrzych, far from the Soviet border,
to keep their distance from the Soviets. However, I learned during a Holocaust study
program that the Polish government's policy was to repopulate the western area of the
country since the Germans had either killed or deported much of the population there
throughout their six-year occupation.
In spite of everything that had happened to the Jews of Poland, my parents remained in
Walbrzych, Poland, loyal, active and prominent members of the Polish Communist
Party. My father managed a clothing factory and my mother was a party employee.
Their promotion within the party hierarchy was swift. My mother received an important
position in the Central Committee and was one of the personal secretaries of Edward
Ochab, a prominent party and government official. Then my father was offered a
managerial position in a military clothing factory in Warsaw because of connections he
had made during his military service. Thus, towards the end of 1949, we moved to
Poland's capital, Warszawa (Warsaw).
We lived first in a town near Warsaw called Anin, occupying a beautiful home in the
woods. Our elderly and kind neighbor was the Polish Jewish poet Julian Tuwim. Then,
we moved to Warsaw once a new home was built there for us. It was located in one of
the first neighborhoods to be constructed on the ruins of Warsaw. These neighborhoods
were erected for Polish and Soviet officers. Therefore, our neighbors were either
military personnel or government officials, so naturally my friends were their children.
Life was good during those years, and I have no recollection of any anti-Semitic
atmosphere or events, although everyone knew that my family was Jewish. We never
hid our Jewish identity. My parents spoke Yiddish in public and attended the Yiddish
Theater in Warsaw. (Unfortunately, I have never understood Yiddish.)
We celebrated some of the Jewish holidays. I recall that my brothers and I demanded
that we have a Christmas tree because they are lovely, and of course because of the
gifts. My parents acquiesced but we also lit Hanukah candles that stood in the window.
Naturally we were given a secular explanation of the secular spirit of Hanukah. At
Passover, my father brought matzo from the Israeli embassy. My Polish friends and I
nicknamed the matzo, which we enjoyed, "Jewish bread." We did not observe the
kosher dietary laws and until we moved to Israel I didn't know what they were.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20

122

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

119

However, the first night of Passover we always had a large feast. Bread was not a part
of the meal and we were told why it was celebrated. Neither God nor any other religious
aspect of the occasion was mentioned. It was purely a celebration of freedom. I have
tried ever since to continue the tradition, first within the kibbutz, and now, since kibbutz
tradition has dissolved, within my own home. I continue the secular Jewish tradition
which I was given in my parents' home.
Although we barely sensed it, it is not true that anti-Semitism didn't exist in Poland in
those days. One event I do recall was my oldest brother Marek, who was a member of
the Polish Communist Youth organization, coming home after being beaten up by
Polish hooligans. I was told that intoxicated hooligans had done it, but years later when
I was in Israel I was told that the reason behind the attack was anti-Semitism.
Nonetheless, we led happy lives and I had many Polish friends. Like all Poles, we
celebrated Wladyslaw Gomulka's rise to power in 1956. The very same Gomulka had
been a friend of my mother’s in Pilsudski`s prison 30 years earlier.
However, as a reaction to the 1956 Sinai Campaign in Israel, and because anti-Semitism
overcame him, Gomulka decided to “cleanse” Poland of its Jewish population. The few
Jews who remained after the expulsion in 1957 were deported (more like “encouraged
to leave”) after the Six Day War in 1967. Of course, I was too young at the time to
comprehend the on-going political process.
It was shortly after Gomulka's election, while we were still celebrating his rise to power,
that I was told by my parents that we were moving to Israel. At first, I didn't know what
or where Israel was, until I was told that they were speaking of Palestine, and that there
most of the family that had survived the Holocaust was living.
As we were leaving Poland on the train in the spring of 1957 I personally experienced
overt anti-Semitic behavior by Poles. On the border between Czechoslovakia and
Poland, the Polish Border Patrol checked the passengers and their belongings. Their
behavior reminded me of the pictures and movies I had seen at home and in school of
the crudeness and brutality manifested during wartime. I remember, as if it were today,
that our record player that was in a very special suitcase, was taken from us. It had been
given to my mother as a farewell gift from her comrades in the Central Committee of
the Communist Party. The image of my mother, the woman who in my mind could do
anything, pleading and crying in front of a young, mocking Polish border guard is
etched forever in my memory.
Thus, for years, I had no desire to visit Poland. A special reason eventually presented
itself in 1999 when my childhood friend and I found each other. 3
3

In 1999, a Polish friendship was re-kindled following a long search. We had had great neighbors, the
Faust family; they lived across the street from us. The father was a colonel in the Polish Navy and they
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Israel
On May 5, 1957, the Greek ship which had transported us from Venice docked in Haifa.
Aside from Jewish Agency representatives, family members I had seen only in
photographs were waiting for us on the pier. My cousin, Haikeh from Kibbutz
Lochemei Hagetaot (The Ghetto Fighters Kibbutz), asked my parents in Yiddish “how
the little boy is called.” "Seweryn", my parents answered. “That is not a name that you
can call a child in Israel” Haikeh replied. “Who is he named after?” My father hesitated,
recalling their uncertainty of what to call me when I was born eleven years earlier.
“Perhaps he is named after my father. They called him Yishayahu”, my father answered.
My cousin saved me by saying that Yishayahu is too long and awkward a name. “We'll
call him Yishai”, Haikeh declared. So it was, and so it remains. I love my name that
was given to me by my cousin Haikeh, who took me to live in her kibbutz. There I
lived for two or three years. Until the day I die I will never forget the Agami family
from Lochemei Hagetaot that so warmly “adopted” me. They gave me a strong
beginning in my new country, along with my new name.
My parents were placed in a ma'abara (temporary housing set up for new immigrants)
in Kiryat Haim, near Haifa. After looking for work, they sought contact with the Israeli
Communist Party.
Yes, in spite of the blows and humiliation they had suffered in Europe at the hands of
the party, in spite of the arrests and eventual exile, Berl and Regina Shuster arrived in
Israel and shortly thereafter joined the Communist Party. At that time, the party was
“anti-Zionist,” and its members were disliked by most of the Jewish population in Israel.
This was during the McCarthy Era and Israel’s political orientations leaned towards that
of the so-called “capitalist” USA. Thus, the communists, or anyone who might be too
“red,” were persecuted, discriminated against and even beaten.
After moving in with my parents in Kiryat Bialik and trying to join a few youth
movements, such as Noar Oved and Hashomer Hatzair, I, too, joined the Communists,
through the youth movement, Bankee (an acronym for The Communist Youth
Covenant).

had two sons, Janek and Jurek. Our connections were cut when we were expelled from Poland in 1957.
But after communism fell in Poland, Jurek found me. We have been in contact ever since.
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Garin Dror (Freedom Group), a part of Nahal4, arrived at Kibbutz Yad Hanna in October
of 1963 for the first phase of its army service. Kibbutz Yad Hanna was on the “Green
Line”, the accepted international border, facing the (West Bank) then Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan city of Tulkarem. Towards the end of 1962, I joined my friends
from the Bankee Youth Movement who were serving in Kibbutz Yad Hanna with Garin
Achva. I remained there until I was inducted into the army. The army track for the
communists was different than the other Nahal groups because of the politically-based
discrimination and isolation that communists then endured in Israel. (Naturally, the
military authorities explained away the discrimination as being based on “security
considerations.”)
In actual fact, there was no true connection between national security and Bankee. Our
track began with pre-military unpaid service in Kibbutz Yad Hanna for three months.
Afterwards we spent six months in basic training and then we were returned
immediately to Kibbutz Yad Hanna to work until the end of our service. The garins
from other youth movements that served in other frontier communities went through
advanced training in the paratroopers, and they created small outposts that eventually
became settlements. These and various other activities and opportunities were denied
to us — all based on politics.
A few years later, during my Reserve Service, I completed the training I had been
denied and became a part of a select paratroop unit. This occurred at the beginning of
the 1970's after the division within Maki, the Israeli Communist Party, and after a tragic
incident along the border, at Kibbutz Yad Hanna.
On December 8, 1964, Jordanian Legionnaires opened fire on Avraham Jurie, who was
protecting me as a security escort while I tilled the fields next to the border of Tulkarem,
then part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Jurie, my best friend, was killed. Ever
since then, my life has been bound to Yad Hanna. (The story of our garin and the border
incident has been told by me in a movie, “As Wind in the Willows,” which was
produced in 1994 by Tikva Sneh and me. The film was shown at the Haifa Film Festival
of that year.)
In Kibbutz Yad Hanna in 1965, I met my life partner (and now wife) Mazal Miyuni.
She was born in Ioanina in northwest Greece. Mazal, the daughter of Greek
Communists, came to Yad Hanna with a garin that was named after my already dead
friend, Jurie. Mazal and I met over a bar of chocolate — our paths crossed and melded.
4

Nahal- a Hebrew acronym for Noar Halutzi Lohem (literally, Fighting Pioneer Youth), refers to a
program for Israeli youth which allows them to combine their compulsory three-year military service
with volunteer-type civilian service, such as organizing social welfare projects in neighborhoods and
towns suffering from socioeconomic difficulties, acting as counselors for youth organizations, or
founding and developing new agricultural settlements. (Wikipedia)
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I was released from my mandatory military service in 1966, and Mazal and I married
in September of that year in Kibbutz Yad Hanna. There, our four children and three
grandchildren were born. There, we all live today. Yad Hanna is no longer a kibbutz
and most certainly no longer communist. Regretfully? Perhaps. 5
One day in the spring of 1969 (if memory serves me well) when I returned home from
work, Mazal told me that a Polish man named Wlodek Przytyk, who barely spoke
Hebrew but who knew Polish and English, had arrived at the kibbutz. He had come to
visit someone from my garin, Oded Yorkovski. Since Oded, to say the least, was not
one of my friends, I had little contact with Wlodek at first. However, after meeting by
chance we learned to like each other and then became close friends. We had a great
deal in common and had very similar tastes in music and books. Wlodek knew a great
deal about the type of Western music that was very popular at that time, particularly
music from the US and Canada. His desire to know about things from the West came
from his life behind the Iron Curtain of Communist Poland; and his knowledge was
vast.
Another thing we had in common was our pleasure in eating and drinking. Mazal loved
then, and still does now, cooking and no one can match her culinary artistry. We
satisfied our appetites with countless parties that lasted through the night and into the
morning — and all within the walls of our tiny kibbutz home.
I learned that Wlodek was born on November 7, 1949, an extremely important date for
communists throughout the world since on that day in 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution
had broken out in Russia. As a good communist family, the gift of a child born on that
day was commemorated by naming their tiny infant Wlodzimierz - Joseph after the
names of the party's founder, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, and Joseph Stalin. The Przytyk
family left Poland in 1968 after their oldest son Jurek went to the United States for a
university sabbatical and opted against returning to Poland.
The family went to Vienna first and then to Rome, where they were temporarily housed
with the help of the Jewish Agency. They intended to immigrate to the US, where
Wlodek's father Andrzej had close relatives. However, his mother, Sarah NombergPrzytyk, was denied a visa by the American immigration authorities as she had been a
very active member of the Communist Party in Poland.
So, in 1969 Andrzej joined his family that had immigrated to the US in the 1920's while
Sarah, together with Wlodek the younger son, immigrated to Israel. In the meantime,
their son Jurek had left the US and moved to Canada, where he met his wife Natasha.
5

The story of Kibbutz Yad Hanna and its subsequent changes from the time of its establishment in
1950 -- and the massive change in 2007 -- is worthy of another essay. I'm not entirely sure that this
place should still be called Yad Hanna.
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When Wlodek and his mother arrived in Israel, she was placed in housing for retired
academics, located in Ramat Efal. Wlodek was sent to a kibbutz ulpan6 which he
quickly left. He tried his luck in the Israeli Merchant Marines and went abroad as a
cadet. On his first journey, he realized that the lifestyle wasn't suitable for him and
when the ship docked at one of the US ports, Wlodek left the ship and joined his father
who was living there. After a while, Wlodek crossed the border into Canada and joined
his brother for a while until he grew tired of it and returned to Israel.
In the meantime, Sarah being a veteran Communist Party member, joined Maki (the
Israeli Communist Party). Maki splintered into two groups — one that became Rakach,
headed by Meir Vilner and Arab leaders, while the other group, Maki, was headed by
Moshe Sneh and Shmuel Mikonis. Sarah joined the latter of the two.
After Wlodek returned to Israel, his mother advised him to try life on a kibbutz and
what could be more natural than to live on a communist kibbutz? And so Wlodek and
I met in Kibbutz Yad Hanna.
One morning, in that spring of 1970, Wlodek and I had breakfast in the kibbutz dining
room with my parents, who were also living in Yad Hanna. Naturally we spoke in
Polish and my mother asked Wlodek where he was from in Poland. “I'm from Lublin”,
he answered. “I had a very good friend from Lublin”, my mother said. “We shared a
prison cell in Poland for three years because of our membership in the Communist
Party. Her name was Sarah Nomberg.” There was a moment of silence at the table and
then Wlodek said, “That's my mother.”
Obviously that same day we went to Ramat Efal and brought Sarah to the kibbutz.
There was great excitement as the two friends who hadn't seen each other for some 40
years finally met. My father, who knew Sarah only from stories, was moved to tears.
The old friends sat into the wee hours of the morning, laughing and crying. Each of
them recounted their life experiences since they left one another in prison in Poland in
1934.

6

The aim of an ulpan is to teach adult immigrants to Israel the basic language skills of conversation,
writing and comprehension. Most ulpanim also provide instruction in the fundamentals of Israeli
culture, history, and geography. The primary purpose of the ulpan is to help new citizens to be
integrated as quickly and as easily as possible into the social, cultural and economic life of their new
country.
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It turned out that Sarah, like my parents, had remained politically active in the
Communist Party until the time Poland was conquered by the Nazis. But unlike my
mother, who was saved by escaping into Central Asia, Sarah was captured by the Nazis
and sent to Auschwitz. A journalist, she had documented her life during World War II
in a book entitled Auschwitz. It was published in English by the University of North
Carolina Press in 1985. The original manuscript had been written in 1966 in Sarah’s
handwriting and is found in the archives of Yad Vashem in Jerusalem.
Obviously after such a meeting, Wlodek and I grew closer and Sarah came to visit often
in Yad Hanna. If memory serves me, she came most weekends. Most of the visits were
between my parents and Sarah, but the family frequently spent time in my home as well.
During one of these visits, while we were all sitting on the porch, Mazal's parents,
Moshe and Lina Miyuni arrived. Immediately after their arrival, Mazal's mother spoke
to Mazal in Greek and said, “I know that woman”. Mazal replied, “Oh, you know
everybody! You're probably imagining it. How could you possibly know her? You're
from Greece, she's from Poland -- what's wrong with you?” Lina persisted and said to
Mazal, “I know her. Look, the numbers tattooed on our arm are from the same camp:
Auschwitz. I know her from there. We were on the same block for a while and I even
taught her songs in Greek.”
Lina approached Sarah and asked her, “Do you remember the little Greek girl in
Auschwitz who taught you a Greek song?” Lina began to sing and Sarah immediately
replied, “Of course I remember,” and she began to sing as well. Lina then said, “I am
that Greek girl from the Block in Auschwitz.” Of course, everyone was moved — tears
and experiences were shared into the late hours of the night.
The relationship with Wlodek became even stronger. Mazal and I shared a closeness
with Wlodek that could be likened to that of a brother, especially because of the
incredible connection between our mothers from 40 and 50 years before. The three of
us shared a good life in Kibbutz Yad Hanna: parties, many trips, food, drink and a lot
of music. Wlodek met a volunteer from Denmark named Karin, who was both beautiful
and sweet. They began living together in Kibbutz Yad Hanna. In 1973, Wlodek joined
the Israel Defense Forces and served in the Air Force. It seemed that he had found his
place in Israel.
At one point, Wlodek's brother Jurek came for a visit from Canada to Kibbutz Yad
Hanna with his wife Natasha and their son Sasha. Other friends of Jurek’ s joined in as
well: Sidney and his partner, along with his daughter Maya from Canada, and Daniel
and Max with their daughter Chantal from Holland. That visit transformed the group
into one large international family.
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During the Yom Kippur War, Wlodek was a member of a crew that transported
wounded soldiers from the field of battle via helicopter to various hospitals. The
horrible experiences during that war and the loss of our good friend, Moshe Uziel from
the kibbutz, affected Wlodek deeply. He and Karin decided to leave Israel. They first
tried to live in Canada near his brother and his mother Sarah, who had also emigrated
to Canada. Shortly afterwards they moved to Denmark, the country of Karin's birth;
there, their daughter Sima was born.
My close relationship with Wlodek didn't change despite the geographical distance. In
fact, we grew even closer. Wlodek, Karin and Sima visited in Israel frequently. Sarah
visited on occasion and remained in touch with my parents.
The first of the people I have written about to depart this world was Wlodek's father,
Andrzej Przytyk, who died of cancer in Canada in 1972. He was buried on Jurek's farm
in Canada. My father, Berl Shuster, died in 1983 and was buried in Kibbutz Yad Hanna.
Sarah Nomberg-Przytyk died in 1990, after becoming ill during a visit in Israel.
According to her request she was buried in Taut. My mother, Rywa Fabrikant Shuster
died in 1993 and was buried in Kibbutz Yad Hanna.
My brother Franek died two days after my mother was buried. I had spent a month and
a half with Franek, who had undergone surgery for a brain tumor. I stood by his side
and cared for him throughout his illness. After he died, I took his cremains back to
Israel to be buried next to our father, as he had requested. In 1996, my oldest brother
died as the result of a lengthy illness and he was buried in Kiryat Bialik.
And finally, my friend-my brother Wlodek Przytyk, died on March 21, 2006 after a
brief struggle with cancer. His wife Karin and daughter Sima decided to have Wlodek
cremated. His ashes were buried in the three places that were meaningful to Wlodek
throughout his life. Some of his ashes are in Denmark, where he spent most of his adult
life. Some of them are in Canada, where he visited often and where his father was
buried. The rest of his ashes are in Israel, a place where he spent fascinating years and
where his mother Sarah is buried. Wlodek is the only person I know who is buried on
three continents: Europe, America and Asia.
In my opinion, this story is one that only a Jew could experience.
Translated from Hebrew by Beth Malke.
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Book Reviews
Andrew Scull, Madness in Civilization:
A Cultural History of Insanity from the Bible to Freud
from the Madhouse to Modern Medicine.
Princeton University Press, 2015.
Reviewed by Michael Palencia-Roth
In the concluding sentence of this long and impressive book, Andrew Scull writes:
“[Madness] remains a fundamental puzzle, a reproach to reason, inescapably part and
parcel of civilization itself” (411). He wants to leave us with this fundamental truth:
the question of madness is inextricable from the question of civilization. In two
previous works, Museums of Madness ((Penguin Books, 1979) and The Most Solitary
of Afflictions: Madness and Society in Britain, 1700-1900 (Yale UP, 1993), Scull’s
frame of reference was “societal.” In Madness and Civilization, his frame of reference
has expanded to an inquiry into that largest collectivity that is the raison d’être of the
ISCSC: “civilization”.
Madness in Civilization mines Scull’s Madhouse (Yale UP, 2005), The Insanity of
Place, the Place of Insanity (Routledge, 2006), and Masters of Bedlam (Princeton UP,
2014). In the preface to the second edition of his 1977 book entitled Decarceration
(Rutgers, 1984), Scull writes of his own work as a scholar: “I hope it is not immodest
to suggest that the republication of the original text is testimony to the continuing impact
of my attempt to develop a historically informed macrosociological perspective on the
structure of social control in contemporary England and the United States.” Writing
today, Scull might substitute for “macrosociological” the word “civilizational”.
Madness in Civilization is therefore a kind of omnium gatherum that brings together all
his previous work and thought on the subject and also provides a scholarly testament to
the “continuing impact” of his life’s work. Scull habitually mines previous work and
even repeats certain chapters in successive books. For example, a chapter entitled “The
Rise of the Asylum” from Museums of Madness (pp. 13-48) is repeated, with that title,
in The Most Solitary of Afflictions, and then expanded upon (pp. 1-45). Some of the
language, details, and paragraphs from this and other chapters are distributed through
Madness in Civilization. All of that makes an evaluation of Madness in Civilization
difficult.
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Other scholars have written on madness and mental illness from broadly historical and
societal perspectives. Consider, for example, the co-authored book by Franz G.
Alexander and Sheldon T. Selesnick, The History of Psychiatry: An Evaluation of
Psychiatric Thought and Practice from Prehistoric Times to the Present; E.R. Dodds,
The Greeks and the Irrational; Roy Porter’s books, including A Social History of
Madness and Madness: A Brief History; The Routledge History of Madness and Mental
Health, edited by Greg Eghigian; Petteri Pietikäinen, Madness: A History; and of course
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, which is the abridged translated version
(1965) of his massive Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique (1961) .
Folie et Déraison was translated into English as History of Madness in 2006 and 2009.
But Scull is more comprehensive and more wide-ranging on this subject than any other
writer I have come across. Even Foucault’s History of Madness, longer (by more than
200 pages) than Scull’s Madness in Civilization, covers a briefer time period and has a
more limited geographical scope.
Much of the work in the comparative history of civilizations has to do with such large
and often rather abstract issues as state systems, symbolic systems, comparative
religions, migrations, urbanism, economics, world-system theory, trade networks,
urbanization, imperialism, industrialization, war and peace, and the like. Much
attention has also been paid to the conception of “civilization” itself and the taxonomy
of civilizations (how many there are, and where). Seldom is work in comparative
civilizations reduced to the self, in particular to the mind and its illnesses, in relation to
the society or civilization in which it is embedded. Scull’s reduction focuses attention
on a very specific problem and the threats it presented historically, and continues to
present, to social order. The topic and Scull’s treatment of it lead to a number of
questions. “What do we mean by ‘madness and what is its relationship to
“civilization”? “Do the theory and treatment of madness belong to ‘the civilizing
process’”? “What causes insanity”? “What is the proper response to madness”? “What
are the effects of madness, if left untreated”? “What is the opposite of madness”? “Does
the very notion of ‘civilization’ – which includes the desire to be ‘civilized’ – require
the isolation of the ‘insane’”? Many other questions could be asked.
Madness in Civilization is divided into twelve substantial chapters: Confronting
Madness (10-15); Madness in the Ancient World (16-48); The Darkness and the Dawn
(48-85); Melancholie and Madnesse (86-121); Madhouses and Mad-Doctors (122-161);
Nerves and Nervousness (162-187); The Great Confinement (188-223); Degeneration
and Despair (224-267); the Demi-fous (268-289); Desperate Remedies (290-321); A
Meaningful Interlude (322-357); A Psychiatric Revolution? (358-411). The chapter
titles signal their contents and announce Scull’s broadly chronological approach to the
subject.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2017

131

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 77 [2017], No. 77, Art. 20

128

Number 77, Fall 2017

He distinguishes his subject from the history of psychiatry (which is a modern term
invented in 19th-century Germany) because ‘madness’ has always existed in all
societies; it is part of the history of humankind. He puts it this way: “Madness and its
cognates – insanity, lunacy, frenzy, mania, melancholia, hysteria and the like – were
terms in general usage” (12) throughout history and Scull’s particular interest is in “the
encounter between madness and civilization over more than two millennia” (12).
As Scull progresses through the history of madness, his scope becomes increasingly
secular. It also narrows from “madness in civilization” to “madness in society”. One
might say, therefore, that as Scull approaches modernity, his analysis becomes less
“civilizational” and more “societal”. This is in part because he is tracking a movement,
and in part because he becomes increasingly interested in medical issues per se. He
begins in the ancient (western) world, in Palestine, Greece and Rome, with a nod to
Imperial China (the Qin and Han Dynasties, 221 BCE to 220 CE) (36-47). Then he
moves to early Christian culture and the rise of Islam as he focuses on the European
Middle Ages. The references to Islam and madness are relatively brief. Though Islam
is dropped from consideration in the early modern period and beyond, what is important
here, to my mind, is that Scull recognizes Islam’s positive influence on the development
of medieval Christian institutions for the insane, especially in Spain (85).
In the earlier centuries of western history, up through the European Middle Ages,
madness was viewed primarily through a religious lens. For example, the Greeks
viewed epilepsy as a “sacred disease” (26) and said of madness, as a quotation
mistakenly attributed to Euripides suggests, that “those whom the gods would destroy
they first make mad”. But Euripides himself actually gives a more psychological
interpretation of madness when he describes how Medea, driven mad by her husband
Jason’s infidelity, kills her own children. In addition, the followers of Hippocrates
(460-357 BCE), in discarding religious explanations for the origin of madness and
emphasizing more physical origins in the body (this became the humoral theory of
illness), set the stage for the competing religious and secular interpretations of madness
throughout western history. The Romans continued in a similar vein. Both cultures
“bequeathed,” says, Scull, “both natural and supernatural accounts of the ravages of
madness to subsequent generations. Doctors and priests offered comfort and solace in
different ways” (35).
In emphasizing “supernatural accounts,” Christianity followed Hebrew tradition (for
instance the idea of the inspired prophet). Medieval Christianity is full of stories of
“divine madness” and the “raptures of Christian visionaries and saints” (36). A contrary
interpretation of the origin of madness also was prevalent: madness as demonic
possession, a view that predominated in Christianity in early modern European history.
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These weren’t the only views on madness, however, and in the early modern period, as
well as into the 19th century, madness also became something of a fashionable illness
in the guise of depression and especially melancholy, even to the point of being
associated with genius and creativity. Madness increasingly became part of the history
of art and literature, from Albrecht Dürer’s Melancholia I (1514) to Ariosto’s Orlando
furioso (1532), Shakespeare’s King Lear (circa 1608), Cervantes’ Don Quijote de la
Mancha (1615), and Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy (1652), to mention
but a few titles.
Present throughout Scull’s work is a binary view of the history of madness in
civilization. Madness is either religious or secular in origin. It is physical, originating
in the body (this is the humoral theory of madness which Dürer, for example, relied on),
or it is spiritual, originating in the psyche or soul. It is biological, originating in the
brain, or it is mental and thus accessible through psychoanalysis. The binary view is
even present in the term “schizophrenia” or “split mind.” Whichever half of the binary
one believed to be the origin of madness determined, in part, the treatment of the person
believed to be insane. The belief in demonic possession as the cause of madness led to
practices like exorcism and witch-burning. Belief in supernatural causes, left
unexplained or not directly attributed to Satan, led to more benign treatments such as
housing the insane in charitable institutions supported by the Church. The conviction
that the insane were dangerous and needed to be isolated from society led to the creation
of asylums. Scull details the establishment of such institutions in the English-speaking
world, the most famous of which was the Bethlehem Hospital, founded as a religious
charity outside London in 1247 and the antecedent of the more “secular” hospital known
as “Bedlam”. The separation of the insane from society is Michel Foucault’s principal
focus in Madness and Civilization and History of Madness. As did Foucault, Scull calls
this development “The Great Confinement” (188-223), which for him began in a
definitive way in the 18th and 19th centuries and has continued into the present. For
Foucault, in History of Madness (48), the “Great Confinement” began in Paris in 1656
with the royal decree which set up the Hôpital Général. For both Foucault and Scull,
the “Great Confinement” accelerated the development of a more secular and, in some
ways, a more inhumane treatment of madness.
That more inhumane treatment is linked, sadly, to the predominance of the view of
madness as a societal problem and a medical issue. The history of madness in the
modern era becomes increasingly the history of psychiatry, whether through the
treatment of hypochondria, hysteria and other nervous disorders, or the application of
psychoanalysis to a patient’s dreams in the treatment of neuroses. 19th and 20th-century
remedies for madness have included the inducement of fevers and malaria (300ff), the
application of electrical shocks (308ff), sensory deprivation, a particularly brutal
surgery known as transorbital lobotomy (316), and, most recently and most prevalently,
the use of psychotropic drugs.
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In sum, the view of madness has evolved from a disease of the soul or psyche to a
disease of the mind and, in the case of psychiatry and pharmacology, a disease of the
brain.
The treatment of the mentally ill has increasingly relied upon the pharmaceutical
industry. “Anti-psychotics and anti-depressants,” writes Scull, “are among the most
profitable of all drugs sold on the planet” (402). More recently, it has been suggested
that the cause of madness can be even more precisely determined. Though Scull does
not dwell on this fact, research has shown that in at least 70% of cases there is a genetic
component to a disease like schizophrenia, though a direct causal link between a gene
or particular set of genes and the disease has not been proven. The status of research in
this field is summarized by Courtney Humphries in his essay on “Probing Psychoses”
in the July-August issue (2017) of Harvard Magazine. The new neuro-scientific genetic
approach is at odds with traditional interpretations of mental illness in the West, “from
the Bible to Freud,” as Scull’s subtitle puts it, which sees it as coming from the psyche
or soul of the person.
Scull is generally dismissive of Foucault’s work, but he shares with him the view that
institutions or asylums for the insane historically have mostly been punitive in nature.
For both men, the treatment of the insane is a moral issue that says a great deal about
the society in which diagnosis and treatment take place. The issue is moral because
throughout history, Scull says, it is the society itself which must bear some
responsibility for the mental illness of individuals within it. Indeed, after more than
400 pages of detailed history, of example after example and story after story, Scull
suggests that despite all the attempts by shamans, healers, medical doctors,
psychologists, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists, we have not progressed as a society as
much as we should have. “Modern psychiatry and its potions notwithstanding,” writes
Scull, “one of the more sobering realities about serious mental illness in the twenty-first
century is that its sufferers not only die at a much younger age on average than the rest
of us (as much as twenty-five years sooner), but also that the incidence of serious illness
and mortality in this population has accelerated in recent decades. On this most basic
of levels we seem to be regressing” (406). In sum, after more than two millennia, we
still have not been able to solve the mystery of the causes of madness and its most
effective and humane treatment. Where do the roots of this mystery lie? The roots lie
somewhere, Scull says, “in the murky mix of biology and the social” (411). This is not
an optimistic conclusion, but it is probably the most appropriate one.
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I believe the praise for this book to be largely deserved. “A work of heroic scholarship,”
says Elaine Showalter of Princeton University. “Brilliant, provocative and hugely
entertaining,” says Dirk Wittenborn, author of Pharmakon. “A wonderful book,
fascinating and beautifully written,” says Sylvia Nasar, author of A Beautiful Mind.
“There is no other volume comparable to this in scope,” says David Healy, author of
Pharmageddon. “Mr. Scull’s tone is elegant, his scholarship immaculate. The story he
tells is riveting,” writes Joanna Bourke in The Wall Street Journal (April 2015). What
all these comments gloss over is the following. What distinguishes Madness in
Civilization and makes it more than ordinarily significant is the civilizational
perspective. It is there where Scull, in my view, is most illuminating and suggestive.
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William Egginton, The Man Who Invented Fiction:
How Cervantes Ushered in the Modern World. Bloomsbury, 2016
Reviewed by Ernest B. Hook

This book’s title must puzzle anyone even vaguely familiar with the history of world
literature. Did Cervantes (1547-1615) invent fiction?
Unfortunately, the author’s focus is exclusively Western. Neither “India” nor “China”
appears in the index, for instance. But China provides a tradition of fiction that long
antedates Don Quixote (published in two volumes, the first in 1605). The Water Margin
and The Romance of the Three Kingdoms appeared the 1300s of the Current Era (CE).
Journey to the West appeared about 1590. Many regard the even earlier Tale of Genji
(11th century CE) from Japan as the first psychological novel in a modern sense.*
Even restricting our focus to the West, how plausible is the title’s claim? It obviously
depends on what one means by “fiction”. In what sense was Don Quixote (book one
1605, book two 1615) different from all that went before?
First, do we include poetry or plays as fiction? On plays Egginton is ambiguous,
implying in some places he will accept them as fiction. In this case clearly Sophocles
and other notable Greek playwrights two millennia before Cervantes have clear priority.
(I think one can exclude the even earlier Iliad and Odyssey on the grounds the initial
author[s] and listeners probably regarded them as history, despite our present
perspective.) Narrative poems, clearly fictional, include Chaucer’s Canterbury’s
Tales, or Dante’s Inferno among a great number which clearly predate Cervantes.
But even limiting oneself to narrative prose from the West, the claim of the title is
incorrect. Complete Greek romantic novels survive from the 1st to the 3rd centuries of
the Current Era (CE). ** From the Romans we have among others The Satyricon by
Petronius (27- 66 CE), The Golden Ass by Apuleius (124 CE - 170 CE) and A True
Story by Lucian (125 CE- 180 CE), which despite its title is a fictional satire of false
claims. Its plot includes what would be called science fiction 2000 years later.
Egginton might claim that these were lost and not rediscovered until after Cervantes
wrote. That is not correct. For example, Cervantes himself knew of and drew on at least
one work of antiquity, The Golden Ass.
Egginton does mention at least The Decameron, 1345, by Boccacio (1313 – 1376),
Utopia 1516 by Thomas More (1478 -- 1535), and Gargantua and
Pantagruel (appearing in print from about 1532 up to 1564) by Rabelais (1490 – 1553).
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He concedes priority in a sense to Boccacio because, in the Decameron, he created the
form of the novella. But that along with the works of the others remain insufficient
because “his [Boccacio’s] characters remain only objects in this world”. Presumably
this means the reader has little or no access to the “inner life” of the characters.
Cervantes by contrast plumbs the depth of character and shifts fluidly among different
points of view. Don Quixote constantly leads us “to question the intent behind the
descriptions, the difference between the masks the characters show to one another and
the emotions that animate them.”
If this is the modern (Western) world created by any literature, then Cervantes did not
invent it in 1605! Novelist or no novelist, Shakespeare did it starting 15 years earlier.
(Hamlet appeared no later than 1602.) Egginton rather grudgingly concedes
Shakespeare’s importance, but only in a footnote at the end of the book, where he
defends the primacy he gives to Cervantes because the latter “created a more potent
vehicle for influencing culture and thought.” (My emphasis.) I dispute this, and wonder
if Egginton knows how widely Shakespeare has influenced the world.
But the “modern world” aside, what does Egginton mean precisely when he claims
Cervantes invented “fiction”? He means Western modern (non-dramatic) fiction, i.e.
the modern novel, hardly the modern world. One may forgive a critic for a little literary
braggadocio, but Egginton’s title goes too far.
Many writers and literary critics (and politicians and advertisers) use language sloppily.
Others speak and write as if they believe they have a right to take license with language.
Because language evolves, these actors may think they are justifiably hastening the
process. They may not go as far as Humpty Dumpty who openly asserts his sense of
dogmatic entitlement. (“When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean” nor
moreover, will you know the meaning “till I tell you”!) But, one may ask them, where
is the boundary between a clearly understood new use, a misleading use, and a misuse?
At what point does misleading or misuse of language become dangerous in the sense
George Orwell discussed in his essay “Politics and the English Language”? As long as
an author makes clear directly, or at least by implication, that the exaggeration or the
distortion of truth embodied by “literary license” s/he employs, is in fact such, and the
reader understands that, then we avoid such corruption. But often we may not.
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Egginton refers often to the equivalent of “truths in fiction”, as e.g. “a novel giving
access to a truth otherwise inaccessible.” Thus allegedly, such fiction enables moral
questions to be explored that could not otherwise be. Certainly, prose fiction, as well
as plays and narrative poetry, may convey “truths.” John Steinbeck’s novel the Grapes
of Wrath (1939) — or the film, the play, or the opera — presented movingly the
poignant bleak effects of the Dust Bowl and the Depression on human lives. But vivid
as it was, one hardly needed fiction to have access to these facts. Steinbeck made vivid
the despair of those affected. But no one needed fiction to be aware of that.
Fiction can help us find truth. But it may not. It can as readily convey lies as well as
truths, and lead us to believe things that are untrue! Nazis’ children’s fiction portrayed
Jews as moral monsters. Some novels have glorified anti-semitism and race hatred.
Fiction in Communist Poland served the Party’s ideology. So how is the reader or
observer to know which fiction lies for the sake of propaganda in service to some
ideology, or, for other reasons, deliberately presents harmful untruths in the guise of
“fiction,” and which does not? It may be obvious. But it may not be.
There is in a location I cannot relocate in this book reference to the “glorious art of facts
that aren’t.”
In two lines Shakespeare in his 138th sonnet put this notion better and more honestly
than Cervantes and Egginton:
“When my love swears that she is made of truth,
I do believe her, though I know she lies…”
There is no ambiguity in this paradox. The poet acknowledges he loves the maiden so
much, he will accept her lies knowing them for what they are.
Setting aside the courtesy of taking the title at face value with the knowledge that it is
exaggerated bluff, let us examine the contents within.
We find a vivid biography of both Cervantes (1547-1616) intermingled with a
discussion of his creation. Cervantes had a remarkable life, full of incident and which
itself could be the nidus of a great historical novel. His five year military career resulted
in extensive battlefield exposure, maiming wounds (he lost use of his left arm), long
hospitalization, and ultimately capture and then enslavement for another five years in
Algiers before ransom by his family. Despite tribulations for the sake of the State and
cause to which he was devoted, he received no financial reward for what he suffered
for his sincere patriotism. Even at age 58, with the publication and immediate success
of the first volume of Don Quixote in 1605 in the twilight of his life, he still endured
financial difficulties, despite the fact the work was immediately and widely successful,
and translated into many languages. He had 11 more years before dying in 1616, the
same year in which the second volume of the work appeared.
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Egginton starts a richly imagined chronicle with a scene of the raucous enjoyment of a
reading aloud of Don Quixote in a low Spanish inn. This along with a large number of
other descriptions and comments are simply speculative. “Cervantes might well have
looked up and reflected…,” after some event “…friends likely gathered at a restaurant
[with him]…,” here “Cervantes may well have met…,” “…it is hard to believe this is
not how Cervantes felt…,” “…undoubtedly he felt relief… ,” etc. My favorite is the
image reported as fact of Cervantes on a hot August day in the dusty streets of
Valladolid clutching a heavy package (the manuscript of the work) with his one useful
hand. It was likely dusty in Valladolid (average rainfall is about 0.9 inches for the
month) and maybe it was hot that August day or maybe it wasn’t (the average high
August temperature in this era of global warming in that city is 86 and low 56), but how
does Egginton know that Cervantes and not a friend didn’t carry it for him, especially
if it was heavy. And we are frustrated by being told that while he stepped gingerly over
blood and offal in the streets, we don’t know where he is going, although we are left to
infer the package contains the manuscript of volume one of Don Quixote and it is being
taken to a scribe to make a fair copy for the publisher. These speculative imaginations
in a work of biography and literary criticism are signs of a novelist manqué. I suspect
the author has been trying too hard to emulate Cervantes in attempts to probe aspects
of his mind and life to which he really has no access.
Egginton, in discussing the variable viewpoints Cervantes creates in his novel, notes
the similarity of Jorge Borges’ 20th century multi-perspectival approach to fiction.
Borges, who was a great admirer of Don Quixote, had great fun writing, and his public
reading, reviews of non-existent books. One such was of a work by an-of-course nonexistent Frenchman who, Borges reports, recreated parts of Don Quixote, word for
word, not by copying but through his own experience. Yet though the Frenchman’s
work is identical, Borges’ review of his non-existent book pronounces it better than the
original.
Borges and Cervantes enjoy the mischievous approach, as do we readers. And also does
Egginton. Indeed, every once in a while, I got the sense he was enjoying playing a joke
or two on his own readers in his text. Perhaps that accounts for his title.
_________________________________________________
* I thank Yunzhong Shu for calling my attention to these works.
** I thank Michael Palencia-Roth for calling my attention to the Greek Romances. This led me to
discovery of the Latin novels.
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Johan Galtung, World Politics of Peace and War. New York: Hampton Press,
2015.
Reviewed by Michael Andregg
This 2015 book published by Hampton Press, New York, NY, has 192 pages of text in
12 chapters, an appendix on trends and predictions, an index, 5 figures and 22 tables.
Its author is Johan Galtung, an undoubted world leader in development of “peace
studies,” an emerging field, which I have watched emerge. The book is based on a
series of lectures he taught at Princeton and other universities from 1985-2000. He has
reflected deeply on his geopolitical theory of peace and war since then of course, in
many venues not least the Transcend, Global, on-line Peace University, which he
founded. But some of Galtung’s chapters have an ancient air about them today, because
so much history has passed to challenge his visionary prescriptions.
Chapters:
1. The Four Worlds: A Classification
2. The Four Worlds: A Characterization
3. The Four Worlds: The Six Relations Among Them
4. Inside the First World
5. Inside the Fourth World
6. On the Causes of Terrorism and Their Removal
7. Relation-Oriented Approach
8. Structure-Oriented Approach I: The State System
9. Structure-Oriented Approach II: The Center-Periphery System
10. Diversity, Symbiosis, and a Moral Imperative
11. On the Abolition of War and Other Social Evils
12. Visioning a Peaceful World
Galtung’s conclusion on page 189 begins with “Almost 40 years have passed since the
12-part framework for this book was written as a 12-week University course.” I have
concluded after reading the book through that lens, therefore, that his latest among many
books is better as a historical document on Galtung’s thinking than as a literal
prescription for change today.
One cannot doubt that Professor Galtung is daring! His Appendix lists 50 predictions
about the world written in 1988 for a World Futures conference in Beijing, China. To
publish such a list 27 years later for review is to risk all your errors being obvious. He
concludes this appendix with a brief paragraph claiming that about 48 of the 50 have
come true. Well that is debatable. Many are quite broad and some are truly visionary,
but others have clearly not come true.
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I am going to illustrate that in some detail so I want to acknowledge again the
undeniable and considerable contributions of Professor Galtung to social science theory
and especially to peace studies, even though so many of his predictions were … less
than fully accurate. I will run though some that I find most noteworthy. By all means,
judge for yourselves.
3. Galtung predicts “ever more pressure on empty land in Siberia, Alaska, Canada,
parts of the United States” … and on around the less populated parts of our
world. Well that is easy, and on the positive side, Galtung explicitly considers
demographics, which are very powerful forces in international affairs, but are
also often neglected by scholars who want to avoid controversy. On the negative
side, Galtung concludes therefore that “Increasingly, this will mean the end of
nation-states.” We certainly see failing states today, but end of nation-states? I
do not think so.
6. He predicts an “Accelerating deterioration of moral standards.” Amen to that.
But have not all elders predicted this since the beginning of time?
7. He then predicts an “Accelerating deterioration of intellectual standards.”
Little doubt there.
9. He predicts “A changing world economic power composition.” Well, of course
the composition of world economic or other powers is always changing.
Galtung predicted a “major increase for China and the Soviet Union.” He was
obviously right about the former and wrong about the latter. This is a recurring
pattern of his predictions; something very general which is almost inevitable,
followed by details that are sometimes right, sometimes wrong, and sometimes
very wrong. But again, I give him considerable credit for daring to a) make the
predictions, and b) publish them decades later so we can see for ourselves how
accurate his model was.
13. “The peace movement will continue influencing the discourse.” In his dreams.
To this, life-long participant in the US ‘peace movement’ this appears to be pure
rosy-glasses illusion since the peace movement I observe has been quite
marginalized since the Vietnam War. Yes, if you consider any tiny thing to be
influence, once in a great while we accomplish microscopic changes in policy.
But mostly, powers that be ignore even multi-million person protests as
insignificant irritants even before major mistakes like the US invasion of Iraq
on false “intelligence” in 2003. For a non-US example, consider how feeble the
“peace community” in Israel has become.
14. Galtung predicts that 1992 will be a “take-off for major movements.” I was
there; it was not.
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15. “America may give up its image as the leader of the free world.” Well,
predictions that have “may” in their structure are impossible to falsify. But what
I see is a President Trump and “America First” (again). Neither looks eager to
give up our images of leadership in the world.
16. Here, Galtung claims that the Soviet Union “may give up their image as a unique
and chosen country.” Well the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, but President
Putin of Russia seems keen to restore the prestige of imperial Russia, not to
abandon its version of national exceptionalism.
17. “The superpower character of the European Community will be increasingly
clear.” Actually, the EC appears to be fragmenting as we watch it in 2017, again
to me at least.
18. “Africa south of the Sahara possibly to be recolonized by the EC.” Well
possibly, but not visibly to me. China might be colonizing Africa
economically, but not the EU or the EC.
19. “War in the Western Pacific over maritime resources is possible.” Again,
anything is possible. But I think Galtung is more prescient here, because we are
certainly seeing more tensions over the South China Sea and other resource
issues.
20. “ASEAN to emerge as a major power with 10 member states.” ASEAN is the
Association of South East Asian Nations, which indeed includes 10 states and
is fairly important economically. But a “major power?” Not remotely in
military terms. It is dwarfed by China, Japan, India and even Pakistan if
Pakistan were to get really upset with its >100 nuclear warheads and missiles.
21. “Unification of divided nations will proceed in the 1990’s.” Galtung was right
about Germany, but wrong about the Koreas and China (by which he meant
reunification of Taiwan with mainland China). Once again, Galtung presents
an attractive generalization followed by both accurate and non-accurate detailed
predictions.
23. “The UN is in for a major revival as pax americana and pax sovietica are
coming to an end, with no pax nipponica or sinica emerging.” The UN appears
to me in major decline. Galtung is certainly correct that no pax anything has
emerged to replace the UN. But he also ends this section with the amazing
sentence “Been solved.” No, the war puzzle has not “been solved.”
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30. “The debt crisis will be solved politically not economically.” Well I certainly
hope someone solves those crises, both domestically and internationally. But I
do not know any economist who believes that either has been solved today in
any fundamental way.
32. “More power to academics all over the world.” What a hoot of a prediction!
Which world is he observing? Galtung follows this with “A major result of the
education revolution all over the world will be the near impossibility of keeping
the (near) Ph.D. class out of power.” This prediction also seems to contradict
his prediction #7 noted earlier.
35. “Glasnost and perestroika will come to the United States.” I cannot wait, but
will not hold my breath on that.
36. “The Soviet Union will experience dynamism as never before.” Well, as noted
before, the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. So that is not happening. But
in Galtung’s defense, even the CIA failed to note the deep decay that
undermined the Soviet Union while they were building ever-bigger nuclear
bombs. Remember, visionaries who dare to predict run exceptional risks –
Galtung has accomplished many great things even though his visions are too
rosy to me.
37. “Palestine will become independent.” No commentary needed there. Perhaps,
someday, we pray. But not in any future I can see through the fogs of
uncertainty that bedevil all forecasters. My formal prediction for that area is
eventual genocide or more likely, ethnic “cleansing.” I do hope that Galtung is
more correct than I am about that.
42. “There will be more KGB and CIA defectors.” Well the last KGB defector I
know was assassinated in London (Alexander Litvinenko). The KGB’s
successors, Russia’s “FSB” and “SVR,” seem equally brutal. More recent CIA
leakers have been put in jail than in the past, and I do not know of any recent
CIA “defectors.” So this prediction seems very optimistic to me.
Therefore, I conclude by applauding again the many accomplishments of a true
visionary, Johan Galtung, but recommend the book only as one of historic interest on
his thinking rather than as a formula for the peaceful world we all desire. (Well, most
of us desire that.) One recurring failure of my rosy-eyed peace friends is failing to deal
with those who actually love wars, and start them.
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Scott L. Montgomery and Daniel Chirot, The Shape of the New: Four Big Ideas
and How They Made the Modern World. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2015.
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
Daniel Chirot is the Herbert J. Ellison Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies in the
University of Washington’s Henry Jackson School of International Studies. Chirot’s
most recent book, co-authored with Scott Montgomery, is The Shape of the New: Four
Big Ideas and How They Made the Modern World (Princeton University Press, 2015.)
Chirot’s other books have been about genocide, ethnic conflicts, tyranny, social change,
and Eastern Europe.
In a digital world of quickly passing opinions and “points of view,” how is it possible
that just a handful of deep ideas could still be dominant? That is the challenge of the
authors of this book. They claim to have hit upon just four deep ideas that have shaped
our world, its economics, politics, and notions of freedom since the late 18th century.
Scott Montgomery and Daniel Chirot focus on the main ideas that were authored by
Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Charles Darwin, and the combined thought of Thomas
Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. Although these ideas and the people from whom
they came were not the only shapers of the modern world, they were surely among the
most important. The authors not only explain the ideas, but explore the characters and
times of these five intellectual innovators.
Adam Smith (a Scot who lived just before the industrial revolution, 1723-1790)
was the first to explore how enlightened self-interest was the best guide to economic
prosperity, and laid the basis for modern economic thinking. These ideas provided
a justification and guide for the capitalism that was starting to transform the world
and is still with us today.
As well as it worked, Smith was wise enough to warn that for such a system to avoid
enormous and unfair inequality, capitalists and the wealthy must have strong moral
underpinnings. Smith’s second book: The Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, is
much better known than his first, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), which
deals with the sorts of values that we see even today in the new popularity of
philanthropy being promoted by the best of today’s billionaires. The key to Smith
is that he was a moral philosopher, not readily found among economists.
The authors conclude that free and open markets in economic matters and free
markets in the expression of political ideologies are essential for democracy.
Freedom and political liberty cannot exist without both.
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Karl Marx, born in 1818, was a difficult, irritable man who raged against the world
he lived in; yet he created a theory for how it would one day become a near
paradise.” In identifying the inequality inevitable in untrammeled Capitalism, he
imagined a world in which inequality would be impossible, thus conceiving of a
utopia. Utopias, unfortunately, are a joke of Plato who selected the word to describe
his imaginary Republic, Utopia meaning “no place.”
Although Marx, a baptized Protestant, was hostile to religion, including his father’s
religion at birth (Judaism), the system he created functioned as a virtual religion and
his works serve as a kind of gospel. No other thinker of the 19th century was ever
the source of such transformative, life-and-death power. “What is so astonishing
about Marx, however, is that his influence led to the wholesale restructuring of
societies, with unparalleled consequences, achieved purely through the ideas he
expressed in his writing.”
Marx’s big idea was Dialectical Materialism as the Theory of History. He believed
that the economic system of a society determines all else: its political and legal
institutions, cultural values, and the very forms of daily life. This was belief in a
purely materialistic interpretation of history affecting every aspect of human
existence.
The Communist Manifesto of 1848 predicted that once the industrial proletariat was
organized, it would sweep away the existing order by means of revolution and make
itself the ruling class. Marx died well before this happened in Russia.
After his death, his colleague (and economic patron) Friedrich Engels, assembled
materials from Marx’s and his own writings to publish Das Kapital, considered the
gospel of Communism. A British scholar of Marxism, David McLellan, noted: “For
a book which has a reputation for length and difficulty, Capital is an unlikely best
seller.” This enormous and turgid book has been translated into more than 50
languages and has been one of the most widely quoted books of the last hundred
years.
The authors conclude: Karl Marx’s theories encompassed much of what was both
good and dangerous about the Enlightenment. He sought scientific rigor, idealized
progress, and wanted to liberate mankind from what he saw as oppressive economic
systems. But his utopian vision resulted in a whole series of nightmarish, ultimately
failed political systems. Fury was present at its birth, and may yet come to life again
in another incarnation.
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Charles Darwin was a gentle and conventional Victorian gentleman who never
intended to pull down centuries of belief in a fixed, divinely ordained universe built
by a benevolent God. Yet his major opus, Origin of Species, not only changed the
life sciences, but unintentionally provided fodder for more sinister ideas about
“survival of the fittest” as a justification for some terrible economic and political
systems that emerged later. Darwin’s great idea is that man evolved through natural
selection and random mutation. For religionists that has been a hard pill to swallow,
and this is why Darwin’s science is still being rejected by those who refuse to give
up the older view of a God-ordered stability. But here again is an idea, or a
systematized science of how creation really works, that has changed the world.
Democracy, as found in the Jefferson-Hamilton Debates, is an extraordinary set of
ideas centered on notions of human freedom and ways to preserve it. Yet Hamilton
and Jefferson strongly differed on how the core values of the new American
experiment could be preserved.
Modern democracy harks back to ancient Athens. That extraordinarily innovative
regime had some rough procedures which we could broadly call democratic; but it
was limited to native born, male, property owners. Montgomery and Chirot note
that it was a very long time between the maturation of those ideas and the rebirth of
democracy in the modern world on the American continent. That it happened there,
in such a primitive, non-urban setting and in a colonial outpost of the British Empire,
has always been a puzzle. The authors give a good account of the political ideas
that were then percolating in Europe and American access to them. It was from
those ideas that our liberal democracy of today evolved. It could not as easily have
happened in Europe, with its authoritarian traditions and hereditary aristocracy.
Although there was a problem in the American South, which looked more like a
hereditary aristocracy and a slave labor force, Southern aristocrats such as Jefferson
and the northern Harvard-educated lawyer John Adams, accompanied by the
entrepreneurial genius of Alexander Hamilton, debated for decades what the nature
of their new country should be.
Jefferson and Hamilton disagreed on the size and responsibilities of government.
Jefferson believed that the new country should be in the hands of independent
yeomen farmers and a weak central government while Hamilton believed that the
country needed a strong central government. This included a central bank, to
maintain order and encourage development. Their debates illuminate issues that to
date have not been completely resolved. But what they both agreed on was that
there must be rule of law universally accepted with the separation of powers to
prevent tyranny and corruption, and that there is a need for a diligent citizenry that
is literate, hardworking and informed by the values of the Protestant Reformation.
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This chapter is an excellent exploration of America’s earliest years and it casts light
on the varieties of democracy in the world today. Not all democracies are the same.
A liberal democracy differs from an illiberal one. In the latter, the people may vote,
but how they vote scarcely matters because an autocrat rules. We see many such
around the world today.
The idea of democracy matters, and has created a country that is, and may, in its
ideals, continue to be, the best example of how a country should be run. But
American progress has not been linear. It has had setbacks and emergencies (such
as the Civil War and some near brushes with totalitarian ideas). Yet, we have
expanded the rights and duties of citizens to include women, blacks and many who
are not property owners. No idea that sees the light of day and becomes influential
lacks its opposition. Ideas that change traditional patterns of human culture threaten
people vested in the older system. This is certainly true today.
The Enlightenment proposed that humans be guided by reason, not by tradition. It
was a system that promoted science, the exploration of the world without heeding
the mythological or religious explanations that were accepted as truth for millennia.
But the danger of an Enlightenment can be that all traditions are swept away, both
good and bad, with new, untested ideas put forth as truth.
Nonetheless, the Enlightenment has given rise to a modern world in which many
miseries of the past (starvation, plagues, slavery) have become largely, if not
entirely, eliminated. It has given us cultures in which every adult can voice
preferences about issues in their daily lives. It has also produced some violent
ideologies that are devoted to the destruction of this democratic world order.
A group of outliers in the United States are populist believers in extreme Christian
evangelical fundamentalism. This is our most resistant sector to the ideas of the
Enlightenment.
There have been three other major opponents of the Enlightenment: Fascism and
totalitarian dictatorships (the Nazis and the Japanese in World War, and formerly,
the totalitarian Soviet Union), and today, a backlash that has pushed archaic Islam
into a new form of totalitarian domination.
All of these hark back to darker times, yet their practitioners are not reluctant to use
the sciences and material benefits of the Enlightenment without also adopting the
modern political institutions that created rule-by-law.
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Two of these enemies of modern democracy, the Fascists and Communists, have
lost in conflicts with the United States and its democratic allies. The third, a violent
ideology that marries literalist Islam with fascism, is now roiling order around the
world. The proponents of it have declared war on modern ideas and institutions,
but it does not seem likely that they will prevail for long.
I cannot praise this book enough. Ideas are indeed the stuff of culture and how they
have played out in the 20th and 21st century is a matter of paramount interest to us all.
Although Montgomery and Chirot do not say it, they have identified and articulated a
vital, core set of values, unique to the Western world. In the days to come, we can
expect them to face serious opposition around the world. As our authors point out in
their chapter on the “Making of Democracy,” after the emergence of a number of new
democratic states in the first third of the 20th century, the process stalled so that by
2014 only forty percent of the world’s population now live in fully democratic societies.
Will there be a new, fourth wave of democratization? Present signs are not favorable.
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J. D. Vance, Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis.
New York: HarperCollins, 2016.
Reviewed by Laina Farhat-Holzman
The growing gap in the traditional trajectory from poverty to middle class may have
less to do with color than with culture. We can see during this present election process
the anger and distress of poor white men, flocking to the rallies of candidate Donald
Trump. These men, who were once doing well during the post-WWII era, when our
country was a manufacturing giant, are now victims of a changing economy.
Their fathers, working in these factories, supported families and sent children to college,
thanks to strong unions and good industry profits. But as the US helped the rest of the
world to recover from their wartime disasters and helped open up China, some of our
industries couldn’t compete.
Lesser-educated white men found themselves competing with black men for jobs in the
diminishing industries. Even more insulting to many of them was competition from
women. Add to this a flood of immigrants, some taking agricultural work that nobody
else wanted, and others arriving with skills that were welcomed by the newer industries.
J. D. Vance admits in his Introduction that it is absurd for a 31-year-old to write a
memoir, usually the fruit of a distinguished long life. However, his memoir tracks an
anomaly: a child from a dysfunctional “hillbilly” family growing up poor in a rust-belt
Ohio town whose steel industry had gone to China, a child who managed not only to go
to college, but to get a law degree from Yale University. His memoir, however, is less
about his achievement than about the culture of failure and violence that darkened his
childhood.
Although his focus is on the Scots-Irish who people West Virginia and Kentucky
(greater Appalachia) who then migrated to the mid-west industrial towns, his
observations apply similarly to other groups living in poverty: Blacks in inner cities or
as sharecroppers in the South, and second-generation Hispanics living in gang-poisoned
urban enclaves.
All of these communities have good and bad traits. The Scots-Irish maintain an oldfashioned adherence to family, religion, and politics. They believe in loyalty and
dedication to family and country. But on the negative side, they dislike and suspect
those who differ from themselves in color, behavior, or how they talk.
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Greater Appalachia has changed from Democrat to Republican since Reagan. Also,
from the optimism of the working-class people achieving middle class, they have
descended into low social mobility and poverty, divorce, and drug addiction. The entire
region is in misery.
He notes that his people are more pessimistic about their futures than blacks and
Latinos, many of whom suffer from poverty too. Social isolation that derived from
Appalachia has been passed down to their children. Their religion has changed from
the earlier Methodism that offered mutual aid to highly emotional churches that offer
no support. Many have dropped out of the labor force as coal mining and factories
declined, choosing not to relocate for better opportunities.
He notes: “Our men suffer from a peculiar crisis of masculinity in which some of the
very traits that our culture inculcates make it difficult to succeed in a changing world.”
Is this not the same crisis in masculinity suffered by inner-city Blacks and Hispanics?
This crisis is leading to a rise in divorces, one-parent families, and a plague of
irresponsibility among men. The Protestant Ethic seems to have flown over this region
leaving many without a future. The consequence is dysfunction, violence (quick fists,
knives, and guns), and drugs now joining alcohol abuse as a killer of stability.
We, as participants in our governance, need to understand the nature of this “White
Men’s Rage,” as well as its counterpart in the “Black Lives” movement. As I read this
book, I see that much of this rage is misdirected, but these angry men (and it is mostly
men) are not seeing this.
The patriotism that used to characterize this population has declined and been replaced
by distrust of government. Vance notes, for example, that trust of the media that used
to unite us (newspapers, journals, radio, and television) has been replaced by a culture
of internet conspiracy theories instead. The widespread belief that our president is not
America born or is a Muslim is more a reflection of envy than racism.
None of Vance’s high school classmates attended an Ivy League school. “Barack
Obama attended two of them and excelled at both. He is brilliant, wealthy, and speaks
like a constitutional law professor — which, of course he is. Nothing about him bears
any resemblance to the people I admired growing up: His accent — clean, perfect,
neutral — is foreign; his credentials are so impressive that they’re frightening; he made
his life in Chicago, a dense metropolis; and he conducts himself with a confidence that
comes from knowing that the modern American meritocracy was built for him. Of
course, Obama overcame adversity in his own right — adversity familiar to many of us
— but that was long before any of us knew him.”
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This subculture does not believe that the modern American meritocracy is for them.
And yet this one young man, J. D. Vance, through sheer luck, was able to survive his
family’s dysfunction. He was able to do this thanks to a pair of fiercely principled
grandparents who pushed him to excel at school, attain a work ethic through part-time
jobs and to serve in the Marine Corps. He argues that there is far too little mentoring
of the young in working-class or inner city populations — mentoring concerning the
management of time, appearance, and money that is natural in Middle Class families.
Vance’s book makes it possible to see the virtues and failings of people who might
otherwise be known to us only when they hoot and holler at a Trump rally. Of course,
some of their troubles are external: changes in technology, social norms, and global
issues beyond their control. But Vance urges that the qualities that have shown
themselves to be the best for us: loyalty, family love, responsibility, and
industriousness, can go far to make a better future.
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CCR Style Guide for Submitted Manuscripts

Begin the document with title, author’s name, author’s position (e.g. professor, lecturer,
graduate student, independent scholar), author’s academic department and affiliation, if
any, and the article’s abstract (maximum 200 words). Do not include page numbers,
headers, or footers. These will be added by the editors. Do not utilize automatic
formatting for indents, space following subheads and paragraphs, etc.
Write your article in English. Submit your manuscript, including tables, figures,
appendices, etc., as a single Microsoft Word or PDF file. Page size should be 8.5 x 11
inches. All margins (left, right, top and bottom) should be 1-inch, including your tables
and figures. Single space your text. Use a single column layout with both left and right
margins justified. Main body text font: 12 pt. Times New Roman. If figures are
included, use high-resolution figures, preferably encoded as encapsulated PostScript.
Maximum length of article is 20 pages including endnotes, bibliography, etc.
Do not indent paragraphs. A line space should follow each paragraph. Subheads are in
bold, flush left, separated by a line space above and below. Long quotations should be
placed in a separate paragraph with a .5-inch hanging indent, no quotation marks, and
preceded and followed by one-line spaces.
Except for common foreign words and phrases, the use of foreign words and phrases
should be avoided. Authors should use proper, standard English grammar. Suggested
guides include The Elements of Style by William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White; and The
Chicago Manual of Style, University of Chicago Press.
Underlining in the text is discouraged. Whenever possible use italics to indicate text
that you wish to emphasize. Use italics for book titles, movie titles, etc and for foreign
terms. Using colored text is prohibited. However, we encourage authors to take
advantage of the ability to use color in the production of figures, maps, etc. To the
extent possible, tables and figures should appear in the document near where they are
referenced in the text. Large tables or figures should be put on pages by themselves.
Avoid the use of overly small type in tables. In no case should tables or figures be in a
separate document or file. All tables and figures must fit within 1-inch margins on all
sides, in both portrait and landscape view.
Footnotes should appear at the bottom of the page on which they are referenced rather
than at the end of the paper. Footnotes should be in 10 pt. Times New Roman, single
spaced, and flush left, ragged right. There should be a footnote separator rule (line).
Footnote numbers or symbols in the text must follow, rather than precede, punctuation.
Excessively long footnotes are probably better handled in an appendix.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol77/iss77/20

152

Review: Full Issue

Comparative Civilizations Review

149

The subhead References (denoting Bibliography, Works Cited, etc.) should appear right
after the end of the document, beginning on the last page if possible. They should be
flush left, ragged right. Use the format with which you are most comfortable, such as
APA (American Psychological Association), MLA (Modern Language Association),
Chicago/Turabian.
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Call for Papers
48th ISCSC International Conference
http:www.iscsc.org
Suzhou (Soochow) University, Suzhou, Jiangsu, China
June 15 -17, 2018
Civilizational Analysis and the Enhancement of Inter-Civilizational Understanding
Thematic Sessions
Comparative Models of Economic Development
Comparative Legal Histories
Comparing Literatures in China and the West
Asian-American International Relations
Asian Culture, Values and the West
China, the West and Globalization
Comparative Environmental Protection and Survival of Civilization
Histories of Science and Institutional Development
Papers are invited on the above topics and any other topics with civilizational relevance.
Send Abstracts of up to 300 words describing your proposed paper by (date to be
determined), in MS WORD to the Program Chair, Laina Farhat-Holzman
Lfarhat102@aol.com. Abstracts submitted in Mandarin should be sent to Program
Committee Member, Shi (Irving) Yuanhui, Vice Dean at yuanhuishi08@aliyun.com.
All Abstracts must include your name, contact email, phone number and affiliation.
Please see the ISCSC website http://www.iscsc.org for news on conference updates,
details, registration, logistics and transportation suggestions. The website will be
updated as new information becomes available.
Our hosts at Soochow University are Professor Fang Han Wen, Director of Comparative
Literature and Comparative Civilizations, and Professor Shi Yuanhui, Vice Dean
School of Foreign Languages. Professor Fang is the Vice President of Coordination to
China.
Conference participants should plan to arrive in Suzhou (Soochow) by June 14th, one
day prior to the initial conference date for hotel check-in. Our hosts have arranged for
us to stay at the Gloria Plaza Hotel in Suzhou, a 5-minute walk to Soochow University
where conference sessions will be held. The reduced conference price per night is
approximately 400 RMB (approximately $60 USD). Do not make hotel reservations at
this time. Further information will be provided soon regarding travel recommendations
and how hotel reservations are to be made.
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